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ABSTRACT: 
This dissertation investigates the general use of language on 
instrumental music. Three types of linguistic usage are 
identified: the metamusical, the systemic, and the 
metasystemic. 
In the first section, various forms of the metamusical -
description, attempts at "recreation" and formal analyses of 
music - are considered, and are all shown to fail in different 
ways. The limitations of existing systems for negotiation 
between language and music are also brought to the fore. 
Failure is redefined, and shown to be intrinsically related to 
the tradition of musical ineffability, which finds its most 
extreme development in the notion of "absolute music". 
The second section attempts to provide a systemic 
discourse which takes the failure of language into account. 
Drawing on Lacan's imaginary/symbolic distinction and on 
Derrida's notion of the frame, it sets forth a construct 
called "the word of music", which is itself an impossible 
point of aspiration, but which manages to account for some of 
the dialectical complexities involved in systemic negotiation 
with a non-denotative form such as mus~c. 
The thi~d section entails metasystemic analysis proper; 
in other words, metamusical and systemic sources are analyzed 
and assessed. This part consists of a passage-by-passage 
translation of eight pages from Thomas Mann's Doctor Faustus, 
in which the fictional character Wendell Kretschmar delivers a 
lecture on and performance of Beethoven's Opus 111. Various 
metamusical and systemic issues are discussed: it is shown 
that Mann draws on a large number of established 
musicoliterary traditions, with his sources ranging from early 
Beethoven biographies to the writings of Theodor Adorno. 
Particular attention is given to the Romantic "Beethoven myth" 
and to Adorno's analysis of the composer's late music. Mann's 
negotiation between two partly opposing trends in the 
presentation of Opus 111 as an "ultimate" or "absolute" 
composition - the one based in a Romantic discourse of musical 
transcendence and the other originating in Adorno's 
identification of a tendency towards alienation in Beethoven's 
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The experience of music has often been explored in language. 
As it is only in historical times that we can assess how music 
has been understood before, our understanding of the function 
and experience of music already entails looking at language 
itself. Often, in writings about music, we also come across 
the need to define how the writers' own medium of 
communication relates to music. What this dissertation will 
set out to do is both to explore how others have tried to 
theorize, explicitly or implicitly, the links between language 
and music, and to propose certain other ways of doing so. 
It soon becomes obvious that the relationship between 
language and music is at any given moment a fairly precarious 
one. This relationship presents a "problem" in so far as the 
goal of any critical investigation is to find unambiguous 
links, to cast expression in a single mould, to provide an 
iterable system of organization, or to recreate the identity 
of one form by means of translation into the other. Theorists 
often invoke the notion of origins: music and poetry are said 
to have a mutual basis in song, and must therefore function in 
similar ways. Such an explanation however turns out to be.no 
more useful than identifying any other historical position of 
language-music interaction; the presence of mutual influence 
says little about the "nature'' of each. The emancipation and 
remarkable extension of instrumental music during the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, on the other hand, does 
entail an extreme development. Here, one system could explore 
its ability to rely on its own means and attempt to gauge its 
identity by positing the limits of its own expression against 
that of the other. Separation, in other words, provides a 
degree of analytical clarity: language and music come, in 
their motion towards self-definition, to be "accessible'' in 
those terms they dictate from within. 
viii 
·It is for this reason that the link between language and 
instrumental music - here., "western art music" 1 - is a more 
practical and valuable object of analysis than song or opera. 
The verbal meanings which musical units acquire or create for 
the first time within opera can by no means be excluded from, 
or have their origin pinned down within instrumental music 
"proper". This is primarily because the purity of each form is 
already made impossible by the very act of association itself. 
Yet looking at these meanings only within the operatic context 
limits music to a large degree to its conventional song or 
dramatic context. 
What becomes obvious, then, is the need for an approach 
that is dialectical - one that acknowledges temporal 
instability, mutual constitutiveness, corruption of pure forms 
- rather than one that attempts to maintain the objective 
ascendancy of language over that which it describes, or one 
that unifies music and language in a crude manner. The 
dialectic of history or society - which tends to side with 
language - can in this manner be incorporated into a motion 
that is more subtle, that branches outwards and alternatively 
allows each of music and language a certain independence by 
associating the other in turn with more "objective" social or 
historical factors. Again, it is through separation that the 
two forms can be seen dialectically; whereas it is possible to 
identify dialectical interchanges between parts in song, this 
amounts largely to an observation of authorial intent, which 
says little about the parts themselves. 
Theorizing the Preposition 
What do we mean by "Language on Music"? The apparent 
implication of directionality (for we are remaining, in the 
most banal of senses, true to the analytic form employed here) 
already suggests a self-limitation. 
ix 
We can think about the preposition here as an essential 
third term. It fills a mediating position, relating the two 
topics in the very simplest manner. Such simplicity is of 
course also the most effective generator of ideology, and thus 
we find within three words a variety of polemical positions: 
language about music (the two are distant, but language can 
comfortably stride into new territory - the commonsense or 
uncritical approach); language for music (music cannot stand 
on its own and needs a successful counterpart in the more 
efficient sphere); language in music (song, opera, program 
music, score directions); language after music (temporal 
inequality, Bergsonism); language from music (music comes to 
its full expression in its return to language, the school of 
Wagner, logocentrism, inspiration); language through music 
(language is enhanced, given greater appeal through music); 
language around music (words can never identify what is 
intrinsic to music, but can frame it); language towards music 
(music as the ineffable, Hegelianism, apocalyptic motion) . The 
list could go on, and the difficulty of selecting the most 
appropriate middle term lies exactly in the fact that each 
preposition named is both valid and limited to the subject 
matter that is related to its goal. 
To an extent, the preposition "on" reflects all of the 
others; it is, in fact, not temporally unidirectional - the 
copy on CD sleeves, writing on fictional pieces of music, the 
biography industry (all of which "pre-create" the experience 
of music) attest to this. The subject of this dissertation is 
the language that is intended to result separately alongside a 
composition that already exists - language which claims to 
have an "object", even though the true distance from its 
counterpart is essentially impossible to judge. The 
preposition chosen seems to provide a means of instating 
awareness of such a separation, as opposed to a conflated 
language with music. Language "on" music will also be a weak 
language - it is one which cannot contain, cannot fix, and 
which is therefore more appropriate to the more fluid 
dialectical process desired. 
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An Example 
In an essay that has achieved a remarkable standing within the 
literary world's response to music, the French theorist Roland 
Barthes writes: 
Language, according to Benveniste, is the only semiotic 
system capable of interpreting another semiotic system ... 
How, then, does language manage when it has to interpret 
music? Alas, it seems, very badly. If one looks at the 
normal practice of music criticism ... , it can readily be 
seen that a work (or its performance) is only ever 
translated into the poorest of linguistic categories: the 
adjective ... Naturally, this epithet, to which we are 
constantly led by weakness or fascination (little parlour 
game: talk about a piece of music without using a single 
adjective), has an economic function: the predicate is 
always the bulwark with which the subject's imaginary 
protects itself from the loss which threatens it. The man 
who provides himself or is provided with an adjective is now 
hurt, now pleased, but always constituted. 2 
Among the host of issues raised by this statement, perhaps the 
most striking element that comes forth is perhaps the 
reintroduction of a Romanticist discourse within the bounds of 
a fairly strict structuralist approach to the relation between 
-
music and language. On the one hand, pure musical subjectivity 
is seen to be an impossibility - language is a prerequisite 
for its social functioning; on the other, Barthes would seem 
to be granting music access to realms of self-annihilation 
that are entirely beyond the grasp of language. He goes on in 
this regard to ask, "would it be that music is dangerous - the 
old Platonic idea? that music is an access to jouissance, to 
loss, as numerous ethnographic and popular examples would tend 
to show?" 3 
What is at stake here, of course, is the old question of 
ineffability. Barthes' position is interesting in that it 
opposes both the association of language with reason and a 
reigning poststructuralist critique of presence in its own 
terms; a long tradition of musical ineffability is 
acknowledged from two partially conflicting angles. The 
beginnings of formalism are closely tied to the rise of 
_.._/. ~·- ··-··.1·.-···· ........ _ ............ ~·"········· l'··~-- ~ •• : ··~·:.---. ....... ;;,,• .•• : ... \. 
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instrumental music - the notion of "absolute music" is in a 
sense a logical intermediary - yet it is the same music that 
gave rise to theories of the transcendental in music. Within 
both views the subject - in so far as it can be related to the 
terms of human expression - is to an extent excluded. Barthes 
attempts to find an answer for the crisis of linguistic value 
by "displac[ing] the fringe of contact between music and 
language" 4 onto sites within the body. Via Kristeva's notion of 
the "genotext" he arrives at what he calls the "grain" of the 
body. Ineffability is couched in terms of emotion and desire, 
which for Barthes directly communicate from within the body. 5 
What has Barthes achieved here? Some fairly obvious 
problems are raised by his attempt to reestablish, by 
relocating the source of music within the body, the notion 
that music provides direct experience unmediated by cultural 
factors; such a subjugation of sociopolitical issues to desire 
itself is of course the hallmark of his later writings. 6 Yet 
his avoidance of the rationalizing strictures of formalist 
analysis by insisting on subjective value - while at the same 
time opposing "weak" descriptive writing - is commendable: he 
manages to skirt two extremes of writing on music which have 
been strongly - and, as shall be seen, appropriately -
criticized from opposing angles. But how does his writing fare 
once the musical object itself enters into the picture, once 
his fairly sophisticated system of negotiation enters into 
practice? 
The disappointing reality is that his application of the 
notion of the "grain" to actual musical events is far less 
convincing than his theorization of the construct itself. In 
"The Grain of the Voice" the concept becomes a highly (and 
fairly irritatingly) subjective principle of performance 
evaluation:. Panzera's singing is said to "cofitain" the grain 
while Fischer-Deskau's does not. And in Barthes' other lesser 
3 
known essays on music the use of similar constructs results in 
a degeneration into hyperbolic valorization of private somatic 
and emotional responses, as in for instance the following 
passage from "Rasch": 
In Schumann's Kreisleriana (Opus 16; 1838), I actually hear 
no note, no theme, no contour, no grammar, no meaning ... 
No, what I hear are blows: I hear what beats in the body, 
what beats the body, or b~tter: I hear this body·that beats. 7 
Such writing - with regard to how music comes across through 
language - is in effect not very different from the kind of 
"impressionistic" analysis and general writing on music which 
early formalists such as Riemann, Schenker, Keller and Adler 
were reacting against. 8 The end result here amounts to little 
other than .Barthes positioning himself as enthusiastic 
listener; the less sceptical reader may possibly be left 
feeling inspired to listen to the music. 
What we may discern, then, is failure on more than one 
level. Music firstly does not have any "objective" presence: 
its effect alone is reproduced in highly subjective terms; it 
is not recognizable; there is no exactitude in identifying 
creative or formal aspects of the composition .. That all of 
this should amount to .failure of course depends on what is 
primarily required from language on music; for the time being 
it can be noted that music does contain what may be called a 
mathematical element: all systems of composition - tonal, 
serial, non-Western - adhere to certain structural rules, 
overtly or implicitly there. 
Another failure occurs in the way that an interesting 
generalized philosophical solution to problems in linguistic 
responses to music fails at the moment that it proceeds 
towards actual objects of analysis. We may already at this 
stage discern the three levels of language on music that will 
form the basic structuration of such language in this 
dissertation itself. Barthes' theorization of the "grain" may 
. . ~· . .. . . .. ' " . 
successfully describes one possible response to music. There 
seems to be an aporia here, a gap between what language 
apparently sets out to do and how it achieves it. We are thus 
led to the necessity of trying to define the role of language 
in general: if we want to identify the aims of language on 
music - in order to ascertain whether it fails in specific 
instances or not - we have to consider how language comes to 
have purpose generally. These processes are highly varied and 
difficult to pin down, and the few that I will identify here 
will be related directly to the debate in question. 
5 
In the broadest of terms, and as the earlier passage from 
Barthes has indicated, language is the only way of making 
music "workable" within society. But does that mean that all 
musical experience itself is mediated through language? An 
extreme structuralist viewpoint such as that of Benveniste 
would hold that all responses to music are, like any other 
form of subjectivity, constituted directly by language; 10 it 
follows from this position that to identify all the traces in 
individual linguistic history that make up one's musical 
experience is theoretically possible. This is, after all, also 
in a sense the aim of Lacanian psychoanalysis - at the moment 
where the unconscious, which for Lacan is structured like a 
language, 11 reveals itself in exteri.orized linguistic form, the 
goal of psychoanalysis has been achieved. The implication, 
however, is that - even if this process is possible - we are 
faced with no more than the text of the individual 
unconscious: metamusical discourse as object of analysis can 
be.measured against this individually "true" text, ·and not 
against the music itself. In other words, arguing for or 
trying to identify linguistic subjectivity does not tell us 
much about the worth or successfulness of language on music. 
Language here is a necessity - there can be no "failure" - and 
attempts at coming closer towards truth or reality are not 
--
...... ' '.... ~ ..... ·- ............ 1·. '-'·· -
strictly relevant. 
Language on music generally attempts to extend outwards, 
into the musical experience or musical form, even if such a 
motion is indeed framed by linguistic subjectivity or 
constituted by self-denial, as in the example given earlier. 
Let us look again at specific extracts from metamusical 
writing to investigate how this occurs. 
Examples 
6 
Emil Ludwig, writing in 1943, sums up Beethoven's Piano Sonata 
Opus 111 - a work that will be a central object within the 
metasystemic analysis found in Section 3 - as follows: 
Beginning with two great notes, oppressive and sombre, the 
introduction reminds us somewhat of Prometheus. In the 
beginning this sonata seems to be a sister work to the 
Appassionata. Then a thunderstorm breaks loose, the basses 
roar and thunder. The treble, however, storms and blows as 
if the lower world of the Titans were in conflict with the 
upper world of the gods. The second movement, twice as long 
- an aria with variations - brings back an atmosphere of 
quiet humility, resignation to the fate that has just surged 
past, a song filled with longing and faith. The first 
variation floats quietly on its way like a gondola in 
Venice. The next two are animated, even cheerful; the fourth 
ghostly; the fifth ascends to the heights. All flow into one 
another without interruption, like an improvisation. In the 
famous final variation with the long trill, parts of the 
theme are heard underneath, while the upper parts begin to 
brighten, as if the sun had come out again after the storm,, 
while drops, perhaps raindrops, perhaps teardrops, still 
fall from the lower branches.u 
Let us take this passage as an example of what will be 
referred to as "impressionistic" writing on music. We can 
compare Ludwig's description of "the famous final variation" 
with the analysis of the same section by Donald Francis Tovey. 
While Tovey is by no means accepted in musicological circles 
as an objective formalist critic, his writing on Beethoven's 
sonatas, printed in 1931, brings him closer to such a position 
than his other work: 
106-117. - The expected close is indefinitely postponed by a 
cadential trill. Below this figure (a) enters in the bass, 
- ··-- - -· 
"; ••• ,.· • • <: ••• '··- ·'' ... , ......... : •• :Ol.oh • .... --.J. •• : ...... .z .. 
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defining a 4 suspension. This is resolved by a modified 
answer in 6ths around the trill. The trill becomes minor, 
and the modified answer changes its mode also. The leading-
note B, after hesitating for a bar, descends to Bb, while 
the treble rises from G to Ab. We are now in the dominant of 
Eb (bIII.). Figure (a) in the bass defines this with its 
5th, not its ! . The figure is echoed 2 octaves higher below 
the trill, which then becomes a triple trill on the dominant 
7th of Eb for 2 bars .... The topmost trill mounts alone by 
semitones for 4 more bars; a dominant bass enters at the 
bottom of an abyss, and the passage closes into 118-121. 13 
Can either of these two analyses be called more "valid" 
than the other? The first extract for the most part falls 
squarely into what Barthes identified as "weak" adjectival 
writing, with the musical "feel" carried over into metaphors 
which end up offering a literary program for the sonata. 
Subjectivity (and the political dangers that accompany its 
free expression) can be invoked here as accusation: there is 
no real reason to believe that Beethoven was thinking of the 
weather while writing his sonata; Hans Keller's point that 
"description gives a verbal account of what you hear and is 
essentially unnecessary" also holds. 14 While Keller was an 
outright opponent of Tovey, 15 the second extract comes close to 
his idea that language on music should illuminate organic 
structure rather than perceptual effect: it tells the 
musically uneducated nothing at all about how Beethoven's Opus 
111 is experienced, bordering instead on the incomprehensible. 
The issue of audience already comes directly into play: 
the aims and concomitant language use are clearly dependent on 
who is to consume it. Ludwig's writing may thus be highly 
effective in inspiring readers to listen to the sonata (and 
may for some have artistic value in itself, something against 
which the accusation of self-prioritization can also be laid); 
yet it is difficult to assess how much of an admission to 
metaphoricity is made and therefore how much closure is forced 
on music. Language may well function as suggestion here. 
Tovey's analysis, on the other hand, seeks to explain the 
sonata, to find mathematical structures which redefine music 
in terms of reason. 16 
Language and Reason 
a 
This dissertation will deal primarily with the use of the 
metamusical within a novelistic context (particularly as it 
appears in Thomas Mann's Doctor Faustus), with the result that 
not much attention will be paid to the kind of stronger 
formalist musicological analysis in question. Impressionistic 
description of music offers many avenues for ordinary literary 
analysis; more technical forms of musicology however require 
some further comment here. 
A form of goal-based reason associated with language 
could already be discerned in the psychoanalytic discussion 
earlier; it is of course more glaringly present in the 
empiricist tendencies found in the kind of analysis under 
discussion. Language - as active critical mechanism - can here 
be seen as attempting to extend its borders progressively 
further into unspoken territory, and to place that which it 
finds under the sign of logocentric understanding. 17 Language 
sides with reason, with the aims of scientific progress: in 
this sense a culture of writing such as ours may be said to be 
essentially eschatological, where all articulation is 
eventually to be gathered (as is all knowledge) under the sign 
of Logos, with God returning and inhering in all forms. To 
some extent language opposes music, with the result that the 
1980s and 1990s have seen a large surge of writing that 
attempts to counteract the supposed alienation of music via 
technical language. 18 Joseph Kerman's recent book Contemplating 
Music: Challenges to Musicology accordingly identifies 
analytic "positivism" as the primary animating force in what 
he considers a devaluation of musical "worth" in musicological 
studies. He argues that 
Musicology is perceived as dealing with the factual, the 
documentary, the verifiable, the analysable, the 
positivistic. Musicologists are admired for the facts they 
know about music. They are not admired for their insight 
into music as an aesthetic experience. 19 
9 
Aside from the glaring simplification of interpretative 
issues, the questioning of an all-too-confident belief in the 
appropriative power of language is appropriate. The loucheness 
of composers like Edgar Varese who wrote of Density 21.5 that, 
"if you have read what is written in the score, following the 
various indications, you can ignore the analyses by Wilkinson 
and all the others", 20 can to an extent be forgiven in this 
regard. 21 
What Kerman's statement also reflects is a recent trend 
towards reinclusion of the listening experience in analysis, 
which has obviously been downplayed by formalism. In extreme 
instances (which have perhaps been the norm until recently) 
composition itself has moved further into language in that 
experimental music seems often to be written for the purpose 
of analysis itself rather than for performance. Such language 
has then little need for perceptual comment, and tends to 
become increasingly mathematical in its vocabulary. George 
Steiner - in an article of questionable conclusions - cites 
the following passage from The Musical Quarterly in this 
regard: 
The initial pitch class of Sis denoted by the couple (0,0), 
and is taken as the origin of the co-ordinate system for 
both order and pitch numbers, both of which range over the 
integers 0-11 inclusive, each integer appearing once and 
only once as an order number and a pitch number. In the case 
of order numbers, this represents the fact that twelve and 
only twelve pitch classes are involved: in the case of pitch 
numbers, this is the arithmetical analogue of octave 
equivalence (congruent mod. 12) . 22 
Whereas such discourse may indeed entail what Steiner calls a 
"retreat from the word" in that language steers away from 
"humane literacy" towards becoming a quasi-mathematical 
symbolic apparatus, it remains a written form and can 
therefore still be included in our broader definition of 
language. Even where semiological analyses of music make 
extensive use of graphs and tables 23 such interpretations are 
still secondary to the score itself. 
10 
For general purposes here, verbalization of existing 
phenomena (and it is not formalist analysis only that is 
relevant in this regard) may be said to be a process which 
imagines for itself a timeless horizon - and yet it is time 
itself which is necessarily its condition of extension and 
change, the basic field of the dialectic between what it seeks 
to accomplish and what has been included before. This 
dialectic also extends into its own identity: to be aligned 
with reason, language has to exclude its object while 
assimilating it. Its relationship to itself - the connection 
between language as a whole and what has been given as its 
definitional aim in a field such as musicology (description, 
co~unication) - is ever problematic, and it is specifically 
in moments of appropriation, in transformations of the 
language-music balance, that its reductive (controlling) drive 
would seem to be largely inconsistent with this attributed 
intentionality. Thus, for example, when an original musical 
phenomenon takes place language has within this temporal break 
both to redefine itself (it has to relocate its own systemic 
structures regarding, say, language on the symphony to 
accommodate the arrival of the symphony which suddenly no 
longer ends in the tonic key) and to keep itself distant from 
music (it must keep up the appearance both of advance control 
and of being more "objective" than the symphony it is 
assimilating) . 
This can be linked to claims for totalized linguistic 
subjectivity: where language fosters our experience it also 
proves the invalidity of its own prescriptions (its denotative 
involvement), for it is then constituted by a remove from 
........... :. ; .. ,.·, ..... '·'''' ...... '.\\.: ...... •-····~-....... ~ .. ~ ................ ,,, ........ _ ... . 
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itself. In other words, language cannot create and describe at 
the same time; at such moments it must be "loose": it does not 
exist ahead of music in any sure manner, and the project of 
reason ascendant through language is flawed as result of the 
pro'cess of self-definition. Put more simply, what we have is a 
failure of linguistic closure over music, due to the fact that 
the language of reason stands in dialectical relation to music 
and is not constituted only in its own terms. 
Recreation 
But what about the attempt to provide an equivalent for music 
that is heard? This is, after all, the implied pursuit of many 
works of literature which at the same time inherently respect 
the presumed supra-literary qualities of music, and would seem 
to off er the most practical way of making judgments regarding 
levels of success or failure. 
Distinctions can be made here among reproduction, 
discussion, representation, interpretation, analogy and 
correlative. As these words are commonly used, it is only the 
first that lays a claim to achieving equivalent identity of 
sorts with the musical object - the example that comes to mind 
is that of the recording of a musical performance. We are thus 
led to another problem: where does "music", the object of 
language, exist - in the score, the performance, or the 
aesthetic experience? This debate will be entered into at a 
later stage; for the time being a formulation by the Canadian 
musicologist Jean-Jacques Nattiez may be put to constructive 
use here. 
Nattiez divides the "total musical fact" into three 
definitional categories: the neutral (or immanent) level, the 
poietic level and the esthesic level. The neutral level - a 
term coined by Jean Molino - is the level at which traditional 
structuralism functions: "the symbolic form is embodied 
~·· ~· ••~'-•• •"'·••• "•-..•.'1.-.... ""•'•~··~, .... _.. ,_...._ .. _,~, ••••'• '.•·""4•w•,.'•-.fJ>~··•.a.~.,~··•"•••"''"' 
12 
physically and materially in the form of a trace accessible to 
the five senses". 24 Nattiez has reservations about the 
possibility of objective definition here, and acknowledges 
that operations at the other two levels influence our 
conception of the neutral. These are identified as the poietic 
level (that is, the compositional or improvisatory process) 
and what Valery termed the esthesic level (perception, the 
listener's construction of the text). 
Nattiez tries to show in Music and Discourse that many of 
the problems of musicology are related to the fact that 
linguistic attention often tends to focus on one of these 
three levels, to the exclusion of the rest. As far as the 
poietic level is concerned, the attempt at equivalence 
addresses the authorial intention or the essence of a musical 
work, or more directly searches for the "program" behind the 
work. While even a musical piece with the most explicit 
program can hardly be equated with such a program (the music 
is for instance another interpretation of the verbal idea, or 
vice-versa), the former two attempts are generally impossible 
to achieve within analysis. 
Formalist analyses approach the neutral level, and 
whereas identification of structural procedures often accounts 
successfully for emotions relating to suspension and 
resolution techniques (especially in the tonal language), 
there is little sense of music being made tangible to the 
reader. In other words, analysis tends to look at what is 
"done" rather than "said", and the musical experience itself 
cannot be said to be reproduced. Nattiez remarks, in a 
statement that could well apply to other levels as well, that 
Because it is a metalanguage, musical analysis cannot 
substitute for the lived experience of the musical. If 
analysis should achieve this substitution, that would mean 
that discourse is the musical piece itself. The relationship 
between experienced musical reality and discourse about 
music is necessarily an oblique one. 25 
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Even if analysis were to consist of a line-by-line 
transcription of the score ("a dotted crotchet consisting of 
A2, D3 and F#3 followed by a quaver repeating th~ same, above 
D2 of half-note value in the bass") it would amount to little 
more than a clumsier alternative to an existing version of 
musical directions. 26 
It would seem that it is primarily within artistic 
literary endeavours that equivalence on an esthesic level is 
sought. Many literary works dealing with music attempt to 
reflect neutral elements of specific musical compositions or 
genres within language: Calvin S. Brown's two groundbreaking 
studies Music and Literature: A Comparison of the Arts and 
Tones into Words trace quite effectively the extent to which 
literary works manage to incorporate the rhythmic and 
structural elements of the music that is their object. 27 His 
findings, like those of most careful musicoliterary critics 
writing on the same topic, 28 are generally highly pessimistic. 
Whereas awareness of musical structure usually does enter into 
verbal attempts to create an effect analogous to that produced 
by the original music, such aspirations on the other hand have 
validity in a different way. Both language and its object may 
be said to function at a remove from objective material, and 
the success of recreation no longer has any direct relation to 
repetition of formal structures and procedures. In a sense 
the most subjective description of music can also be included 
here in that it entails a verbalization of the esthesic itself 
rather than of the neutral level. 
As far as recreation of music is concerned, it is at the 
esthesic level, then, that metamusical undertakings have the 
greatest validity, primarily because the placing.of music 
within a subjectivist framework by definition acknowledges the 
failure of generalizable reason. Thus even extreme instances 
of verbal impressionism - such as the passage by Ludwig given 
' .... ~~--~·-~·· ••..•..• : ... "" .~ •. -t .............. 1 ••• .:..;.~ •• -: .•..••.• ~, ............ ·'· ..... ..,. .• ;;,,~ ..... : ... :..~·~·.'=""'·~~·- ... · ...... ..),,"' 
14 
earlier on - can be considered "successful" in so far as they 
manage for the author to recreate or bring to mind his or her 
own musical experience after the fact of writing. The various 
hermeneutic and poststructuralist positions which emphasize 
the "role of the reader"29 in the production of meaning are 
applicable here; "validity" is redefined as soon as 
objectivity or generalizability is no longer seen as a stable 
aim. 
Redefining Failure 
Direct structural, rhythmic, melodic, dynamic, textural and 
visual reproduction of the musical performance would have been 
a tangible point of comparison; such an extreme is obviously 
impossible (language would then, as Nattiez has pointed out, 
become music) and this impossibility must be accepted as a 
given. Music, in other words, has to some extent to be 
ineffable by definition. Failure becomes difficult to pin down 
once language moves towards discussing aspects or the essence 
of music, and also, as has been shown, once the balance is 
shifted away from the neutral towards the esthesic level. 
But this also happens in more practical ways. The 
preceding discussion has avoided, amongst other issues, any 
direct mention of political instrumentality inherent in the 
use of language: here we can take as a simple example the way 
in which scientific explanation of music has "successfully" 
been employed in relaxation experiments - language aligned 
with reason is shown to be effective within the latter's 
greater range of social ·functioning. The relation between 
reason and capitalist modes of production is fairly obvious 
once such knowledge is employed by the music therapy industry. 
The shift towards esthesis mentioned above also entails the 
complication of the notion of success in other types of 
metamusical discourse. The biography and music magazine 
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industries, advertising, reviews and album notes all 
constitute versions of language on music that are successful 
in so far as they manage to sell goods within consumer 
society; the evaluative aspect of performance and record 
criticism can from a sceptical viewpoint also be placed within 
such an economy of musical production. On a more direct 
political level, the abuse of Wagner by Nazi authorities can 
again be seen as having been politically successful. 
The terms of success are dictated by the structure within 
which language finds itself, and such a structure is not 
always metasystemic like the present one. Analysis and other 
general scholarly pursuits set their own goals, and pleasure 
is contained within self-defined dimensions (successful 
analysis for instance often amounts to pleasurable "trick-
sol ving"). Writing on music is also used as a means towards 
further non-musical intention within literature - in the 
writings of symbolist and modernist authors such as Mallarme, 
Valery, Woolf, Pound, Huxley and Eliot it is often employed as 
an idealized space of free subjective projection30 by which 
wider novelistic or poetic ideas can be developed. Language on 
music can also be seen as a result of music acting as artistic 
"stimulation" or "inspiration", and may bear, while being 
artistically valid, little or no relation to the music itself. 
Thus it can be seen that the term "failure" is useful 
only in so far as it is linked to rational verifiability or 
placed against the constraints of one system of language on 
music. In other words music, by dint of its generally non-
referential nature, its tendency towards the status of 
ineffability, presents an obstruction to the pursuits of non-
dialectic reason itself, against the type of classification 
represented by the evaluation of the successfulness of 
language as parallel mechanism. Music can in this regard to an 
extent be taken as a "model" for poststructuralist theories of 
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language which oppose verifiability, stable signifier-
signified linkings and so forth. 31 Its relationship to language 
is interesting exactly because, as noted earlier, failure here 
also to an extent becomes a measure of the successfulness of 
language. Rather than attempting to make complicated 
distinctions between what is objective and subjective in the 
recognition or reproduction of music within language, 32 
analytical attention can be shifted to the interface between 
language and music itself, and towards the relationship of 
language to its own failure. Where the problem of meaning or 
"essence" in music is addressed, a form-content distinction 
can for instance be made in both fields, and so on. 
Under a broadly hermeneutic banner all verbal approaches 
to music, then, have "validity",. whether failing according to 
the projects of reason, because of non-verifiable 
impressionistic content, or otherwise. Listening to music 
necessarily entails a need for words, but the failure of such 
words to provide true closure propels music as form into a 
space where subjectivity can have freer play. The inherent 
problems of metamusical discourse have been identified in 
broad terms, and it is worth looking at the two separate . 
fields of language and music in themselves, at how they have 
been related systemically, before moving on to more complex 
dialectic interactions. 
Other Arts 
First of all, let us ask the question: if language is said to 
exist in a relation of intrinsic failure to music, is there 
any use in attempting to consider music outside of it? 
Music has been interpreted extensively by other art forms 
that do not employ language. Dance, painting, 33 architecture, 34 
sculpture 1have all taken musical compositions as their point 
of departure at times; in Walter Pater's aesthetics music is 
... , ...... '. ··~···. '-•·"~· '· .. ..-... ······ .. ,: 
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the principle of integration between form and content towards 
which the artist must strive. 35 Robert Schumann was said to 
uphold the principle that all artists communicate the same 
matter in different formats; this position is put forward more 
directly by Jacques Barzun, who writes that "[t]he meaning of 
literature resides in the same motions of the spirit as those 
aroused by music; only the means differ. 1136 
The debate surrounding this issue is generally obscured 
by a conflation of - to use Nattiez's terms - the poietic and 
neutral levels. Barzun's comment is of the least verifiable 
kind - although he presumably incorporates the esthesic level 
1 ihto his formulation it is at the poietic level that it is 
f 
primarily relevant; suffice it to say that it is extremely 
difficult to give comparative commentary on the spiritual 
state of artists at the time of creation. It is far more 
practical to consider different art forms at their respective 
neutral levels, which are generally implicated if a clear 
distinction is not made. The interaction among these, however, 
is an extensive subject of study by itself - for our purposes, 
it is enough that verbal language is set aside from other 
articulative forms by dint of the denotative or communicative 
primacy lent it by society. The mode of knowledge that we seek 
through language (especially when it acts as third party, as 
in the metasystemic discourse employed here) is linked to a 
greater specificity which music does not have; where language 
attempts to "become music" it usually avoids a direct object 
altogether because it no longer has responsibility towards its 
own identity. 37 
Jackendof f and Lerdahl 
Attempts have, of course, been made to find operative 
similarities between language and music; if music can be shown 
to "work like a language" inferences regarding meaning and 
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denotation can presumably be drawn more effectively. The vexed 
issue of musical meaning is of prime importance to the 
relations between music and language: if the meanings of music 
can be stipulated, if its signifieds can be identified, 
metamusical language will be valid in that it will be able to 
mean the same thing and achieve closure without having to 
enter musical form itself. 
In broad critical terms this kind of discussion of music 
and language is bound to centre on comparative analysis. 
Analysis in comparison to language can either concern 
linguistic functioning or literature; in other words, are we 
to see music as a "language" in itself or as art, where 
meaning is acquired only by means of larger-scale structuring 
(as "narrative")? This distinction itself has major 
implications for claims towards universal or "natural" 
elements in musical organization. 
The most authoritative attempt at proving the existence 
of musical structures that are analogous to those governing 
linguistic functioning is to be found in the work of Ray 
Jackendoff and Fred Lerdahl. The "generative theory of tonal 
music" arising from this combination of musicology and 
linguistics is based within Chomsky's transformational 
grammar: it lays claim to modelling the "largely unconscious 
knowledge which the [experienced] listener brings to music and 
which allows him to organize musical sounds into coherent 
patterns". 38 Natural musical "rules" are analogous to Chomsky's 
innate cognitive "deep structures"39 ; these can be divided into 
metrical and grouping rules, which analyze rhythmic structures 
and higher-level time-span, and prolongational rules, which 
analyze relations between rhythm and pitch. 40 Working within 
tree structures, the findings of analysis based on these rules 
are not dissimilar from Schenker' s Urlinie and Ursatz. 41 
The usual objections to Chomskian theory are applicable 
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here. The notion that language is a site of struggle and that 
meaning is produced socially is ignored almost entirely, both 
in that the esthesic level is subsumed under the neutral here, 
and in that the neutral is linked to "naturality". Jackendoff 
and Lerdahl are less outright on the "innateness" of their 
musical rules than Chomsky (the problem of how representative 
the "experienced listener" actually is already casts doubt on 
this). The most obvious critique on this point is that their 
theories are applicable exclusively to tonal music; they are 
for instance not clear on the position of non-Western 
listeners. The dominant presence of twelve-tone techniques 
(and others which are "arbitrary" in relation to classical 
tonalism) in twentieth-century "serious" music (employed to a 
far greater extent than for instance Joycean "destabilization" 
of language in literature) brings the implied correlation 
between language and music into serious question. It would 
seem that within the realm of the symbolic music has an 
autonomous property granted exactly by its lack of 
communicative primacy, which extends to syntactic and semantic 
structure as well. To identify grammatical structures inside 
music is not the same as discovering denotative meaning in 
specific notes, keys, or melodies. Jackendoff and Lerdahl 
themselves write that: 
Many previous applications of linguistic methodology to 
music have foundered because they attempt a literal 
translation of some aspect of linguistic theory into musical 
terms - for instance, by looking for [a] musical ... 
semantics ... [This] is an old and largely futile game ... 
[W]hatever music may "mean", it is in no sense comparable to 
linguistic meaning. 0 
This systemic theory thus does not give an answer to the 
problem of what music actually signifies; musical units if 
anything signify other parts of the musical structure. The 
implication of the "generative theory" is that a musical 
composition relates to the basic principles identified as 
verbal discourse would to grammatical rules. Semantic 
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limitations, however, include the impossibility of finding 
stable equivalent units for elements of language inside music, 
with the result that the articulative ability of language on 
music is by no means altered by following this model. In Music 
and Discourse Nattiez, following Nicholas Ruwet, devotes 
several pages to the multiplicity of differing definitions of 
musical terms such as "cell", "motif", "figure", "theme", 
"phrase", "period" and "sentence", and to the extreme level of 
interreferentiality amongst them; 43 if these units themselves 
are not stable, it is even less likely that they could be 
linked to elements of language. The "findings" of the 
generative theory are still presented in structural musical 
terms, which, in the end, do not bring us much closer to 
"effability" that is substantially significant beyond the 
neutral level; 44 the placing of music as a "language" here is 
limited on both syntactic and semantic levels. 
Deryck Cooke 
The other main contender for the discovery of the linguistic 
nature of music is Deryck Cooke's popular and controversial 
I 
The Language of Music. This book has become a central point of 
reference in the debate surrounding language-related meaning, 
even though Cooke often tends merely to reopen earlier 
debates. His strength lies perhaps in the extent of his 
coverage of examples from tonal music, and in the systematic 
way in which he develops (sometimes questionable) first 
principles. 
Cooke explicitly sets out to oppose formalist thought on 
music, 45 arguing that "the conception of music as a language 
capable of expressing certain very definite things is not a 
romantic aberration". His book "tries to pinpoint the inherent 
emotional characters of the various notes of the major, minor 
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and chromatic scales, and of certain melodic patterns which 
have been used persistently throughout our musical history. "46 
Most of the fairly severe problems to be found in his work are 
already raised by these statements; while Cooke's 
musicological argumentation is fairly sophisticated and often 
convincing within its own framework, his conception of how 
musical language comes about is for the most part dependent on 
untenable philosophical and political presumptions that need 
to be pointed out here. 
Firstly, Cooke never quite defines what he means by 
"language", generally following a simple communication model 
which does not take larger syntagmatic elements or esthesic 
variables into account. The meanings of musical elements are 
considered static: they do not change and are simply consumed 
in similar manner across the span of history. Expression, 
then, is for the most part based on ready-made phrases: this 
stands in direct opposition to the views of a theorist such as 
Theodor Adorno, for whom expression is, as shall be seen, far 
more of a subjective principle, arising in dialectical 
relation to conventional forms. 
Secondly, Cooke skirts the issue of how language comes 
into being: the use of the preposition of in his title already 
suggests that language is a fixed attribute, something inside 
music that can be drawn out with suitable care. As Alan Durant 
points out, Cooke ignores problems relating to language and 
meaning as sites of sociopolitical contestation: 47 he takes his 
examples from the work of serious composers only, and even so 
does not make clear how intervals and progressions come to 
acquire significatory status. A conflict arises between the 
emphasis on language as a natural and as a culturally shaped 
phenomenon; in the end it is Cooke himself who subjectively 
assigns meanings to musical elements. The interpretative 
closure forced upon music is in many cases extreme: the 
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opening section of the funeral march from Beethoven's Eroica 
symphony "presents the feeling of heavy, universalized 
grief", 48 and Cooke insists that 
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If someone were to declare the ... March to be a sanguine 
piece, we should unhesitatingly accuse him of being 
emotionally undeveloped .... The truly musical person, with 
a normal capacity to respond to emotion, immediately 
apprehends the emotional content of a piece of music to the 
degree that he can experience this. 49 
Such a hypostatization of the "normal" listening subject is, 
then, central to much of his argumentative method. 
There are other practical problems relating to Cooke's 
analysis: performance variables are left out, and while he 
does take tempo into account, he fails to acknowledge that the 
performance of certain works at tempos that are even 
marginally different can substantially change the emotional 
effect (certain of Mahler's symphonies are prime examples 
here). In other words, musical meaning cannot purely be 
located within the composition as it exists on paper. 
Lastly, Cooke admits that "music cannot express concepts; 
[it] can only express feelings". 50 Admission is thus made 
to the lack of specificity in this "language": if language is 
indeed seen as the one articulative form that allows 
denotative, conceptual and communicative clarity, Cooke's use 
of the term becomes little more t?an a metaphorical one. More 
pertinently, the idea that music does "communicate" 
effectively - Cooke writes that "the listener makes direct 
contact with the mind of a great artist"51 - can itself be 
severely criticized. Jean Molino reformulates the 
traditionally unidirectional producer-message-receiver model 
of artistic communication by placing equal emphasis on the 
input of receiver and "producer" in the construction of the 
"trace"; 52 he thus "deems communication no more than any 
particular case of various modes of exchange, only one of the 
possible results of the symbolic process. "53 Cooke, then, is in 
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effect doing little more than placing the author, in the most 
traditional of ways, in a position of absolute control. 
Lanquaqe and Music: Forms 
Both the systemic models elaborated above are inadequate in 
supplying a workable mechanism for relating music to language: 
the first offers questionable structural similarities that 
bring us no closer to a more effective employment of 
metamusical discourse; and the second has made claims for 
meaning in music that approximates meaning in language, 
without showing how the two forms can be structurally related. 
It is perhaps worthwhile to look at the problems of relating 
music and language from a different angle. 
If our purpose is to find similarities or dissimilarities 
between music and language (or literature) on the neutral 
level only, an imbalance is bound to appear once we look at 
metamusical discourse itself. This is because - at least 
regarding the musically uneducated, for whom connotations have 
not yet been formed - a technical analysis of the musical 
neutral level will either nmean nothing" or exist as an 
organization of signifiers set up around arbitrary parameters 
of duration, frequency, amplitude and so forth, 54 it can be 
seen as markedly different from such an analysis of language. 
In the latter case, for all existing attempts to achieve a 
"mathematical objectivity", the object is still directly 
inscribed into the code itself; language, in other words, 
provides its own metalanguage. The esthesic is, as it were, 
inseparable from any functional implementation of a signifying 
form; one can imagine - and here music reveals its "positive" 
independence - the difficulty of using musical units to 
analyze musical texts in a symbolically certain manner. 55 
Language thus inhabits a dual potential which music does not: 
it has a socially ordained instrumentality, and the same 
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"positive" lack of referential precision attributed to music. 
But whereas it is impossible to find a third term which 
is comprehensively applicable to both language and music, it 
must also be noted that the two forms cannot be conclusively 
separated either. There can be no exclusive formulation of 
what music is: both Nattiez and Durant show decisively that 
music cannot be stably distinguished on the basis of its 
relationships either to dissonance, to "noise", to non-
performance, to speech, to dance, or even to silence. 56 This is 
also of course a problem of perception: in writing about 
ethnomusicological research, Nattiez makes "the distinction 
between an 'etic' approach (that is, an analysis accomplished 
only by means of the methodological tools and categories of 
the researcher) and an 'emic' approach, an analysis that 
reflects the viewpoint of the native informants". 57 Where this 
relates to the question of musical universals he concludes 
that "[s]ince etically similar phenomena can be emically 
dissimilar, and etically distinct phenomena may result from 
the same emic categories, universals can no longer be sought 
at the level of immanent structures, but in more profound 
realities. "58 What a Western ethnographer might perceive as 
music might for instance have the emic function of prayer, and 
so on. The "profound realities" are to be found, then, in 
creative and perceptive processes, which are not necessarily 
directly related to music as form itself. 
It makes sense to look at music and language 
dialectically even at a basic systemic level, and it also 
makes sense to acknowledge that esthesis is a central 
component of such a dialectic. It is in this sense that the 
attempt at discerning musical meaning is an inevitable outcome 
of metamusical discourse trying to get beyond pure form. 
25 
Further Meanings: Semiotics 
Many of the issues raised by the section on Deryck Cooke can 
be related to general debates surrounding signification in 
music, specifically in the field of musical semiotics. A long 
tradition descending from nineteenth-century formalism holds 
that music is an artistic form without a signified, and 
various schools of semiological thought have attempted either 
to reclaim such a signified or to locate it within the musical 
composition itself. 59 
This distinction is important: Bright speaks of a 
difference between endo- and exo-semantics of music; Roman 
Jakobson distinguishes between introversive and extroversive 
semiosis. 60 Theorists have taken different sides on the issue: 
Benveniste acknowledges that music does have a "language", but 
insists that semiosis never occurs: "With music, we have a 
typical example of units that are not signs, that do not 
designate anything"; 61 other structuralist positions such as 
those of Jakobson and Ruwet hold that music is indeed capable 
of referring intrinsically, but not extrinsically.~ Jakobson 
writes that 
instead of aiming at some extrinsic object, music appears to 
be un language qui se signifie soi-meme. Diversely built and 
ranked parallelisms of structure enable the interpreter of 
any immediately perceived musical signans to infer and 
anticipate a further corresponding constituent ... and the 
coherent ensemble of these constituents. Precisely this 
interconnection of parts as well as their integration into a 
compositional whole acts as the proper musical signatum. 63 
This kind of semiosis is intramusical; intrinsic referral can 
also be intermusical, and this is for instance Cooke's point 
of departure. 
As far as musical meaning is concerned, it follows from a 
position such as Jakobson's that such meaning would amount to 
the elements of musical structure themselves. The strict 
tabular division in some semiological analyses of musical 
pieces into pitch classes, number of attacks, number of first 
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beats, degree statuses and so on64 leads to a fairly arbitrary 
assignment of the status of signifier and signified: after 
doing an analysis of Brahms' Intermezzo, Opus 119, no 1, 
Jonathan Dunsby concludes fairly simply that "[the pitch] 
units and their arithmetic values might be considered 
signifiers and signifieds forming twelve tonal signs. " 65 The 
only instance where "meaning" in the ordinary sense occurs via 
intramusical semiosis is when musical quotations are made; 66 
generally, it would seem to require some form of reference to 
extramusical content. 
When it comes to music's potential for extrinsic 
symbolization, Nattiez makes a division into three fields: the 
spatio-temporal, the kinetic, and the affective~ Psychological 
studies have established mental associations in Westerners 
between a musical movement from high and low and an image of 
movement, between volume and space, between pitch and level of 
lightness or darkness, and so forth; 67 these associations are 
of course by no means "natural", especially when it comes to 
the affective sphere. With regards to the latter Nattiez draws 
up a table indicating comparative interpretation of tonal 
symbolism: for Rameau, for instance, the key of F major 
suggests "storms, rages" while for Lavignac it suggests a 
"pastoral, rustic" mood. 68 The obvious question is asked by 
Nattiez: 
Did Beethoven choose F major for the Sixth Symphony (the 
"Pastoral") because F major is (according to Lavignac) a 
'bucolic, pastoral' key? Or is it not rather that we (with 
Lavignac) associate a bucolic character with F major because 
Beethoven picked it for the Pastoral Symphony? ... Above all, 
we must not confuse music's meaning, properly speaking, with 
translation of that meaning, since verbalizing music's 
meaning is itself a special type of symbolization. 69 
Once semiotics proceeds away from pure structuralism the same 
problems that are encountered with general attempts at 
establishing musical meaning come to the fore. 
Meaning and Ineffability 
The recent trend towards application· of feminist, 
sociocultural and deconstructionist models within music 
criticism70 would seem to entail a forceful move away from 
structuralist or general philosophical methods which uphold 
the idea of ineffability as well as from the emphasis on 
programmatic signification.· While much of this work promises 
interesting results, it seems that the notion of "meaning" 
here has so far remained limited to narrow ideological 
programs, with much debate centering around redefinitions of 
authorial intent. The claim of Lawrence Kramer - one of the 
critics at the forefront of this movement - that the 
27 
discursive meanings of music "are definite enough to support 
critical interpretations comparable in depth, exactness, and 
density of connection to interpretations of literary texts and 
cultural practices"71 is nowhere borne out by his own analyses. 
Whereas it seems safe to assume that instrumental music 
cannot ever approach the narrative specificity of verbal 
language - if only because of the primacy lent to the latter 
by society - it would also be foolish to deny that any musical 
act produces meaning within context. Once again a definition 
presented by Nattiez is useful here: 
An object of any kind takes on meaning for an individual 
apprehending that object, as soon as that individual places 
the object in relation to areas of his lived experience -
that is, in relation to a collection of other objects that 
belong to his or her experience of the world. 12 
Meaning is in the last analysis a subjective phenomenon, and 
the difficulty of pinpointing it in any given musical fact is 
directly related to and exacerbated by the failure of reason 
in the face of the denotatively ineffable as shown earlier on. 
The alternative to placing musical meaning in verbal 
terms (to aiming for a metamusical that is based on perception 
of meaning) is to take the kind of line followed by Susanne 
Langer: 
[I]t seems peculiarly difficult for our literal minds to 
grasp the idea that anything can be known which cannot be 
named ... But this ... is really the strength of musical 
expressiveness: that music articulates the forms that 
language cannot set forth. 73 
John Dewey takes a similar approach when he writes: 
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If all meanings can be adequately expressed by words, the 
arts of painting and music would not exist. There are values 
and meanings that can be expressed only by immediately 
visible and ... auditory qualities, and to ask what they 
mean in the sense of something that can be put into words is 
to deny their distinctive existence. 74 
Both these statements make claims for radical ineffability, 
but this ineffability is said not to exclude meaning itself. 
In structuralist terms such a conqition of course entails a 
paradox; this paradox has however been commented upon earlier 
on, and is the result of attempting to apply any thought 
whatsoever to the notion of ineffability. Ineffability has 
been the unspoken other in all of the discussion thus far - it 
is in a sense the logical "conclusion" of all attempts at 
writing on instrumental music - and it is worthwhile looking 
at it more closely also as historical phenomenon. 
Ineffability and the Absolute 
There exists a long Western tradition which sees music as·a 
whole somehow accessing or representing greater metaphysical 
realities or truths than other forms of human expression. 
Plato describes in Book X of The Republic how tones are 
generated by the revolution of the spheres, and how each 
sphere produces its own sound in natural harmony with that of 
the others. The notion of a numerically based universal 
harmony found in Pythagoras and Euclid grants, then, that 
proper application of the tonal system amounts to an 
embodiment of greater principles of order within musical 
compositions themselves. The "music of the spheres" also finds 
a later place in the Christian tradition of God as the author 
of all things, and is continued directly in the writings of 
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Boethius and the Somnium Scipionis. 
A further Biblical tradition, that of God as the 
ineffable, combines with the rise of instrumental music in the 
Eighteenth Century75 to divide musical experience from the 
perceived power of language to convey it. The impossibility of 
describing the music of the spheres is already a repeated 
theme in Milton and Shakespeare; 76 it is however only under the 
sign of a "religion of art" following upon the Enlightenment -
especially within the Romantic tradition - that individual 
musical works assume the same status in relation to language. 
Thus for Schopenhauer - as for Schlegel earlier77 - music is 
the highest of all the arts, an embodiment of pure Will, in 
which not even emotions can be separately identified. 78 The 
German Idealist belief in "music as the key to the 
transcendental world of absolute ideas" 79 is absorbed by 
Nietzsche, the symbolist poets and other late nineteenth-
century writers, and it is Walter Pater's formulation in "The 
School of Giorgione" that "all art constantly aspires to the 
condition of music 1180 - in other words, that music is an ideal 
unmediated form where code and referent coincide - which has 
probably had the greatest effect on twentieth-century thinking 
on music in this regard. 
The term "absolute music" itself was not coined, as many 
would believe, by its staunchest defendant Eduard Hanslick, 
whose book Of the Beautiful in Music is often seen as 
representing the beginning of musical formalism, 81 but by 
Wagner himself, who in 1846 wrote of Beethoven's Ninth 
Symphony as "breaking the bounds of absolute music" . 82 It is 
only in Wagner's later writings that absolute music becomes an 
object of polemical assault; here at its inception it still 
conveys a sense of ultimate achievement in instrumental music 
(even as the latter was on its way out), represented of course 
by Beethoven's symphonic compositions. Where the term is 
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applied in this sense to music generally, it is understandable 
that a conflation of music and transcendence (of the ordinary, 
of the human) will take place. 
When music is set outside of reason and linguistic 
restrictions, then, ineffability itself becomes a loaded sign, 
one on which the meanings of "purity", "transcendence" or 
"ultimacy" are hung. Where specific compositions are singled 
out, the act of identification of course does involve 
"speech", and - partly because one cannot speak of degrees of 
ineffability - recourse is often made, as shall be seen, to 
correlatives within events, places or states of mind that are 
ineffable by convention, such as spiritual peace and paradise. 
The rest of this dissertation will take ineffability as a 
point of organization. Section 2 will provide a systemic model 
for mediating between language and music with the failure of 
language assumed as a basic tenet; Section 3 will look 
metasystemically at how the absolute appears in a passage from 
Thomas Mann's Doctor Faustus, and place ineffability within 
wider literary, philosophical and historical context. 
SECTION 2: SYSTEMIC 
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I mistrust all systematizers and I avoid them. The will to a 
system is a lack of integrity. - Nietzsche 
Introduction 
It is apparent from the preceding section that the 
metasystemic is not exclusive; an alternative systemic 
methodology is implicit in any process of metasystemic 
criticism, and is in a practical sense made necessary where 
one identifies failure. In other words, language cannot merely 
be said to "fail" while it is still being used 
metasystemically to point out failure elsewhere: music is an 
obvious dialectical if unarticulated presence. What this 
section will set out to do is to theorize more extensively the 
relation of language to failure. 
I will consider language and music as pure semiological 
mechanisms. Because my interest here is in primary 
representation or signification, I will hold by the 
problematic tradition of musical ineffability, and address the 
formal nature of music and language before the switch to 
contextual meaning occurs. The identification of social 
meaning entails in ·the larger sense a motion towards language, 
in so far as denotation and connotation are more readily 
identifiable in the latter. Music cannot merely be relegated 
to being a successfully "mystified" form even by the most 
successful of sociopolitical analyses. The absolute centrality 
of the absolute-program debate itself requires a systemic 
position if one is to engage in it critically. In my own 
analysis, I will avoid this debate as it has recently been 
cast in contestations between structuralist and broadly 
Marxist schools of thought, and instead address it in its 
"own" historical terms. 
This section thus presents a "mechanism" which may be 
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employed as third term in semiological or psychoanalytic 
approaches to musicoliterary or general metasystemic analysis. 
Once again, metamusical analysis will inevitably appear, and 
this section will in that regard suggest ways of reformulating 
what is metamusically "useful". 
The Word of Music 
The word of music is the imaginary word: it is the one that is 
called into existence by logocentric subjectivity. Yet as 
such, while still embodying a necessary desire, it achieves 
articulation in itself, without the appearance of the written 
or spoken word. 
The word of music is not the same as song; singing 
entails the confluence of two differing orders. Speech and 
music encroach upon each other. They may for our purposes be 
said to affect each other, where "affectation" reads as the 
artificial appropriation of an alien discourse; an attempt at 
alignment with a contradicting code; or, ultimately, at self-
denial, as in the subordination of the enunciation of words to 
the use of the voice as a pure instrument. Thus "words spoken 
musically" can for instance only be judged from one of two 
angles, and never from a unified vantage point: "Is the 
meaning or poetic effect of the words enhanced or brought into 
a different.light by their musical presentation?" and "Are the 
words sung in a way that contributes towards or comments on 
the musical means (texture, rhythm, melody, tonality and so 
on)?". The poems of those genres which explicitly set out to 
"aspire to the condition of music" (Symbolist, Dadaist) may 
well be located at an interstice between language and music 
(the emphasis being more on rhythm and sound than on verbal 
meaning), but are difficult to place within the definition of 
song. 1 Schoenberg's development of Sprechstimme thematizes this 
difficulty: even when the human voice is balanced "perfectly" 
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between speech and song the performed text generally needs 
instrumental accompaniment to be recognized as song. Moreover, 
the word here proceeds into music and not from it; whereas the 
word of poetry attempts meaninglessness, the word of music is 
exactly that meaning that originates from within the musical 
text. 
(A counterargument: surely one can judge a song in terms 
of its beauty alone? Yes, but we are speaking about words 
here: the beauty which qoes not spring solely from the poetry 
of a sung text is, as the two questions above show, 
ascertained from a purely musical vantage point. The use of 
the adjective "musical", often analogical to "beautiful", to 
judge a verbal text also implies an always external yardstick: 
the switch to the noun form never occurs except 
metaphorically.) 
The connection of the word of music to song is thus the 
same as it is to instrumental music. It does not seek to unify 
music and external language, and exists rather as a spatio-
temporal incarnation of the dialectic itself. 
Imaginary and Symbolic 
The notion of an "imaginary word" at first poses a problem to 
Lacanian theory: how can the word, the mainstay of the 
symbolic, proceed so uninhibitedly from the resort of the 
imaginary? Is the word interstitial? Does it come to the fore 
despite the control which "usual" language attempts to assert 
over music, or more specifically, despite the inherent 
difference between the two forms? 
As a starting point, we may consider the place of music 
within Lacan's rather rigid formulation of existence as it 
relates to "meaning" and "being". Kaja Silverman explains how 
Lacan's thinking here can be placed in a "your-meaning-or-
your-life" pattern: meaning is directly proportional to self-
alienation and to loss of Being, which is associated with the 
imaginary. 2 The imaginary is one of the vaguest concepts in 
psychoanaiytic terminology: for our purposes, it can be read 
as the pre-symbolic projection of and subsequent narcissistic 
relation to the ideal self . 3 
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Music is obviously a symbolic form: patterns have certain 
social meanings, hegemonies exist as in any other form of 
expression. Yet it would be difficult to equate the effects of 
music with what Lacan posits as the self-alienation resulting 
from the acquisition of language (and therefore, in his terms, 
of subjectivity) . 4 Much modernist fiction for instance equates 
the experience of music exactly with access to an imaginary 
., 
realm unhindered by the constraints of language. For modernist 
authors, music in fact manages to articulate the complexities 
of human nature with far more clarity and sensitivity than 
poetry or prose; the entry into musical writing (the imitation 
of structure, sound and "mood") is in part an attempt at more 
exact or comprehensive self-expression. 5 Music thus does relate 
to meaning while yet being linked to a mode of existence that 
is not by definition one of alienation. What it represents is 
in a sense a composite of the Imaginary and the Symbolic, no 
doubt being partly because language does have communicative 
primacy in our society. It is not that music is a transparent 
code, experienced without mediation while yet containing a 
verbal impulse (the current wave of sociopolitical critique is 
at great pains to prove this). Nor is it that music is as 
rigid and limiting to the initiated as what language is (which 
seems to be one of the implications of Adrian Leverkuhn's 
artistic development in Mann's Doctor Faustus) . 6 Rather, music 
fills an indeterminate position which grants it great freedom 
within this debate itself: it can to an extent tip either way. 
Thus the word manages to proceed from the Imaginary. 
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Once it is articulated in a known form it is of course 
subsumed within the symbolic order; we know this already from 
Barthes' statement that "[the musical adjective] is always the 
bulwark with which the subject's imaginary protects itself 
from the loss which threatens it". In both Lacan's and 
Barthes' terms desire - created by musical experience - is not 
fulfilled, but is checked and contained by a word that is 
necessarily false. The word of music, the imaginary word, is 
however not bound to Lack as is the case with the symbolic 
word. Whereas it is called into being by the same need it also 
proceeds from within music itself; it is equivalent to the 
0 meaning" of music when the latter is not articulated in 
speech or on paper. 
The word of music is thus an impulse; it is experience 
before it is spoken, self-constitution before that self can 
enter the outside world. It remains "verbal" in that it is a 
sign into which wider musical motion is contracted (or to 
which the latter gives rise), and in that it is the necessary 
predecessor to exterior verbal articulation. The word of music 
is furthermore the explicit or implicit aim of all speech on 
music: it is the subjectively perceived and elusive "feel", 
structure, biographical detail, extramusical ("program") event 
·-
which language attempts to woo onto paper, beyond the failure 
of phenomenological and hermeneutic enquiries. 7 Desire here 
stays within its own bounds, yet achieves a degree of 
formalization it would usually find only in its (fake) 
translation into-language. The Derridean concept of deferred 
meaning is therefore of little concern; a "bearable 
completion" of desire is achieved without recourse to the 
symbolic word (which has the paradoxical misfortune of needing 
to present and inevitably having to defer meaning) . 
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The Fictional Work 
The fact that the word of music can never be spoken or written 
down links it intimately to the imaginary work of music in 
fiction. The forgotten choral pieces of Johann Conrad Beissel 
in Doktor Faustus, 8 the various works of Adrian Leverkuhn, the 
sonata of Vinteuil in Proust's A la Recherche du Temps Perdu -
the description of all of these fills the reader with the 
desire to experience them, to partake in a music that is more 
intense than that which he or she has ever heard before, music 
that offers transcendence of its context. Like the forgotten 
manuscript found in the stories of Poe and Borges, the 
imaginary work of music, existing only in actual words and 
never represented in its actuality, depends on a hierarchical 
principle. On occasion it may merely inspire interest, but 
most of the time it is set up by the author either as 
representative of some form of lost Golden Age or as an 
embodiment of artistic, spiritual or social ideals which are 
at odds with and which transcend contemporary social 
conditions. The point is that the text leads to desire for an 
Imaginary which is still acknowledged as such; there are 
leanings towards fantasy, and in Bakhtinian terms the 
transgression into the carnivalesque9 reads here as the 
entrance into a harmonious realm that denies social 
conventions and restrictions. The written word is the sole 
trait within which music finds existence, and at the same time 
it is this word that creates desire for experiencing the same 
music. The music as such exists within the desire for it: like 
the imaginary word, it cannot be represented (language cannot 
represent anything "real", and the music furthermore becomes 
"greater" than the written words that create it), but is 
granted actuality by the reader's or listener's desire and by 
the desire which it produces in turn. While we may wish to 
urge the word of music into language it remains verbal (real) 
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only within the confines of the musical text or performance: 
similarly, the fictitious piece of music acquires its superior 
reality only within language. Although language has succeeded 
in generating music, these words do not however amount to the 
imaginary word: the latter, once again, is a locus at which 
desire finds a midway position, at which the reader begins the 
attempt at voicing his or her own translation. 10 
Framing the Absolute 
Can we at all negotiate the relation between the word of music 
and the word that writes or speaks about music? 
It is only in so-called program music that an entire 
piece of music may be said to follow a verbal arrangement. 
Compositions such as Chopin's nocturnes and preludes which are 
supposed to reflect the composer's emotional or mental state 
at the time of writing11 - even if they do succeed in this - do 
not have a piece of verbal discourse as their "narrative": 
emotions are meant to be represented directly (and more 
faithfully) in musical shape and are therefore not accessible 
to language. With program music, on the other hand, a 
relatively clear narrative is re-represented by musical means. 
Associations, however, do not occur naturally (except in rare 
cases where conventions are strongly established, ·such as the 
use in the nineteenth century of chromatic progressions to 
represent approaching storms) and the listener has to be 
guided in nearly every element of understanding. 
Nattiez touches on a central issue when he writes: 
When I read the phrase "the marquise went out at five 
o'clock", I don't need a title to know what has been 
narrated. When I hear the beginning of The Sorcerer's 
Apprentice, I have to know that I am dealing with a 
symphonic poem in order to approach the work with the 
intention of hearing it as narrative.u 
The word "title" here can also read from the angle of recent 
literary theory as "frame". When we hear a major key melody 
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literary theory as "frame". When we hear a major key melody 
played by an oboe in Prokofiev's Peter and the Wolf we know 
that it is the duck who is being represented, having been told 
to make this association by the (speaking) narrator. The 
process of framing an instrument is obvious: any entrance of 
oboe sound into the texture of the music is "framed" by the 
word "duck". Similarly, in a piece such as Berlioz's Symphonie 
~antastique, where there is no verbal interference in the text 
itself, our "understanding" of individual movements is led by 
descriptions in the program notes of the scene which each 
represents. Finally, the entire length of Dukas's work is 
heard with a prerecognized fable in mind; the title alone is 
sufficient as framing device. As Nattiez notes, however, the 
music need not rely on its frame; it is also obvious that 
although a framing of every fragment or musical event could 
arguably be possible (although this has never been achieved) 
the frame can never cease to exist. However far it manages to 
intrude into its object (the word "subject" assumes a 
simplistic unity between frame and "picture" which is not 
there} it never reaches a point where it becomes equal to the 
latter (the point of self-dissolution), not even to the 
minutest musical detail. Music here, like those abstract 
expressionist paintings which still claim to have a 
referential link to some external object, needs a name to tell 
a story. 
But what about musical works that do not relate to some 
specific program event? Where the title of a piece relates to 
its categorical identity (Symphony No 9, Piano Sonata Opus 
111) the frame could for instance be said to proceed from 
within the music itself (a sonata can be recognized by its 
structure without needing a title}. A similar situation occurs 
with regard to the names of movements (Andante espressivo, 
Lebhaft) : these terms are directions for how to perform the 
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music, but unlike other textual directions (printed notes, 
crescendo symbols and so forth) they remain as the markers by 
which movements are finally identified. Furthermore, one might 
also ask what the relationship of the composer's name is to 
the frame: the title of a piece is rarely an~ounced without 
the name of its author, and few would deny the power of the 
sudden intervention of a composer's name in changing one's 
response to music already being listened to - the "frame" here 
once again actively directs our experience. It is clear that 
the relationship between frame and framed is more complex than 
a simple division between the two or imposition of the one 
over the ·other. 13 
Derrida's Frame 
In The Truth in Painting, Jacques Derrida takes up the issue 
of framing as it relates to language and painting at gr·eat 
length. 14 Drawing from and criticizing Kant's third Critique, 
he argues for the non-exclusivity of ergon and parergon, 
questioning in other words the binary opposition of 
inside/outside which is traditionally instituted by the frame 
(the frame is a strong example of Derrida's notion of the. 
"trait", the line which divides absence and presence, the sign 
which allows but also controls understanding and which he 
constantly seeks to reconsider). At the most obvious level, 
the frame does not institute an absolute division between 
subject and object; the viewer (or, then, listener) cannot 
prevent his or her subjectivity from affecting the perception 
of the work of art. The exterior world as such becomes part of 
the ergon and, ·in turn, of the parergon. Similarly, the work 
of art is internalized by the spectator, becoming part of the 
outside world. Looking at program music from this angle, one 
can better consider the inevitable influence of subjective 
experience - particularly in the case of "non-
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representational" art forms - on the "prescribed" narrative. 
The questions asked by Derrida are thus in the line of: 
where does the frame begin - inside or outside the art work?; 
where does it end?; where does it "take place"?; does the 
frame signify in itself or does it merely supplement the 
ergon? The difficulty of answering these enquiries becomes 
clear in a comparison of different views on a Van Gogh 
painting of a pair of shoes: while Heidegger holds that the 
peasant to whom the shoes presumably belong is inside the 
frame, the art critic Meyer Shapiro argues that the peasant is 
outside, while Van Gogh himself is inside (we seem to be able 
to sense his emotions and so on) . There are distinct 
correlations between the fluid nature of parergonality 
apparent here and the two-way framing process in music 
described earlier; how, then, does the imaginary word fit into 
this model? 
Let us return to an earlier reading: the frame is the 
limit of music and of the exterior world, which we equate with 
language; the two articulative forms may be said to converge 
within parergonality. 15 The frame as significatory institution 
is however always verbal: whereas in painting, frames can. 
exist without verbal titles, in order to exist next to a 
musical work the frame requires a written or spoken sign. Yet 
the music remains "inside" the frame in a form whose 
ontological status is unclear, but which is accepted as real. 
Now we have claimed that the word of music is an impulse 
towards verbalization from within the musical fact: does this 
c9nstitute it as an inner frame, lying alongside the real one? 
If this is the case, we have a double frame; in other words we 
have three traits, the middle one being the line which divides 
the two frames and which therefore amounts to a frame itself~ 
Even without considering Derrida's critique of parergonality 
as limited to an exclusive field, this kind of designatory 
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division presents a problem. We can see how this 
multiplication of the frame can be practically infinite: the 
middle frame is also separated by something on either side, 
and so on. Where there are two adjacent frames, the trait that 
divides the two (what would here be the difference or 
convergence between word and imaginary word) reveals a 
capability for endless fragmentation. 16 It becomes impossible 
to stipulate the point at which the two frames are given 
meaning by the dividing trait, or at which point the trait 
itself is given meaning by those traits that institute its 
inner divide. 
It therefore makes little sense to try ·understanding the 
relation between real and imaginary word in the way described. 
The conjectured model furthermore supposes that the word of 
music is framed by language, which leads to an interesting 
paradox. If we question whether this is possible, the answer 
is both yes and no. On the one hand, the word of music is part 
of its music, and the two are framed together.-On the other 
hand, language has not said anything about this word: the 
difference in code between language and music suspends the 
realization of failure, whereas the fact that language does 
not reach its own element points towards a more remarkable 
inadequacy. The word of music is also the aim of language: 
"language frames music in an attempt to reach its true word". 
And, finally - incontrovertibly - the word of music is 
imaginary. It cannot be judged from the same ontological 
position as two empirically verifiable social acts. Not 
completely inside or outside, not destroying the frame, but 
acting as an unstabilized base - it fills an expansive field, 
with the frame adrift like a lifesaving ring on an open sea. 
It spills over, it cleanses, it confuses language. 
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Systemic? 
The word of music acts as a dialectical model, and it finds 
its own models in Derrida's conception of the frame, in the 
Platonic-type metaphor of the sea, and in language, which 
according to Ricoeur and Barthes is metaphoric (connotative) 
in its basic nature. It is a critical instrument, and its 
conceptual validity is perhaps no greater than the 
instrumental validity of language in describing music. 
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The comparison of music and language, the study of their 
various interactions, is by nature apt to give rise to a 
variety of models which are difficult to evaluate. Systemic 
framings range from "melopoeisis "17 to "melophrasis ", 18 and it 
is amusing to see how many of these have considered themselves 
definitive in establishing a critical idiom that provides 
answers in the field. The word of music for this reason does 
not seek to demonstrate anything: it cannot signify, and as 
metaphor it does not claim access to any particular piece of 
music. It remains, rather, a general point of aspiration which 
avoids limitations of two forms by becoming a third, properly 
impossible term. 
The mechanism and function of critical - especially 
metasystemic - analysis thus become points of reconsideration. 
Are literary transcriptions, musicological analyses, 
biographical diagnoses all to be judged under the yardstick of 
how they adhere to the imaginary word, or of the extent to 
which the latter appears, both of which are impossible to 
ascertain? Are they to be evaluated in terms of their 
recognition of the existence of such a word, which is a 
construct in any case? What questions should we ask in 
relation to the word of music? 
Firstly, we should keep in mind that the imaginary word, 
as an object of aspiration rather than emulation, leads to a 
change in the nature of language as functional field. In 
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writing the imaginary, language should not be judged as it 
would be under "ordinary" conditions: the impossibility of the . 
object should be a starting point, and representation 
discarded as functional aim. 19 
Secondly, the word of music is in a sense a metaphor for 
the general predicament of language; such a figure is 
applicable in so far as the term itself is a condensation of 
the various battles between opposing forces, an operative 
embodiment of the play between word and world. It illustrates 
a suspension of value, which in working outwards allows the 
repressed tension of representation to surf ace around a 
governing but non-determining body. By being itself included, 
it "normalizes" both metaphoricity and failure. 
Thirdly, the imaginary word brings into association the 
concepts of reading and writing. The denial of the notion of 
origin is implicit in the imaginary order, and the infusion of 
both activities with an anti-referential mood lends a general 
condition of the scriptible. 
The word of music, then, should be allowed free play in 
order to deregulate the aims of reading, writing, listening, 
so that the experience of language and of art can avoid being 
structured through metaphors of space, direction and 
intentionality. Its field lies beyond language while occupying 
the whole of the symbolic; its presence is signalled from 
within a position of engagement, and is difficult to exist (I 
exist it = I find, choose, create, experience). The resistance 
it forces against closure is, by dint of its metaphoric 
nature, also applicable to exterior definition and suggests, 
ultimately, the notion of the membrane: it allows passing of 
inspiration for the rest. 
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SECTION 3: METASYSTEMIC 




Moving from observation and systematization to praxis here is 
not a simple procedure, or at least not one of those in which 
theoretical concepts confidently find self-justification by 
reconstructing the text to which they are applied. The 
limitations of the frame model have been elaborated, and are 
indeed implicit in the conception of this model: it is largely 
the notion of praxis itself which is called into question by 
inscribing failure as a principle of truth. Because of the 
interrelatedness of the three levels of language on music, the 
transition is furthermore not a uniform process: practical 
application (and by application we mean splicing, 
tangentiality, "another voice") of any systemic approach 
becomes a metamusical exercise. Similarly, metasystemic 
analysis necessarily incorporates systemic and metamusical 
tropes (at the simplest level, through implied comparison). 
Whereas the following section can as a whole be labelled 
metasystemic (for critical consciousness tends to be placed 
along a hierarchical line, where the furthest position is 
accorded the greatest truth value until it is shown to be 
defective), all different levels are admitted, informing 
analytic process as both subject and object. 
Neither of the preceding two sections, then, can be 
excluded; the vagueness of the first, the self-acknowledged 
over-specificity of the second both acquire structural 
relevance in their relation to an "open metatext". 
Hypertext 
Are we thus heading for what has been called the hypertext, 
the endless text, for what Deleuze and Guattari have labelled 
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the rhizome? 1 Language itself is a hypertext (that is, after 
all, the implication of Derrida's notion of differance) 2 and, 
as a result, all verbal texts are hypertextual: there can be 
no closure of interpretation as· long as connotation or 
association is seen as a free (or circular) process. To admit 
to this belief within analysis is to "move away" from the 
text, to allow it to generate meaning beyond its own 
intention, to assign it through process the status of Barthes' 
scriptible. Intertextuality is "naturalized" in that it no 
longer depends on directionality in being shown; via such a 
method we can exit and enter the text in a relatively free 
fashion while still acknowledging it as a primary generative 
locus. 
The hypertext is thus one way of acknowledging some of 
the complexities of the dialectical approach to language and 
music elaborated earlier. Although the reading that follows 
will not have the direct interreferentiality of the hypertext 
proper, it can be called "rhizomic"3 ~n that it avoids linear 
goal-orientation, in that no metamusical or systemic form is 
given direct preference, in that the notion of ineffability, 
rather than being an inviolable Other, can be interspersed 
throughout the space among nodal points. 
Line by Line 
In the introduction to S/Z, a reading of Balzac's story 
"Sarassine", which has substantial similarities to the process 
which follows, Barthes writes: 
Discerning ... signifieds systematically for each lexia does 
not aim at establishing the truth of the text (its profound, 
strategic structure), but its plurality (however 
parsimonious); the units of meaning (the connotations), 
strung out separately for each lexia, will not then be 
regrouped, provided with a metameaning which would be the 
ultimate construction to be given them ... We shall not set 
forth the criticism of the text, or a criticism of 
this text; we shall propose the semantic substance (divided 
but not distributed) of several kinds of criticism 
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(psychological, psychoanalytical, thematic, historical, 
structural); it will then be up to each kind of criticism 
(if it should so desire) to come into play, to make its 
48 
voice heard, which is the hearing of one of the voices of 
the text .... [T]he work of the commentary, once it is 
separated from any ideology of totality, consists precisely 
in manhandling the text, interrupting it. What is hereby 
denied is not the quality of the text (here incomparable) 
but its "naturalness". 4 
For Barthes, it is thus exactly the fragmentation of the text 
which allows for the actualization of what Bakhtin defined as 
heteroglossia, 5 which works to avoid ideological closure. The 
added dissolution of strict subject/text relations as implied 
earlier has direct relevance here: connotation as governing 
principle allows the primary text to appear alongside others, 
to avoid its necessary critical ascendancy. Where it is 
accepted that language-music relations are not going to be 
consistent, such a reading also normalizes the presence of the 
third party, of interpretation, and does not exclude those 
readings that may work against it. Similarly, different 
readings will be allowed to reread or contradict one another, 
to follow the logic of their own language; it is for this 
reason that conclusions (which are contrary in spirit to the 
rhizomic procedure in any case) will in many places be 
avoided, in favour of subjective inference. 
By dividing the primary text into extended fragments, it 
can also to some extent stand on its own; it is not simply 
incorporated into the critical text. It is thus not a question 
of drawing large inferences from small bits of evidence - the 
effect of the text (be it pathetic, boring, "musical") can 
still be assimilated independently. 
As regards the "presence" of music: in a few instances, 
fragments from the score will be inserted; "music lies between 
the lines"; it is only by means of a line-by-line analysis 
that such a crude direct comparison can be achieved. 
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Looking at Literature, Looking at Music 
But the important question remains unanswered: is this method 
specifically more valid for musicoliterary study? Will music 
"appear" more successfully than in other readings? 
On an elementary level, the passage through the text is 
linear - it approaches the time experience of listening to a 
piece of music rather than that of reading, which allows easy 
repetition, turning back of the page. But this is perhaps an 
idle point: listening can be repeated, interrupted, and the 
time sequence of the text in this case does not follow that of 
the music, except in certain limited sections. 
What is perhaps of particular use here is that music and 
literature can be approached separately as well as in 
interaction; the ordinary concerns of textual analysis 
(narrative, metaphor, symbolism, characterization and so on) 
as well as of musicology can be followed. Both language and 
music are given "subjects", with the result that comparison 
can occur in a wider sense; issues relevant to musicoliterary 
study can be distinguished, and because literature can combine 
metamusical and (by implication) systemic discourses, the 
interrelations can be perceived more clearly. 
Translation 
The problem of the translated text should be raised here: is 
it valid to analyze a musicoliterary text which is not in its 
original form, which has lost the sounds, rhythms, phrasings, 
and connotations which make up a large part of its metamusical 
texture? 
As far as possible, relevant phrases are given in German 
also; but it is likely that much authorial intention is lost. 
The obvious point may be observed, however, that the galaxy of 
esthesic variables are endlessly fluid, especially in the 
temporal sense; all individual readings are secondary to that 
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of the author, which cannot be a fixed entity. 
The problem is one of both form and content. Musical 
effect cannot be isolated within either, and it is thus 
difficult to relegate the problem solely to the act of 
translation itself. What is lost cannot be designated; 
translation in this sense approaches the act of experiencing 
the text (verbal or musical) itself, in that ineffability is 
the condition of its own reading. Translation can here be 
linked to music via Kant's notion of the sublime: the moment 
of radical heterogeneity, the ultimate principle of difference 
still evokes a reaction after the experience of loss in those 
painters and writers whose concern it is has passed. In twice-
tempered fashion, the language of translation approaches an 
uncategorizable Other, following on the heels of language 
itself as it finds its way into those limits surrounding 
music, cauterizing its own substance for the sake of 
necessity, continuation and, in the supreme instance, ecstasy. 
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The Text: 
Wendell Kretschmar, at that time still young, was born in the 
state of Pennsylvania of German-American parentage. He had got 
his musical education in his country of origin; but he was 
early drawn back to the old world whence his grandparents had 
once migrated, and where his own roots lay, and those of his 
art. In the course of his wanderings, the stages and sojourns 
of which seldom lasted more than a year or so, he had become 
our organist in Kaisersachern. It was only an episode, 
preceded by others (he had worked as conductor in small state 
theatres in the Reich and Switzerland) and followed certainly 
by others still. He had even appeared as composer and produced 
an opera, The Statue, which was well received and played on 
many stages. 
Text 
To begin, we may ask, what are we looking at? Designating the 
boundaries of the text is itself an impossibility, as the 
frame model has made amply clear, and the method that follows 
entails an actualization of the principle of instability. 
Words in the text here are themselves a frame, unable to 
exclude or include music as a subject. Such a dialectical 
interchange is of course not contained by a metasystemic 
reading such as this one either. 
This is a re-reading: we know what the lecture is about, 
we know its own subject. Let us then emancipate the notion of 
text, so that Mann, Kretzschmar, Beethoven, Opus 111 and all 
others are no longer enclosed within a primary locus. Barthes 
writes in his essay "From Work to Text": 
It is ... as though the interdisciplinarity which is today 
held up as a prime value in research cannot be accomplished 
by the simple confrontation of specialist branches of 
knowledge ... ;it begins effectively ... when the solidarity 
of the old disciplines break down ... in the interests of a 
new object and a new language ... 6 
This "new object" is "text" itself, that which does not, like 
the "work", "[close] on a signified". 7 In this sense 
Beethoven's Opus 111 is not the object, the signified of 
Mann's (or Kretzschrnar's) language; it may be said to appear 
from within the text. 
Literature and Music 
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The ubiquitousness of music within literature is perhaps 
astounding for those who have not considered such a presence 
or who think of artistic disciplinarity as being confined by 
exclusive barriers. A brief investigation of a critical 
resource such the MLA bibliography reveals that studies are 
being done on the role of music in the works of writers 
ranging from Shakespeare, Milton, and Spenser to Hoffman, 
Lenau, Burns, Blake, De Quincey, Dickens, Poe, Whitman, 
Tolstoy, Balzac and the French symbolists, from Proust, Kafka, 
Rilke, Hesse, Camus, Artaud, Gide, Yeats, Shaw, Lawrence, 
Forster, Huxley, Eliot, Pound, Woolf, Joyce and Beckett to 
Patrick White, Burgess, Grass, Carpentier, Kundera and 
Pynchon. These studies are generally considered to constitute 
the field of musicoliterary study proper: metasystemic 
investigation can include consideration of the role of music 
as theme, as structural or esthesic principle, as subjective 
principle of characterization, and so on. 
An entire continuum of musical involvement in literature 
(and vice-versa) can accordingly be drawn up, from discreet 
allusion to specific compositions, to-entire literary 
translations of musical works, where transcription of theme, 
structure and presumably meaning and aesthetic quality into 
literary format is attempted. On the one side, Eliot's Four 
Quartets are for instance generally seen as alluding to 
Beethoven's late string quartets; 8 in the middle, we find basic 
versions of the metamusical such as discussions and subjective 
interpretations of compositions for the sake of 
characterization, theme, and so on; on the other side, we can 
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take as example that which occurs between Beethoven's Third 
Symphony and Anthony Burgess' Napoleon Symphony. It is worth 
noting that the latter form of transcription has occurred more 
often in the opposite manner: Jean-Pierre Barricelli writes of 
Liszt's Divina Commedia (which, incidentally, is often 
regarded as a musical failure) that "the composer becomes a 
remarkable literary interpreter". 9 Various ways of musicalizing 
the poems of Stephane Mallarme, from emotional interpretation 
to attempts to find exact musical equivalents for rhythms and 
sounds in the poems, have been attempted throughout the course 
of the last century by composers ranging from Debussy to 
Pierre Boulez to the contemporary Swiss composer Walter 
Feldmann. The number of Mallarme's works "transformed" into 
music as well as the variety of musical styles utilized for 
the purpose presumably represent a lack of denotative 
restriction both in musical forms themselves and in certain 
specific forms of literature. 10 The links between the role of 
music and that of language in the Symbolist tradition are 
clear: the symbolic form is one that is ordered without 
ordering the interpreter, and often the traditional intense 
artistic experience is to be gained from the paradox that the 
human (the self-conscious) is activated yet "meaningless". 11 
Music is, of course, also a principle of artistic and 
spiritual guidance and, at times, of redemption; this tendency 
finds its fullest exploration in the literature of high 
modernism. In Proust, for example, music is highly important 
thematically as well as in constituting a "compositional 
sensibility" informing his novel at every level; 12 Nattiez 
points out how it is music that both unifies the thematic and 
structural concerns of A la Recherche and provides the "model" 
from which Marcel will henceforth be able to pursue his own 
creative calling. 13 Writers such as Joyce, Huxley, Eliot, 
Pound, Mann and Rilke all experimented with musical structure, 
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generally with a questionable degree of success. It has been 
mentioned elsewhere how an ascetic withdrawal into an 
idealized musical space was one response to twentieth-century 
alienation; the obsession with sound and form approaches the 
traditional notion - subscribed to by a large number of 
modernist writers - of "musicality" as a metaphorical index of 
beauty and often of literary value, propagated further by 
Pater's dictum that "all art constantly aspires to the 
condition of music". The idea that music can command immediate 
and absolute presence carried an obvious appeal for writers 
struggling with the limitations of language and the problems 
facing the individual within regulated society. As in the 
Symbolist tradition, "meaning" here is not meant to be 
primarily verbal, and language itself would seem to desire an 
escape from narrative process; the result is often a blurring 
of outer details of the kind found in long parts of Proust's 
narrative. Where music is described, then, technical terms 
themselves also acquire an enchanting status, becoming 
signifiers that grant access to an exclusive or supposedly 
unlimited sphere of being. 
Failing Again 
It has to be noted that translation between literature and 
music for the most part entails another grand history of 
failure. The use of the term "musical" as an analogy for 
auditory beauty already implies a substantial level of 
dilettantism: 14 the issue is as simple as listening to certain 
less accessible works of Schoenberg or Varese. Even a poet 
such as Mallarme, whose work is more intensely concerned with 
music than that of nearly any other recent major poet, had no 
musical education to speak of, and his poems consider music in 
an abstract and idealized form rather than basing themselves 
on practical models. The charge of dilettantism is perhaps no 
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more valid than that laid against writers using terms such as 
"chiaroscuro" in their work; the difference lies however in 
the extent to which there is an active attempt at conveying 
formal elements in writing. 
The problems that arise have to do mainly with three 
phenomena: the failure to recognize possible authorial 
intentions such as irony and parody (this works both ways: in 
so far as it is relevant to how the music is experienced, 
Tchaikovsky for instance missed the irony in Pushkin's Eugene 
Onegin), the overemphasis on surface similarities or 
generalities, 15 and the incorrect application of musical 
terms. 16 It is within the latter category that the worst 
"atrocities" have occurred - while it is not easy to consider 
music and language in any exclusive way, there does seem to be 
a distinct irrelevance in the claims made by literary works 
towards paralleling fairly strictly and clearly defined 
musical forms. Thus Robert Nicolosi points out that Eliot 
might have used the name of any other classical form for his 
Four Quartets without any noticeable change. 17 Similarly, 
Nattiez clearly establishes the incorrectness of finding 
symphonic and sonata structures in Proust18 and cites Matore 
and Mecz as having "listed once and for all everything that 
distinguishes the specificity of a leitmotif in music from the 
Proustian system of preparation and anticipation". 19 It would 
seem that within serious musicoliterary criticism there are 
only a few authors - one of them Thomas Mann - whose attempts 
at implementing musical principles have been taken seriously. 20 
The practical point remains that many musical terms -
especially those hailing from the period of early instrumental 
music - themselves to an extent seem calculated to retain 
musical identity, to remain immune to incorporation into 
systemic terminology. Whereas melody can historically be 
related to the spoken (and by implication the written) line, 
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other forms· and techniques such as counterpoint, modulation 
and the fugue are impossible to achieve within the non-
temporal written text. 21 The historical departure in literature 
from orality in this sense also parallels a departure from 
performable musicality; on the most obvious level, the novel, 
the literary essay and certain forms of experimental poetry 
are intrinsically further from song than any other literary 
form in history; the efforts of later Romanticism and 
Modernism in literature are in a sense an attempt at 
historical reversal. 
Some of the worst excesses have occurred within criticism 
itself. Alan Durant notes how the use of musical terms usually 
"take [ s] the form of analogy and license only"22 and we· need 
look no further than the writing of a cultural overseer such 
as George Steiner to find an instance where such a judgment is 
not unfair: 
The words [in Broch's The Death of Virgil] literally [!] 
flow in sustained polyphony. Strands of argument interweave 
exactly as in a string quartet; there are fugal developments 
in which images are repeated at governed intervals; and, at 
the last, language gathers to a dim, sensuous rush as 
remembrance, present awareness, and prophetic intimation 
join in a single great chord. 23 
Kundera's extensive theorization of the novel as a 
"polyphonic" form24 (a term also taken from Bakhtin} must be 
placed in the same category. And yet a simple problem raises 
itself here: what if Kundera had merely employed Bakhtin's 
more "objective" term "heteroglossia"? If, as Ricoeur has 
argued, all language originated metaphorically, 25 such a usage 
cannot be rejected outrighti and we are once again faced with 
an argument about specificity. It is perhaps simplest - if 
theoretically untenable - to acknowledge that these musical 
terms make no practical contribution to the study of 
literature which cannot be made by other metaphors. 26 
Similarly, in parallel fashion to the relation between program 
music and narrative, much literature would not be recognized 
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as having a "musical structure" unless so indicated by a 
title. 
Calvin Brown makes a fairly simple concluding statement 
to a book dealing with the poetic treatment of music: 
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The poem on a specific composition is, in general, 
inadequate and derivative. On the other hand, music has been 
an important source of inspiration ... in recent 
literature ... 27 
We are thus cast back to the notion of the membrane as 
suggested in Section 2, of art proceeding from music rather 
than towards it; the claims which the author makes for 
literature itself need not have a relation to how it is 
experienced. 28 Where the musical object is fictional, where it 
is idealized, the implicit presence of a signified is not as 
much of a controlling input as when the object is a real and 
heard one, around which signifiers have already accumulated. 
Nonetheless, it is in reading as writing, in interpretation, 
that stable linkages can be dissolved; once the domination of 
the signified is discarded (and also where it enters the range 
of signifiers as structure), reading about an existing object 
can be allowed freer play. 
The Novel 
Calvin Brown limits one of his musicoliterary studies to 
poetry alone, because, he explains, there are too many "vague 
uses of music as a part of the atmosphere or the setting of 
the novel" and because "also, in prose we can draw no sharp 
dividing line between attempts at an artistic treatment of a 
piece of music and simple program notes, technical 
descriptions, or analyses". 29 This statement gives a positive 
indication of the scope which the novel allows for metamusical 
and systemic heteroglossia here; it will be shown that the 
section from Doctor Faustus under consideration makes use of 
all the methods that Brown mentions. 
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Georg Lukacs argues that the novel differs from drama and 
poetry in that it entails an objective stance towards time and 
space; drama confuses time identity because it seems to occur 
in the present, while poetry lies somewhere between drama and 
the novel. 30 Lukacs' theorization of the novel, which is 
generally based upon realist texts, is shown to be limited 
exactly by the way in which Chapter VIII of Doctor Faustus 
plays with these issues: Kretschmar is in context an actor, 
and there is a sense of immediacy even though the event is 
twice refracted in time. The effect of the text seems also to 
be a highly visual one. Zeitblom is by no means an "objective" 
narrator - he is largely employed for the purpose of parody, 
and his careful memory of details from childhood experience in 
a chapter such as this one is definitely not a "realistic" 
possibility. In the first passage we are given Kretschmar's 
historical details - "realism", _for sure, but only an inkling 
of what is yet to come. 
Work 
The work here is the context of the text; it does not set its 
boundaries but may be said to posit them for analytical 
purposes. Once again what lies "behind" the work, what 
constitutes its supposed closing signified, can be drawn into 
the text at the same way that the text can be worked outwards 
to disrupt that_ closure. Let us, then, consider the work in 
teleological, hierarchical fashion, where telos reads as the 
attempt at historical closure. 
Thomas Mann's novel Doctor Faustus: The Life of the 
German Composer Adrian Leverkuhn as Told by a Friend was 
completed while he was in exile in California in 1947, and is 
perhaps the least well known, most difficult, and most widely 
misunderstood of his major works. 31 Although generally 
acknowledged as his most self-conscious attempt at artistic 
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innovation and avant-gardism, 32 this novel stands in 
problematic relation to the modernism conceived of by other 
writers such as Joyce, Woolf and Kafka. While actively 
attempting to theorize the modern in the terms of Theodor 
Adorne's cultural critique - which Fredric Jameson calls "one 
of the most pessimistic and thoroughgoing that we possess" 33 -
Mann struggles to embrace the full implications of this 
approach. The dichotomy between the profoundly alienating 
conclusions which such a critique necessitates and Mann's 
inability to forgo the humanist-Romantic roots which so 
strongly inform his earlier writings, finds its fictional 
counteridentifications alternately in the composer Adrian 
Leverki.ihn and his biographer Serenus Zeitblom. ~. 
Doctor Faustus is the culmination of a long-standing 
concern with the role of the artist in society, with death and 
sickness as a creative principle, and with music. 34 As such, it 
is an "end" novel, something which is also reflected in the 
thematic matter, and in the discussion of the sonata to come. 35 
In writing it, a lifelong interest in music is expanded in a 
thematic direction, and is brought into conjunction with 
intense speculation on the troubled fate of art and of the 
art~st in modern society, a situation which finds for Mann 
both correlative and cause in the fate of Germany under the 
Nazis. 
America, Germany 
It was during his stay in the United States that Mann 
formulated his most influential ideas on German culture and 
identity; the address entitled "Germany and the Germans" is 
perhaps his most famous, and reflects many of the concerns 
which found their way into the writing of Doctor Faustus. Mann 
argued that music, as well as a dangerously abstract notion of 
Romantic self-transcendence, are intrinsically bound up with 
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German identity. He writes: 
Music is both calculated order and chaos-breeding 
irrationality. It is rich in conjuring incantatory gestures, 
in magic of numbers, the most unrealistic and yet the most 
impassioned of arts, mystical and abstract. If Faust is to 
be the representative of the German soul, he would have to 
be musical, for the relation of the German to the world is 
abstract and mystical, that is, musical ... 36 
Kretschmar, then, represents Mann's own attempt at a more 
"balanced" subjectivity, one which is passionately bound up 
with German culture but which attempts to see the self from an 
outsider's - in this case American - vantage point. To place 
the analysis of Beethoven's last piano sonata in the mouth of 
one whose personal and artistic "roots" are truly German, but 
who also hails from what Mann perceived as a more. democratic 
culture, is to lend it both more objective authenticity as 
well as to locate it within a definite historicocultural 
program executed by one who can associate with the value of 
what is being said. 
It is perhaps relevant that Kretschmar's famous 
composition - the only one mentioned - is an opera, a form in 
which language is at least as important as music. In the same 
essay mentioned earlier, Mann writes - albeit unfactually -
that Germans are "primarily musicians of the vertical, not the 
horizontal ... instrumentalists rather than glorifiers of the 
human voice". 37 His caution regarding this phenomenon is 
revealed climactically in Doctor Faustus when Adrian Leverklihn 
decides to "take back" Beethoven's Ninth Symphony, the "good 
and noble ... what we call the human, although it is good, and 
noble" ; 38 the implicit association here between the appearance 
of words and what is "human" and "good" descends directly from 
Mann's reading of Kierkegaard. In the latter's The Concept of 
Dread the demonic is defined not as recklessness (of the Don 
Juan variety) but as "shut-upness" (Indesluttehed), that which 
wants no communication. 39 Such a retention of rationalist 
Christianity (which forms but one part of the philosopher's 
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complex system of aesthetic paradox) is basic to the theme of 
"inhumanity" and the return to the demonic in Leverklihn's 
music, and to Mann's critique of Wagner and Nietzsche in his 
later years. Although Kretschmat remains the original "music 
master" in the novel and is the one who convinces Leverklihn to 
follow his musical calling, he would at this early stage still 
to an extent seem to be associated with rationality as a 
positive influence. 
Unpretentious in appearance, a short, thickset, bullet-
headed man with a little clipped moustache and brown eyes 
prone to laughter, he might have meant a real boon to the 
cultural life of Kaisersachern if there had been any such life 
to begin with. 
Chains of Identity (1) 
Could Mann have had any real-life model in mind here? Could 
the "clipped moustache" have some peripheral relation to his 
own appearance or to that of Adolf Hitler, at the time the 
symbol of Germany for the rest of the world?. Such questions 
are perhaps not entirely pointless. Mann seems always to have 
laid great importance on the appearance of his characters:· of 
Zeitblom and Leverktihn he writes: 
My family was always asking me to describe [Leverklihn] . 
how mysteriously forbidden it was, in a way I had never felt 
before! Impossible in a different sense from the 
impossibility.of Zeitblom's describing himself .... Only the 
characters more remote from the centre of the book could be 
novelistic figures in the picturesque sense ... But not the 
two protagonists, who. had too much to conceal, namely the 
secret of their being.identical with each other. 40 
Elsewhere Mann writes that Zeitblom is a "parody" of himself 
and that in "Adrian's attitude towards life there is more of 
[his] own than one might think - or than the reader is 
intended to think". 41 Both Zeitblom and Leverklihn are also 
extensively associated with various other characters inside 
and outside the novel. The result is a web of identities, an 
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the humanist. Form and content, if anything, join within a 
third term that posits subjectivity itself above any 
established form; a "flattening" of narrative, structure, and 
historical content may be said to occur within an extended 
field of human subjectivity which after all is also the effect 
of one of the supposed capacities of music: its allowance for 
a multitude of imaginary identities. From a Lacanian 
perspective, both historical and fictive identities are 
accessed in metonymic {or contractive) fashion: a single 
signifier grants entry to a range of signification which 
allows for wider subjective identification; the "chains" also 
grant the possibility of including original identity. 
If any specific musical form was intended in chapter 8 at 
all, it would most probably have been the sonata form, one 
which Mann had already tried to employ long before. The 
chapter consists of Kretschmar delivering two lectures on 
Beethoven and one on Beissel, and a discussion of the young 
Adrian's opinions on all of this. A "failed" {a superficial) 
reading {but one possibly failing less in the identification 
of authorial intent) could see the transformation of the 
signifier "Kretschmar" via history into an "integrated" 
Leverktihn as an enactment of the theme, development, and 
recapitulation pattern of the classical sonata, again 
actualized in terms of interrelated human identities. 
His organ-playing was expert and excellent, but you could 
count on the fingers of one hand the number of those in the 
community able to appreciate it. Even so, a considerable 
number of people were attracted by his free afternoon 
concerts, in which he regaled us with organ music by Michael 
Pretorius, Froberger, Buxtehude, and of course Sebastian Bach, 
also all sorts of curious genre compositions from the time 
between Handel and Haydn's highest periods. Adrian and I 
attended these concerts regularly. 
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Mann and Music 
Mann's passion for music is well documented. 45 He has 
traditionally been a favourite source of quotation for writers 
on music who desire eloquent appraisals of its super-literary 
qualities, emotive power and so forth. He was among the very 
first novelists to engage seriously with the role of music in 
literature, employing both the sonata-allegro form and 
Wagner's leitmotif as structural principles in his early 
works. As early as 1918 Mann spoke of his work as that of a 
musician, comparing himself to Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, 
"men of letters as well as musicians, but the latter more than 
the former"; 46 he takes his place in an established German 
tradition of employing music in literature. 47 In 1936 he wrote 
of Tonio Kroger, published in 1903: 
Here probably I first learned to employ music as a shaping 
influence in my art. The conception of epic prose-
composition as a weaving of themes, as a musical complex of 
associations, I later employed largely in Der Zauberberg. 
Except that there the verbal leitmotif is no longer, as in 
Buddenbrooks, employed in the representation of form alone, 
but has taken on a less mechanical, more musical character, 
and tries to mirror the emotion and the idea. 48 
It is indeed in the work of Wagner that Mann's love for music 
is steeped. He often admitted that "[t]he triad world of the 
Ring ... is at bottom my musical homeland", 49 and from early on 
he was fascinated by the dangerously irrational reactions of 
audiences to Wagner's operas50 - the story "The Blood of the 
Walsungs" is evidence of this interest. 
Mann lacked substantial formal education in music, and 
was lucky to have among the group of exiles living in 
California at the time none less than Adorno, Stravinsky and 
Schoenberg. During the writing of Doctor Faustus he was also 
in contact with Ernst Krenek, Hanns Eisler, Ernst Toch, Artur 
Rubinstein, Bruno Walter and a number of other famous 
musicians. He writes about his attempts at learning from these 
men: 
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It was almost alarming to see what concern the technical 
musical aspect of the book was giving me. For one of the 
chief demands of the book was a command of these 
technicalities, at least to the extent that no professional 
(and there is no more jealously guarded profession) could 
laugh at me. 51 
The subject position engaged with here is one that appeals to 
the modernist: there is an implied attempt, in the study of 
music by an outsider, at "secret knowledge", at access to a 
hermetic code in which the self, in the absence of God, can 
reign as supreme principle. 52 Through a reformulation of 
language via music this position has access to the "new", to 
the yet unspoken; narcissism lies in precarious balance with 
the perceived capability of escaping or complicating an 
existing verbal symbolic. 
It was indeed one of the most complex writers to whom 
Mann turned to for large--scale assistance: the German 
philosopher Theodor Adorno. Mann relates in The Story how he 
read the unpublished manuscript of Adorne's Philosophy of 
Music while writing his novel, and how many sections were 
completed to Adorne's exact specifications. 53 Much of 
Leverkuhn's dialogue is taken almost directly from Adorne's 
writings, and the lectures on music by the figure Kretzschmar 
are in places almost verbatim transcriptions of Adorne's 
private talks. Rose Rosengard Subotnik goes so far as to call 
Doctor Faustus "the closest thing to a definitive exegesis of 
Adorno' s music criticism". 54 The result is a novel that is 
extremely difficult to read for both initiated and 
uninitiated; it attempts to reach the perceived limits of 
grammar, language identity, philosophy, and ultimately of 
expression. 
In any case, Doctor Faustus offers a range of 
possibilities for investigating relations between music and 
language: intertextually, structurally, philosophically, 
thematically. The discursive sources of "language on music" 
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can to an extent be identified, and attempts at narrative 
production from within music can be placed against these other 
relational concerns. 
Schoenberg 
In discussing the sources for his ideas on music Mann writes 
about Adorne's Philosophy of Music: 
The manuscript [Adorno] brought me ... dealt largely with 
Schonberg [sic], his school, and the twelve-tone technique. 
The author professes his belief in Schonberg's commanding 
importance, but then goes on to subject the system to a 
profound and searching criticism. In a pithy, excessively 
sharpened style that owes much to Nietzsche and still more 
to Karl Kraus, he shows the dire consequences that must flow 
from the constructive Schonbergian approach to music. 
However necessary it may be to subject music to rigorous 
rational analysis, and however illuminating that may be, the 
effect is just the converse of rationality. Over the head of 
the artist, as it were, the art is cast back-into a dark, 
mythological realm. What could fit in better into my world 
of the 'magic square' ? 55 
Mann did not like Schoenberg's music, 56 and would not have 
heard much of it by the time he had finished the novel. 57 It 
was the idea of a "system" which appealed to him, and finally 
adapted Schoenberg's dodecaphonic technique for his own 
purposes, misrepresenting it so as to criticize what he 
perceived as the condition of modern music. 58 
The interaction among Mann, Adorno and Schoenberg in the 
production and subsequent history of Doctor Faustus has been 
the subject of a large number of articles, 59 and has been 
described by Robert Craft as "[o]ne of the strangest incidents 
in modern literary history". 60 After the publication of the 
novel Schoenberg accused Adorno of somehow divulging secret 
knowledge and threatened to sue Mann himself for appropriating 
his own method of twelve-tone composition and presenting it as 
the invention of the fictional Leverki.ihn. 61 Mann's own conduct 
in the affair seems to have been highly disingenuous: it is 
inconceivable, given all the instances of direct plagiarism, 
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that he is sincere when writing in The Saturday Review of 
Literature that there is "no point of contact, not a shade of 
similarity, between the origin, the traditions, the character, 
and the fate of my musician, on the one hand, and the 
existence of Schoenberg, on the other."" Many instances also 
occur in this later book where he tries to def end the system 
in context as his "property". 63 
Can the extremity of intertextual borrowing be explained 
in terms of a fluid music-language relationship? The musical 
system (tonality, serialism), which is by its nature also 
systemic in the way we have defined, is that part of music 
which is most accessible to language; "ownership" of such a 
system amounts to an attempt at diachronic fixing which denies 
the temporal flexibility intrinsic to a dialectical music-
language interaction. Mann's behaviour towards Schoenberg, 
should perhaps rather be seen as an extreme instance of 
uncompromising adherence to a limited systemic formulation 
which results exactly from applying such a formulation to the 
larger historical status of music. In other words, the attempt 
to negate the expressive potential of modern music - which is, 
after all, one of the main points on which Mann's system 
differs from Schoenberg's intentions for his own music - as a 
literary concern leads to rigidity, dogma, and the necessity 
of linguistic and authorial control. 64 
The Canon 
Music, in the section cited, like the small-town and typically 
old-German setting of Kaisersachern, provides the background 
for what is to come: for the lecture, for the entry of 
Beethoven, for Adrian's development as artist. The musical 
setting is an early one: mostly baroque and pre-baroque German 
music, played on the organ, an instrument with strong baroque 
and ecclesiastical connotations. 
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We find in this section the language of biography, as 
well as the language of fictional biography, of the 
Bildungsroman. Leverkiihn's early musical influences are 
identified: the older German canon (which "of course" includes 
Bach), up to Haydn, all of which provides a framework for the 
impending introduction of Beethoven. Leverkiihn is placed 
within a developmental line; as the "hero of our time",e the 
authentic artist of the modern age, he is positioned as the 
inheritor of a long musical tradition which is for Mann 
necessarily a German one (even here no works by composers of 
differing nationality are performed; the "curious genre 
compositions" merely function to strengthen the canon itself, 
providing variety and interest). The interdependence of the 
demonic and the divine, to become of major importance later in 
the novel, is introduced for the first time and is also given 
biographical relevance. 
A complete failure, on the other hand, at least to all 
appearance, were the lectures which he held indefatigably 
throughout a whole season in the hall of the Society of 
Activities for the Common Weal, accompanied by illustrations 
on the piano and demonstrations on the blackboard. They were a 
failure in the first place because our population had on 
principle no use for lectures; and secondly because his themes 
were not popular but rather capricious and out of the 
ordinary; and in the third place because his stutter made 
listening to them a nerve-wracking occupation, sometimes 
bringing your heart into your mouth, sometimes tempting you to 
laughter, and altogether calculated to distract your attention 
from the intellectual treat in anxious expectation of the next 
convulsion. 
Hearing, Lecturing 
The trope appears: listening to music itself is easier than 
listening to language on it; why should lectures have to 
interfere with the immediacy of listening? What exactly is to 
be gained by fragmenting music at the keyboard (the uniform 
musical workplace), by explaining its structures graphically 
on a blackboard? 
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The novel itself, like most writing on music, constitutes 
the answer to this question: Mann needs a format - the novel, 
the lecture - in which to develop music thematically rather 
than descriptively (the second and third reasons for the 
lectures' failure are inventions for normalizing the 
narrative), to use language at all. Music in Doctor Faustus is 
a condition of modern life: Kretschmar, then, is the one who 
first attempts to deal with it, as historian, as analyst, as 
one who is aware of a fatal condition in Beethoven's work. He 
is "indefatigable" in his lecturing: music must be made both a 
more important and a more conscious experience, and it is of 
course only through language that such a critical social or 
cultural commitment can be actualized. 
Inclusion, Exclusion 
Thomas Mann was convinced that his novel would be 
misunderstood in .America; 66 narcissism here functions as the 
desire for exclusion, as a reinstatement of the authorial 
position, if not via control over the text, then via its 
difficulty. 67 In The Story he mentions his irritation at 
finding that Herman Hesse was working on a novel the concerns 
of which seemed to parallel his; in the same section he adds: 
I admit to a wholehearted contempt for mediocrity. The 
mediocre know nothing of excellence and therefore lead an 
easy, stupid life. To my mind, too many people write. 68 
Zeitblom and the young Leverklihn are of the few who attend 
Kretschmar's lectures; while attending "art music" concerts -
especially those at which works from the established canon are 
performed - is an easy way of positioning the self as 
"cultured" in the most banal of senses, attending difficult 
lectures on music entails a different manner of experiencing 
such music altogether. 
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A number of recent studies have attempted to redefine the 
notion of musical appreciation or understanding; empirical 
experiments have for instance tried to show that appreciation 
of form is not successful even amongst the most "educated" 
listeners. 69 The "return of the listener"70 seems to be a 
phenomenon that is gaining critical ground, in a parallel if 
belated version of the role of the reader in the work of 
Culler, Fish, Barthes and Eco. The exclusivity of the 
twentieth-century "serious music" world has been similarly 
attacked by conservative 71 and feminist camps alike. 72 This 
process is also accompanied by a dismantling of the notion of 
"art music" in the works of composers such as Kevin Volans, 
Philip Glass and Michael Nyman and in more recent electronic 
and sample-based ambient music. Whereas uneducated listening 
is often bound to suffer under the tyranny of melody and to 
miss elements such as irony and quotation in music to a 
greater extent than the uneducated reader would miss the same 
in literature {how many "educated" first-time listeners would 
recognize the use of Bach in Alban Berg's Violin Concerto 
anyway?), the validity of response in itself - especially when 
located in the body, in emotion, rather than within 
intellectual apprehension - seems to be gaining recognition 
above that of understanding proper. Education is in any case 
often a question of knowing what to look for; in other words, 
a question of language containing music: language becomes a 
measure of exclusivity. 
For the purposes of the novel, however, the distinction 
is important: if anything new or serious is to be said about 
music, it is likely to be done in exclusive terms. Leverklihn, 
the immediate inheritor of the Romantic tradition, in which 
the artist for the first time moves from "public servant to 
isolated genius", 73 is also essentially bourgeois: culture aims 
to protect itself via self-transcendence, and in works from 
-·- ·- - .. ~ - .. 
• • ~·······~ · ·~ ·-·· • ···•·•• ••• ~.~ ..... ,.,v ............... ,,.,~ ......... ,;1, .. ·.···~.,~ ..... , ....... ~ ....... • .... ~-····•······ · .. ~~·.-.. .. .. 
71 
the modern age this is achieved through increased hermeticism. 
In a positive sense such exclusivity amounts to non-
cooperation with the dominant symbolic (this is also perhaps 
why Kretschmar's lectures are "capricious and out of the 
ordinary"). The listening or reading subject is denied easy 
association with music which has already formed accepted 
linguistic bonds within society, and it is exactly a 
reformulation of music through language which serves to this 
effect. 
As will be shown, however, Mann's commitment to humanism 
(and also his love of humour, of parody itself) prevents him 
from taking an extreme position in this regard. While Doctor 
Faustus is in general highly difficult to read (a factor which 
is in any case due more to its explicit intellectual content 
than to formal and stylistic innovation of the kind found in 
Joyce and Faulkner) this is not the case in all places. There 
is to be found in the novel a strange dialectic - one that 
parallels the easy oscillation of the sublime and the obscene 
or banal in Shakespeare and Goethe - between passages 
containing difficult argument and passages that are merely 
entertaining or informative (and, in the case of the section 
dealing with Leverkilhn's nephew, almost sensationalist). From 
a negative perspective it would seem that narcissism - of 
author, narrator and reader - appears here plainly in its 
liberal humanist sense, so that the individual can exist as 
most important entity by being allowed a position of 
exclusivity while still taking, as a self-protective measure, 
the interests of greater humanity into account. 
His stutter was of a particularly typical and developed 
kind - tragic, because he was a man gifted with great and 




Why is Kretschmar, the person who has so much to say, made to 
stutter? Such an unusual characteristic may be linked fairly 
safely to conscious authorial intrusion; it seems to us that 
the stutter must be there for a reason. In other words, it is 
conceivable that Mann is putting forward a systemic 
proposition: serious language on music is fragmented, 
interspersed with tension and silence. 
Primarily, however, Kretschmar's stutter provides parody 
and comic relief in a chapter of which the intellectual 
content is both highly complex and unilateral (it is not part 
of the dialogue between characters, whereas most of the other 
academic discussion in the novel is). On this level, the 
stutter, "which was calculated to distract your attention from 
the intellectual" concerns, is a direct enactment of the 
principle set.up in which language is a measure of 
exclusivity: it both parodies and "humanizes", and introduces 
the presence of the body into language which might otherwise 
lose its relation to both reader and music itself. Conversely, 
as a departure from fluid technical (dehumanized) use of 
language, it might also in an emotional sense be considered a 
physical rebellion against the absence of "melody" in 
language, of the melos which was during the Renaissance 
believed to accompany the emotional use of words. 74 
But it is ~ot melos which is reinstated: rather, words 
cannot articulate; they are syntagmatically self-obstructive. 
Is Mann employing the trope of the silent musician - shades of 
the handicapped Beethoven - who communicates better in music 
than in language? Stuttering can be linked to the unspeakable 
- in Lacanian terms, that which is repressed - and in 
Kretschmar's case this may well relate both to the difficulty 
of subjective assertion in the modern age and to the 
inadequacy of language to do justice to music itself, to the 
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impossibility of fulfilling desire within language. 
Chains of Identity (2) 
The given passage can be read in conjunction with one from The 
Story: 
[Adorno] is a cousin of Walter Benjamin, harried to death by 
the Nazis ... Adorno ... is a person of similar mental cast, 
uncompromising, tragically brilliant, operating on the 
highest level. Having grown up in an atmosphere entirely 
dominated by theory {political theory as well) and artistic, 
primarily musical, interests, he studied philosophy and 
music. 75 
It is of course from Adorno's ideas that Kretschmar's lecture 
is constructed; the disappearance of the subject within 
modernity is an important element in Adorno's writings on 
later music and can be directly related to the lecturer's 
supposed difficulty of articulating complex musicological 
ideas. Kretschmar in this sense, then, prefigures via the body 
the ideas which will be drawn from Beethoven's last piano 
sonata. 
And his little bark would move upon the waters by stretches 
swift and dancing, with a suspicious ease that might make-one 
forget and scout his affliction. But inevitably, from time to 
time, while constantly and only too justifiably awaited, came 
the moment of disaster; and there he stood, with red, swollen 
face on the rack; whether stuck on a sibilant, which he 
weathered with wide-stretched mouth, making the noise of an 
engine giving off steam; or wrestling with a labial, his 
cheeks puffed out, his lips launched into a crackling quick-
fire of short, soundless explosions; or finally, when with his 
breathing in helpless disorder, his mouth like a funnel, he 
would gasp for breath like a fish out of water; laughing with 
tears in his eyes, for it is a fact that he himself seemed to 
treat the thing as a joke. Not everybody could take that 
consoling view; the public was really not to be blamed if it 
avoided the lectures with that degree of unanimity that in 
fact several times not more than half a dozen hearers occupied 
the seats: my parents, Adrian's uncle, young Cimabue, the two 
of us, and a few pupils from the girls' high school, who did 
not fail to giggle when the speaker stuttered. 
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Comedy, Rhetoric 
As suggested earlier, comedy is a way of "humanizing" the 
novelistic essay form. Mann writes in The Story that one 
reason for including Zeitblom as narrator was to provide more 
humour in the novel; 76 he also mentions a diary entry 
commenting on the peculiar effect of a public reading by Bruno 
Frank, who 
uses the humanistic narrative style of Zeitblom with 
complete seriousness as his own. In matters of style I 
really no longer admit anything but parody. In this, close 
to Joyce ... 77 
In the section cited Mann uses the language of the Bible, of 
slapstick humour, of warfare, of technical linguistics. These 
are all merged together in long, syntactically confusing or at 
places rhetorical sentences designed to equalize these 
discourses and to deliver parody via juxtaposition. There is 
perhaps nothing intrinsically "musical" about such use of 
parody except that language proceeds towards losing control, 
towards attaining connotative meanings that are more relevant 
than the denotative ones of the words in question. 78 
The humour is however not there for all, and the fact 
that Kretschrnar can laugh at himself in the manner described 
foreshadows the "demonic laughter" or emotional coldness 
associated with Leverkilhn later on in the novel. 
Kretschmar wold have been ready to defray out of his own 
pocket such expenses for hall and lighting as were not covered 
by the ticket money. But my father and Nikolaus Leverkuhn had 
arranged in committee to have the society make up the deficit, 
or rather relinquish the charge for the hall, on the plea that 
the lectures were important for culture and served the common 
good. That was a friendly gesture; the effect on the Common 
Weal was doubtful, since the community did not attend them, in 
part, as I said, because of the all too specialized character 
of the subjects treated. Wendell Kretschmar honoured the 
principle, which we repeatedly heard from his lips, first 
formed by the English tongue, that to arouse interest was not 
a question of the interest of others, but of our own; it could 
only be done, but then infallibly was, if one was 
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fundamentally interested in a thing oneself, so that when one 
talked about it one could hardly help drawing others in, 
infecting them with it, and so creating an interest up to then 
not present or dreamed of. And that was worth a great deal 
more than catering to one already existent. 
S/Z 
In the original German, the name of our lecturer reads 
"Kretzschmar". Why would the translator have chosen to drop 
the "z"? 
In Barthes' analysis of Balzac's "Sarassine", the letter 
"z" is identified as the "letter of deviation", of inversion, 
the "initial of castration". 79 Did the translator, Helen Lowe-
Porter, decide to "soften" Kretzschmar's name, or to remove 
the "wound of deficiency" located within its graphological 
format? 80 It is hardly likely that her translation would have 
historically prefigured Barthes' idiosyncratic association 
with the letter, or that there would have been a reason to 
divert attention away from the borrowing of the name from the 
German musicologist Hermann Kretzschmar, director of the 
Berlin Hochschule ftir Musik from 1909 to 1920, 81 whose life 
history and musical orientation have only marginal 
similarities to those of .Mann's character. 82 Instead, we see 
translation effecting the castrative act itself inversely: the 
space of relativity, of ambiguity (here intertextual), is 
imposed as a condition of secondary reading; the lecturer's 
castrated tongue is removed from his graphological presence. 
Whereas for Barthes it is the dash between the two letters 
which constitutes "the surface of the mirror, ... the 
abstraction of limit"83 (or, in the terms of an earlier 
argument, the line between presence and absence), translation 
here removes the .Other entirely, and disempowerment, in the 
form of not being able to distinguish between what can and 
cannot be said, is institutionalized as approach to the text 
itself. 
--
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Mann and Nietzsche 
Erich Heller has also made the unlikely suggestion that the 
name "Kretzschmar" is to some extent an anagram of 
"Nietzsche", an intellectual source who had far more influence 
on the writing of Doctor Faustus than the original 
Kretzschmar. 84 Mann refers to his own reading of Nietzsche in 
The Story, 85 and admits to incorporating various of his 
biographical details into Leverktihn' s own life story; 86 further 
parallels between the two figures - especially their mutual 
Faustian nature - are elaborated extensively elsewhere. 0' 
Mann elaborates his views on Nietzsche most clearly in 
the essay called "Nietzsche's Philosophy in the Light of Our 
Experience". Here he criticizes the philosopher for being too 
fundamentally opposed to reason, and for shifting aesthetics 
itself to a position where it governs both life and morality. 
Mann is primarily at odds with the fact that Nietzsche 
denounces the latter in favour of the former, rather than 
following the more Kierkegaardian opposition between 
aesthetics and ethics. 88 In Doctor Faustus Nietzsche's beliefs 
- especially those dealing with culture and "barbarity" - are, 
as it were, put to the test and brought to their full 
implication, with a resultant critique that is similar to that 
presented in the essay on Nietzsche. 89 
But to what extent are Nietzsche's own views on music 
still incorporated by Mann? 9° For Nietzsche, music directly 
offers an alternative to rationalism and to the predominance 
of the visual associated with it. In The Birth of Tragedy out 
of the Spirit of Music the metaphysics of knowledge and 
morality are replaced with a metaphysics of music; Dionysiac 
destruction and "becoming" are opposed to Apollonian 
"appearance" and linked t6 a "separation of life from art", to 
"the annihilation of the real", 91 a position which music of 
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course fills comfortably. Nietzsche writes that 
Out of the Dionysian root of the German spirit, a power has 
arisen which, having nothing in common with the original 
conditions of Socratic culture, can neither be explained nor 
excused by it, but which is rather felt by this culture as 
something terribly inexplicable and overwhelmingly hostile -
German music as we must understand it, particularly in its 
vast solar orbit from Bach to Beethoven, from Beethoven to 
Wagner. 92 
The unusual level of nationalism encountered here would of 
course by no means be unusual in Mann's case; besides this 
superficial similarity, a belief in the romantically 
unspeakable power of music expressed here (it is absolute 
music which is for Nietzsche the "original metaphysical 
form" 93 ) directly parallels Mann 1 s attraction to music as 
discussed elsewhere. The novel can perhaps be included as 
object of attack in Nietzsche's polemic against the "curious 
arrogance" of placing music "in the service of a series of 
images and concepts, to use it as a means to an end" , 94 but it 
is a Nietzschean affinity to music which Mann comes to 
reproduce in the writing of his book. 
Language on Music as Inspiration 
Kretschmar's assertion that "to arouse interest [is] not a 
question of the interest of others but of our own" is of 
course a reflection par excellence of the Nietzschean - and 
Beethovenian - principle of individualism. Language on music 
here exists in a "pure" form: new musical experience is 
introduced through language; desire is at first constituted on 
a linguistic basis only. Such a unidirectional approach is of 
course not technically possible: it would otherwise have to 
depend on an entirely exclusive subject position (Kretschmar 
must have been the first to hear the sonata, to understand it 
in this specific way) . Yet in the context of fiction, and also 
in the context of reading, language is placed in a liberated 
space - it leads towards music as "magical other", as that 
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which exists within the verbal text as a future presence. 
It was a pity that our public gave him almost no 
opportunity to prove his theory. With us few, sitting at his 
feet in the yawning emptiness of the old hall with the 
numbered chairs, he proved it conclusively, for he held us 
charmed by things of which we should never have thought they 
could so capture our attention; even his frightful impediment 
did in the end affect us only as a stimulating and compelling 
expression of the zeal he felt. Often did we all nod at him 
consolingly when the calamity came to pass, and one or the 
other of the gentlemen would utter a soothing "There, there!" 
or "It's all right," or "Never mind!" Then the spasm would 
relax in a merry, apologetic smile and things would run on 
again in an almost uncanny fluency, for a while. 
Speaking 
If this section is compared to Leverktihn's lecture and last 
performance at the house in Pfeiffering, 95 the first obvious 
difference is the reaction of the audience to what is being 
said. Whereas Leverktihn's pre-psychotic use of archaic German 
represents a complication of language parallel to Kretschmar's 
stutter, the old-German Gemutlichkeit found here has by this 
stage been replaced by rejection, incomprehension and 
vulgarization. Both characters exist outside the verbal 
symbolic to some extent: Kretschmar's language is broken and 
in large parts consists of silence, while Leverktihn reverts to 
archaic (pre-contemporary) convention, effecting a dissipation 
of the subjective which directly parallels Adorne's analysis 
of the music of Beethoven and modernist composers. Kretschmar 
may once again be said to prefigure Mann's composer (in the 
Barthesian sense his body emanates from a text in which the 
body of the latter is completely absent), but is substantially 
different in that he is still zealous, still has things to say 
in what would if possible be a direct manner. The paradox 
here, that silences speak more truthfully, is perhaps more 
applicable to Adorne's analysis of Beethoven's late work than 
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to the complete overriding of the subject which he identifies 
in the modernist compositions upon which Leverki.ihn's works are· 
modelled; like Beethoven's late music, Kretschmar's stutter 
here is an early symptom of what is to come. 
What did he talk about? Well, the man was capable of 
spending a whole hour on the question: Why did Beethoven not 
write a third movement to the Piano Sonata Opus 111? It is 
without a doubt a matter ·worth discussing. But think of it in 
the light of the posters outside the hall of Activities for 
the Common Weal, or inserted in the Kaisersachern Railway 
Journal, and ask yourself the amount of public interest it 
would arouse. People positively did not want to know why Op. 
111 has only two movements. 
Introducing a Lecture 
Mann is indulging in a bit of bad faith here: thus far the 
intellectual content of the chapter has been elided, and by 
letting Zeitblom assume the voice of easy camaraderie, he 
downplays an issue that has been extensively discussed. 96 By 
marginalizing the relevance of the lecture in the same fashion 
as the population of Kaisersachern, Mann-Zeitblom is negating 
the musical subject at the moment where that subject is still 
absent. In a more theoretical sense (which once again 
prefigures Adorno's analysis of Opus 111) he is paradoxically 
able to lead into the discussion by denying its "speech 
potential" ·first. In keeping with the argument on exclusivity 
presented earlier, Mann also has to move into a more technical 
sphere for simpler reasons; he writes elsewhere: 
There is nothing sillier, in a novel about an artist, than 
merely to assert the existence of art, to talk about genius, 
about works, to hail these and rave about their effects upon 
the souls of the audience. No, concrete reality, exactitude, 
were needed - this was utterly clear to me. 97 
What is the value of the question in context? The 
question as critical or artistic mechanism can also be 
theorized as a membrane, an intrinsically unstable frame, that 
80 
which does not fix meaning, but which opens possibilities 
outward instead of drawing them towards the signified of the 
text. A question such as the one which forms the title of the 
lecture (a "why" question) of course expects a stable answer -
the lecture promises to follow a pattern of metamusical 
production: a containment will be made, a "solution" in 
language will be given to a problem of musical experience. How 
Kretschmar will approach an essentially eschatological process 
- how he will negotiate between novelty and closure - is of 
prime importance. For most of the Kaisersachern population, 
however, the question as such does not exist: desire is 
inactive, and we find an example of complete failure, where 
language, at its most vulnerable but potentially most 
effective, fails as metamusical discourse. 
The Work 
A composition that is given an opus number is regarded as a 
"work" deemed worthy - firstly, of course, by publishers - ofe 
inclusion in a composer's official musical history; 
historiography here entails the collection of facts related to 
the production of the work. Beethoven's last piano sonata, 
dedicated to the Archduke Rudolph of Austria, was completed 
early in 1822, the third of a closely interrelated series 
which, with the Hammerklavier Sonata and the Diabelli 
variations, forms the main body of piano works composed within 
what Lenz and other biographers identify as his third or last 
creative period. Here Beethoven returned to C minor - a key 
which he had not used for any sonata since the Pathetique - to 
write the last of four sonatas in his career that contain only 
two movements. 
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We who were present at the explanation had indeed an 
uncommonly enriching evening, and this although the sonata 
under discussion was to that date entirely unknown to us. 
Still it was precisely through these lectures that we got to 
know it, and as a matter of fact very much in detail; for 
Kretschmar played it to us on the inferior cottage piano that 
was all he could command, a grand piano not being granted him. 
The Piano 
Op. 111 concluded a long and fruitful interaction with a 
musical form which not only - unlike in the case of his 
predecessors - produced some of Beethoven's greatest works but 
also acted as a reliable barometer of his development as 
composer. The piano itself plays a massively important role in 
Beethoven's world. He was an accomplisheaperfoimer and a 
great improviser, 98 and when Charles Rosen writes that 
"Beethoven is perhaps the first composer for whom the 
exploratory function of music took precedence over every 
other: pleasure, instruction, and even, at times, expression" 99 
it is work at the piano which forms the initial and physical 
step in the process. 
One of the most widely quoted statements made by 
Beethoven is that the "pianoforte is, after all, an 
unsatisfactory instrument" . 100 Beethoven's return to the church 
modes in his late string quartets was one way of attempting to 
gain a greater expressivity which the keyboard, "the elegant 
embodiment of the Renaissance concept of uniform pitch 
space", 101 might not have offered. Joanna Goldstein points out, 
however, that the composer's dissatisfaction may well have had 
partly to do with the instrument technology of the time; 102 the 
"inferior cottage piano" that Kretschmar plays is perhaps 
closer to the Hammerflugel of Beethoven's· time than to the 
grand pianos Kretschmar's contemporary audience would have 
been used to. It is highly probable that Beethoven would have 
pref erred later pianos, and we find in the performance of the 
sonata a good example of unstable poiesis, of authorial intent 
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both reproduced and uncertain. 
Iterability 
The small audience is faced with the new, that which for 
Derrida is impossible. In Limited Inc. Derrida argues that 
meaning can only come about as a result of iterability; 103 that 
which appears for the first time has no meaning, or if it has, 
is a reformulation of recognizable meanings. The uniterated is 
thus different from the general impossibility of temporally 
and otherwise unmediated meaning which results from the 
process of differance: it lies on the other end of the 
eschatological scale, appearing long before it strains towards 
presence, or the "coming of the Other". 
But how does music relate to this? It would seem that we 
have here an instance in which poststructuralist theory does 
not survive the transition into the philosophy of music: 
because sound units are not as easily defined as linguistic 
ones, there can be no such thing as a "nonsense sound" . 104 What 
newly appears in the world of instrumental music will 
obviously convey certain connotations, but where something (a 
texture, a combination of sounds) produces new experience,. the 
experience exists, albeit as loss (which is not uniform 
either). 
We thus have "levels of the new": Beethoven's Op. 111 is 
"entirely unknown" to Zeitblom and Leverklihn, yet the name of 
the composer and the musical form already assumes knowledge 
and expectation. On the other hand, getting to know the sonata 
"very much in detail" is also a subjective proposition: 
because no "full knowledge" on a piece of music can ever be 
claimed, the new will also exist at all times. 
83 
He played it capitally despite the rumbling noise the 
instrument made; analysing its intellectual content with great 
impressiveness as he went, describing the circumstances under 
which it - and two others - were written and expatiating with 
caustic wit upon the master's own explanation of the reason 
why he had not done a third movement corresponding to the 
first. 
The Impossible Situation 
In one sentence here, we find four different secondary 
responses to music: description of performance, analysis, 
description of poietic context, and witty biographical 
description. It is as if Mann is attempting to transcend 
literary boundaries by what will be the inclusion of all 
forms, to aim for an unsuccessful exhaustion. The fact that no 
hierarchy of metamusical discourses is formed indicates a 
striving for fullness via equalization. This situation is of 
course impossible: Kretschmar cannot do· all of this at once, 
even though Mann's sleight of hand would have us believe so 
(playing the piano is mentioned before any extract from the 
lecture, even though this contradicts the sequence of events 
as clarified later on) . A further simple impossibility lies in 
the fact that Zeitblom remembers a lecture heard as a child in 
so much detail. 
Could we see this as the metamusical entering the 
metasystemic as fantasy? Rosemary Jackson in her book of that 
title links fantasy to Bakhtin's notion of the carnivalesque, 
the menippean situation where different discourses, different 
worlds can exist without conflict. 105 It has often been said, 
albeit usually within reactionary writing, that "all music is 
fantasy": 106 the relatively unlimited scope for projection 
offered by music would. seem to allow a connection with 
Jackson's formulation. 
We are faced once again with the imaginary, the ideal: 
Mann's metasystemic conglomeration is an impossible rendering 
of music exactly because it attempts to capture such an 
imaginary. Barthes speaks of the subject gaining "access to 
bliss by the cohabitation of languages working side by 
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side" ; 101 desire is located within the rupturing of a position 
of unified control, and it is here that the "word of music" 
may be said to come into existence, as an object of 
aspiration, of impossible emulation. 
Performance 
Where does description of performance fit into our tripartite 
division? As a genre, such description is perhaps the most 
common and "safest" way of using language on music. The fact 
that Kretschmar plays "capitally" (vortrefflich) reflects on 
Zeitblom's own old-bourgeois sensibilities; it is also easy to 
locate such a judgment within an implied line of subjective 
evaluation, one that is less susceptible to rigorous critique 
because it never claims objectivity. But is this metamusical, 
systemic or metasystemic usage? 
The difficulty of answering this question lies exactly 
within the problem of relating performance to the ontological 
identity of music, in other words, to the question of whether 
music "exists" within the score, within the performance, or 
within perception - immediate or remembered - itself. 108 Is 
performance a "rewriting" of the existing composition, or is 
it a gloss on how music should best be brought across? A 
musical performance is intrinsically different from a public 
literary reading: even the most accomplished musicians usually 
insist on the need to hear scores; the level of musical 
education necessary to "grasp" music from a pure score reading 
is furthermore substantially higher than the knowledge of 
theatre required to imagine a dramatic play on stage. 
Central to the issue is the question of interpretation. 
The level of autonomy granted the performer is of course a 
historical variable: Alan Durant writes that during the early 
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nineteenth century the musician became an instrument for 
authorial intention, that "the orchestra is transformed from 
an ensemble of musicians into a huge instrument which the 
composer plays by notation"; 109 yet during the twentieth 
century the interpreter has in some ways achieved a status 
almost equal to that of the composer. This is no doubt largely 
due to market forces: names of conductors sell CDs, and so on. 
The rise of the performer is usually not a democratic process: 
the "best" performance is still identified as the one that is 
closest to contemporary conceptions of authorial intention. As 
regards musical meaning, performance presents a complication 
too: esthesic perception is necessarily twice refracted, and 
it is impossible to stipulate how much of what is perceived 
amounts to the author's or the performer's intention. Once 
again, music is shown as being freer than language in this 
regard. Durant also argues that the visual component of 
performance constitutes an important part of how music is 
experienced, 110 which brings us back to Zeitblom's words on 
Kretschmar. 
Again eliding direct reference to music, the chapter thus 
far - despite its denotative contents - has produced a highly 
visual effect: due, in part, to Mann's use of auditory images 
that have equally strong visual connotations (the ocean, the 
fish, the steam engine), and due also to the continual 
reminder of the presence and experience of the audience, of 
the extent to which the situation is a spectacle, a comic 
corporeal performance by a clown lecturer. The practice of 
music criticism can of course hardly avoid describing the 
visual, nor can it avoid commenting on the qualities of music 
in the simplest metamusical terms: even here there are no 
clear breaks, and the question asked at the beginning of this 
section avoids a singular answer in the most practical of 
terms too. 
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As regards language on interpretation, however, Mann does 
manage to achieve an unusual success once Kretschmar actually 
starts analyzing the sonata. Interpretation occurs via 
performance and verbally at the' same time: in other words, 
Kretschmar provides - in the dialectical fashion described 
above - a metanarrative for his own performance. It is of 
course impossible to judge how closely these two relate to 
each other; for purely textual purposes, the language of 
performance is vitalized by insight into interpretative 
principles. 111 
The Beethoven Myth 
Thus far Beethoven has only been mentioned once, in the title 
of the lecture; here, without further ado, he is referred to 
as "the master". 
The word "Beethoven" itself is what Barthes might term a 
"mythical signifier", a social reflection that· has been 
inverted and naturalized. 1u Its historical proximity to the 
signifier "great music" has remained intact with remarkable 
tenacity, even where such music itself is negated from a mass 
music perspective. The "connoted system" which is linked to it 
may well contain, in Barthes' sense, the ideological 
signifieds of German "mastery", high culture, patriarchy and 
so forth, but it seems as if neither cultural criticism nor 
what Barthes calls the "pull of the purely signifier" - the 
turning of the word into "pure form" - has in this instance 
managed to dismantle the Romantic "discourse of the hero" or 
musical genius. Thus Joseph Kerman could write in 1980 that 
"Beethoven has survived demythification"113 • Even when a 
feminist musicologist such as Susan McClary criticizes the 
"masculinist" violence of development and closure procedures 
in Beethoven's 9th Symphony, 114 the tensions she identifies are 
not far removed from those elements which - as shall be seen -
for Adorno render this work "authentic"; she admits that 
[t]he Ninth Symphony is probably our most compelling 
articulation in music of the contradictory impulses that 
have organized patriarchal culture since the Enlightenment. 
Moreover, within the parameters of his own musical 
composition, he may be heard as enacting a critique of 
narrative obligations that is every bit as devastating as 
[that effected by Adrienne] Rich's [poem " The Ninth 
Symphony of Beethoven Understood at Last as a Sexual 
Message"] or [Janika] Vandervelde's ["Jack and the 
Beanstalk"] . 115 
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Whereas Beethoven was exceedingly popular while still 
alive, an ensuing Romantic sensibility that targeted him as 
the archetypal artist-as-hero pushed his standing to 
unprecedented heights. Bettine von Arnim, a friend of Goethe, 
was particularly influential in promoting this view during the 
-,, 
earlier part of the Nineteenth Century, initiating a 
personality cult based on attributes which Arnold Schmitz 
identifies as child of nature, revolutionary, magician, 
religious leader and prophet. 116 While classical-style stoicism 
remains important to the myth's inherent moral idealism, these 
Romantic qualities soon gained precedence. 
We thus find the composer described in messianic terms by 
Liszt, who wrote that "[f]or us musicians, Beethoven's music 
is like the pillar of cloud and fire which led the Israelites 
.... 
through the desert". 117 Wagner conceived of Beethoven "as a 
sublime and unique supernatural being", 118 and as late as 1911 
Paul Bekker wrote of him as "crucified and descending to hell 
and rising again". 119 Elsewhere he is described as the "sun of 
the musical firmament". 120 
The revolutionary musical leader who follows the dictates 
of his own imagination rather than social expectations121 is 
necessarily also a moral transgressor. While a major work such 
as the Eroica Symphony was for instance banned in Prague after 
being declared "morally corrupting" by its display of "musical 
anarchy",u2 it is exactly such a crossing into new dimensions 
which captured the Romantic imagination of writers at the 
.... ''"'""''' \, 
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time. A fascination with limitlessness, ineffability and 
transcendence began to appear among early Romanticists such as 
E.T.A. Hoffmann, who claimed as early as 1808 that 
"Beethoven's instrumental music opens to us the realm of the 
colossal and the immeasurable" . 123 French writers such as De 
Vigny, Lamartine and Hugo were all drawn to the concept of the 
"infinite" in Beethoven's music124 and Balzac wrote of the 
Fifth Symphony: "After that supreme musical poem, we have 
nothing left to say; we can only lower our hands and 
meditate. "125 
Beethoven, it seems, had calmly answered this question, put by 
his famulus, by saying that he had not had time and therefore 
had somewhat extended the second movement. No time! And he had 
said it "calmly," to boot. The contempt for the questioner 
which lay in such an answer had obviously not been noticed but 
it was justified contempt. 
Intertextuality, Montaqe 
This passage is taken almost directly from Anton Schindler's 
The Life of Beethoven, which reads: 
I allowed myself, in my innocence, to put a question to the 
master, who was seated opposite me; why, I asked, had he not 
written a third movement comparable in character to the 
first. Beethoven answered calmly that he had had no time for 
a third movement; that was why the second movement had to be 
extended to such large proportions .... his answer 
sufficed. 126 
In The Story Mann mentions some biographical sources for his 
writing on Beethoven: these include Schindler, Bekker and 
Newman. In an exhaustive matched-column analysis, Gunilla 
Bergsten127 has illuminated the extreme extent to which Mann 
borrowed directly from these and a large number of other 
sources in the writing of his novel. Mann himself writes about 
Doctor Faustus: 
This work ... took a curiously ruthless form, and I was 
constantly amazed by the way its fantastic mechanisms drew 
upon factual, historical, personal, and even literary data. 
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... This montage technique was continually startling, even 
to me, and gave me cause to worry. Yet it rightly belongs to 
the conception, to the "idea", of the book; it has to do 
with the strange and licentious spiritual relaxation from 
which it emerged, with its figurative and then again literal 
directness, its character as arcanum and confession, so 
that, as long as I was working on the book, the concept of 
its public existence did not enter my mind .... Quotations 
of [the anecdotal kind taken from Nietzsche's life history] 
have something musical about them, disregarding the innate 
mechanical quality. They are, moreover, reality transformed 
into fiction, fiction that absorbs the real, and thus a 
strangely protean and attractive mingling of the spheres.us 
It is conceivable that the scope of Mann's project - his 
ambition to deliver a definitive evaluation of the role of the 
artist in the modern age - would lead him to extend fiction 
into reality in the way he describes; his extensive use of 
musical sources is however more likely due to a lack of 
confidence in musical education. Elsewhere he writes about his 
use of apocalyptic texts: 
the extent to which John of Pathos borrowed from other 
visionaries and ecstatics is certainly striking .... I was 
struck, as the text puts it, by the fact "that a raving man 
should rave in the same pattern as another who came before 
him; that one is ecstatic not independently, so to speak, 
but by rote". This psychological item ... coincided in a way 
with my own growing inclination ... to look upon all life as 
a cultural project taking the form of mythic cliches, and to 
prefer quotation to independent invention. 129 
A conflict may be perceived between Mann's justification of 
his use of montage and the type of reasons for which montage 
is valorized in other fields such as recent film theory. 
Within the latter, the piecing together of shots from 
different angles or shots with different content is seen as a 
way of destabilizing the control of a unitary gaze.uo Here, 
however, montage is related rather to borrowing, to 
reimplementation of patterns that "recur eternally" . 131 The 
author, rather than being reinstated in a position of control, 
is located within the functioning of an even greater and 
metaphysically governing force. Thus Mann can be "mythically" 
linked to Adorno, to Kretschmar, to Leverkilhn, to Beethoven, 
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to Faust. 132 From a more critical angle this process can of 
course be likened to the self-promotion - the electing of a 
father - entailed in the excessive praise bestowed on 
Beethoven by composers like Wagner, Liszt and Brahms. Yet for 
analytic purposes here the return to mythical reality -
however it relates to incorporation of the past - can be seen 
as a typical modernist response to the exhaustion of artistic 
possibility (from the angle of modernism, the elaborate 
patterns of displacement that occur in Doctor Faustus may also 
be said to attest directly to the perceived crisis of 
subjectivity in the modern age). At the same time it can also 
be noted that the ease with which Mann locates his own late 
work within an endless and unchangeable cultural force is 
perhaps at odds with the sense of defeatism which Adorno -
another modernist - identifies in the return to convention in 
late Beethoven, as well as with the evil associated with the 
return to the elemental in Leverkilhn's music. 
Anecdote 
Why should anecdotal quotations "have something musical about 
them"? 
The anecdote is the marginal, that which does not fit the 
exclusive collection of important biographical or historical 
fact. As far as "official" personal chronology is concerned, 
the anecdote is a "story" with little relevance; yet, when 
reading biographies it is often the irrelevant interesting 
details which are of greatest interest. 133 In Barthes' terms 
they produce "the pleasure of the text", reinstating the body 
of the written subject across a no longer alienating temporal 
divide. 134 This body is of course never unmediated (in 
biography it passes through another), and the anecdote about 
Beethoven's own answer to Schindler's question serves to 
reaffirm a standard trope of the composer as irascible, proud, 
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and coolly removed from worldly affairs. The possibility that 
the answer may have been a straightforward one - Beethoven was 
at the time under great contractual and financial pressure -
is excluded entirely in an extreme moment of suprematizing the 
author's voice. The anecdote is, in any case, successful in 
once again softening the more technical details to come, and 
in validating Kretschmar's own answer to the question he 
poses. 
Does the "musicality" of anecdotal usage lie then in the 
greater potential for connotation - physical, emotional -
found within the story? It is likely that Mann is also 
referring to the process of artistic construction: the grand 
final linking of completed segments would traditionally seem 
closer to the process of musical composition (delayed 
repetition, reprise and in a sense also recapitulation 
sections are practically ready-made in advance) than to the 
novelistic process, which after all descends from the linear 
weaving of epic narrative. As far as the value of anecdote as 
decoration is concerned, it may be noted that all musical 
writing is an attempt at decorating language, at adorning, at 
adding what is not usually there; restructuring of literary 
form does not change the intrinsic (denotative and syntactic) 
qualities of language. 
To return, finally, to montage: there are marked 
similarities between Mann's process and the metasystemic 
procedure we are using at present. We have made claims for 
"opening" music within a literary text by following a system 
of association, of marginal relatedness, and the same happens 
in Doctor Faustus: anecdote may appear in relatively isolated 
form, with the inference of the third term left to the reader. 
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And now the speaker described Beethoven's condition in the 
year 1820, when his hearing, attacked by a resistless illness, 
was in progressive decay, and it had already become clear that 
he could no longer conduct his own works. · 
The Biography Industry 
In the previous passage cited, biography has already been 
naturalized: the "famulus" is not identified, nor is it 
pointed out that Beethoven's use of this term for Schindler 
was decidedly ironic. 135 Narrative sources are furthermore 
obscured: Zeitblom's use of the term "it seems" makes it 
unclear whether Kretschmar or Schindler is being cited; what 
follows is not identified as free indirect speech, yet we 
still read it under the banner of the "lecture". Why should 
Mann flatten narrative elements in this way? 
Mann's attraction to myth, to the changeless, has been 
discussed earlier: the practical result and possible danger of 
a freely eclectic process such as his are apparent here. 
Beethoven's life becomes a story, becomes myth; as with 
legends generally, the sources of origin are effaced. Exact 
chronological details are neglected: Beethoven did conduct 
after 1820, and Zeitblom/Kretschmar rounds off the true date 
of composition to the closest decade. The power of established 
convention as well as the need to maintain the central 
importance of such a convention within an overt artistico-
cultural program thus appear as equalizing forces establishing 
a collectivity of voices - a differentiated grouping that is 
at basis similar in purpose - rather than heteroglossia 
proper. 
This collectivity is extensive in the extreme, and 
upholds a self-serving principle of production, extended 
highly effectively into the political 136 and commercial sphere. 
This principle is altered only - and paradoxically reinforced 
- by the appearance of negatively slanted Beethoven 
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biographies during the twentieth century. Such a development 
however does not seem to have stemmed the regular tide of new 
biographies; the parallel appearance of extraordinary 
biographical details and "great music" continues to result in 
' 
unprecedented productivity within the field of language on 
music. In this sense Beethoven's situation also aggravates a 
general danger: the notion that music is "politically 
suspect "137 gains validity with regard to biographical writing 
in that both greatness and supposed poietic i~tention can be 
extended more freely into verbal programs due to the lack of 
exactness of meaning in music. Here specifically, Beethoven is 
promoted both as genius and as typically German. 138 
Biography in itself is systemic; even a work such as 
Thayer's Life of Ludwig van Beethoven, which does not offer 
any musical analysis at all, implicitly provides parallels 
between life history and compositional sequence. The systemic 
is merely more clearly defined in psychoanalytical or 
sociocultural readings. Life assumes the status of the 
linguistic text, and it is in the nature of biographical myth-
making to develop certain standard linkages: between great 
music and the great man, between the musical transformation of 
despondent minor-key themes and the personal victory over 
uncommon hardship, between spiritually and ethically uplifting 
music and the man of unquestionable and even of transformative 
moral superiority . 139 With regard to the last connection a 
typical example reads as follows: "as regards [Beethoven's] 
moral character we can say of him that he now and then was 
overcome by affections, but never by passions just as he 
withstood like a man the temptations of wine, so he seems 
never to have been seduced by the power of love" . 140 
In the passage under consideration, then, Mann approaches 
two standard tropes of Beethoven literature: deafness and 
lastness. The extent to which he complies with traditional 
• ..& ••• 
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ways of handling these is telling at least of the need to 
present a Germany that one used to be able to believe in, to 
fix a historical position against which he can measure his own 
artistic construct. By the time that Kretschmar's lecture 
supposedly takes place the proposal that Beethoven's deafness 
was the result of syphilis acquired either at birth or via his 
dealings with prostitutes had already gained ground. 141 Such 
historical placing is perhaps not of consequence in any case; 
one of Mann's sources on Beethoven is Ernest Newman's The 
Unconscious Beethoven, a work in which the syphilis issue is 
faced "freely and soberly"1~ in head-on fashion. Mann had to 
be aware of the possibility of such a further link between 
Beethoven and his own composer, and, while he was more than 
likely drawn - as he was elsewhere - to the link between 
disease and creation, he chooses to pitch the original as a 
victim "attacked by a resistless" but unidentified illness. 
The Good Author 
To investigate the reaction evoked by objections to the common 
link between Beethoven's personality and his supposedly 
morally superior compositions is a remarkable experience .. 
Personal critique of the composer usually concerns his 
excessive use of alcohol, his dealings with prostitutes and 
with publishers and, most importantly, the affairs surrounding 
his nephew after his brother Karl's death. 
Schindler destroyed a large number of Beethoven's 
conversation books, letters, and documents soon after his 
death. Arguments that have been made regarding Schindler's 
motives suggest that he might have been protecting his own 
self-respect, concealing the political indiscretions of the 
composer and his friends, or destroying evidence of 
Beethoven's venereal diseases and less than reputable 
financial dealings . 143 Schindler' s own sycophantic biography 
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reveals little of the composer's darker side; it is telling 
that the generally objective Thayer felt unable to complete 
his three-volume biography when he began to discover beyond 
doubt that Beethoven's behaviour had been morally 
reprehensible at stages; from this point onwards the 
biographer fell ill each time he attempted to continue working 
on it . 144 Editha and Richard Sterba' s admittedly polemical and 
one-sided book Beethoven and his Nephew: A Reappraisal, 
published in 1954, was important in revealing details that had 
until then been effaced, and has since elicited a host of 
remarkably defensive reactions from even the apparently least 
biased of commentators . 145 Recent biographical writing still 
seems unable to avoid taking sides on the nephew issue, and at 
some point usually contains an implicit self-positioning in 
this regard. 146 One of the most historically successful books 
written in direct defense of Beethoven's morality - this time 
specifically in terms of his interpersonal and financial 
dealings - is that of J.W.N. Sullivan, who took the notion of 
judging artists by alternative standards to an extreme, basing 
his argument on the idea that "[n]o man was ever more 
completely loyal to his own experience than was Beethoven. "147 
It is of course a Romanticist notion which is at work 
here: that of the artist as God, as shamanistic link between 
the ordinary and the spiritual or otherwise transcendent 
worlds. Art is transformative here: the poietic, although the 
definite locus of greatness, is made inaccessible to 
linguistic reduction, and it is the work and its effects that 
remain. To follow such a pattern, biography should by 
implication avoid details, the particular; "romanticization" 
reads, in its most obvious sense, as the shaping of life 
events into the generalized narrative patterns of romance. 
Mann writes about looking at facsimiles of Beethoven's 
letters: 
.. ~ .. ·• ·~. :.,;_ ..... ,·. ~ ..... 
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I looked at them for a long time, those scrambled and 
scratched lines hurled onto paper, that desperate 
orthography, all that half-wild inarticulateness ~ and could 
find no love for it in my heart. Once again I sympathized 
with Goethe's rejection of the 'untamed human soul', and 
once again gave thought to the relationship between music 
and intellect, music and good breeding, music and humanity. 
Has musical genius, then, nothing at all to do with humanity 
and 'better society'? Does it perhaps work directly in 
opposition to these? But Beethoven was a man with faith in 
revolutionary humanitarianism, and French writers have taken 
him to task for employing, as a musician, the language of a 
radical politician ... 148 
His ambivalence is also revealed when he describes listening 
to the Ninth Symphony during the time of writing: 
Never had I more deeply admired the scherzo and adagio - but 
once again could summon up no affection for the variations 
of [the] disjointed last movement . 149 
Beethoven - like Mann himself - occupies a problematic 
position within the Kierkegaardian dualism identified earlier. 
When Leverld.ihn refers to the Ninth Symphony as a natural 
instance where "the word should burst forth out of music" 
because "language was music, music a language", 150 Zeitblom is 
quick to point out that such a belief is qualified by the fact 
that what Leverklihn 
had vaguely in mind was as un-Wagnerian as possible, and 
most remote from nature-daemony and the theatrical quality 
of the [Purgatorio] myth: a revival of opera bouffe in a 
spirit of the most artificial mockery and parody of the 
artificial. 151 
Whereas Mann did admire Opus 132, 152 this work is in Doctor 
Faustus clearly linked to the ineffable in a way that others 
are generally not; Leverklihn comments to Zeitblom about the 
initial theme played by the first violin in the fourth 
movement: 
it is vexatious, if you don't want to call it gratifying, 
that in music, at least in this music, there are things for 
which one cannot scare up, out of the whole rich realm of 
language, do what you like, any properly characterizing 
epithet or combination of epithets .... you cannot find any 
adequate term for the spirit, the attitude, the behaviour of 
this theme. For there is a lot of behaviour there. Tragic? 
Bold? Defiant, emphatic, full of elan, the height of 
nobility? None of them good. And "glorious" is of course 
~ - -·- - . -
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only throwing in your hand. You finally land at the opposite 
direction, the name: Allegro appassionato. That is the best 
after all. 153 
The attitude towards this music is strikingly different from 
one found in Leverkiihn's introduction and conclusion in a 
letter accompanying a description of what Carnegy has 
identified as the prelude to third act of Wagner's 
Meistersinger: 154 
I am embarrassed at the insipidness which is the supporting 
structure, the conditioning solid substance of even the work 
of genius, at the elements thereof which are training and 
common property, at use and wont in achieving the beautiful: 
[a lengthy and eloquent description of the work follows] ... 
Dear friend, why do I have to laugh? Why must I think 
that almost all, no, all the methods and conventions of art 
today are good for parody only?155 
The demand for parody exists in direct relation to the 
effability of this music, and Leverkiihn's extremely difficult 
search for expression begins exactly with parodic rejection of 
expressiveness, or easy metamusical closure. Such descriptions 
of Beethoven's works are explicitly avoided in Doctor Faustus 
- the most extensive description, that of Opus 111, follows an 
entirely different pattern - and it is perhaps exactly the 
lack of humanity, the kernel of danger present in Beethoven 
which held a precarious attraction for Mann. Also significant 
in this regard is the fact that the devil - who notably 
insists on his hell being ineffable, claiming that "one can 
really not speak of it at all, because the actual is beyond 
what by word can be declared"156 - upholds Beethoven's work 
itself as an example of inspiration that does not come from 
God. 157 
Schopenhauer writes in The World as Will and Idea that 
The composer reveals the innermost nature of the world, and 
expresses the profoundest wisdom in a language that his 
reasoning faculty does not understand, just as a magnetic 
somnambulist gives information about things of which she has 
no conception when she is awake. Therefore in the composer, 
more than in any other artist, the man is entirely separate 
and distinct from the artist. 158 
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This notion, while still fitting the Romanticist bill, 
reformulates the position of the author so that the 
irreducible is alienated also from his own self; the composer 
is subject to greater and unknown forces in a manner which is 
less predictable than the placing of the artist within a 
pattern of eternal return as found in Nietzsche. Such an 
assessment is more fitting as a principle of artistic 
philosophy for the more general themes of Doctor Faustus than 
the humanitarianism which causes Mann to be troubled about 
Beethoven. While the author had ample personal cause to 
dislodge the Romantic Beethoven image, the composer instead 
remains an idealized presence in the novel, and metamusical 
discourse, rather than definitively embracing the heterogenous 
aspect of the systemic is solidified within homogenous 
metamusical tropes. 
Kretschmar told us about the rumours that the famous author 
was quite written out, his productive powers exhausted, 
himself incapable of larger enterprises, and busying himself 
like the old Haydn with writing down Scottish songs. Such 
reports had continually gained ground, because for several 
years no work of importance bearing his name had come on the 
market. But in the late autumn, returning to Vienna from 
Meddling, where he spent the summer, the master had sat down 
and written these three compositions for the piano without, so 
to speak, once looking up from the notes, all in one burst, 
and gave notice of them to his patron, the Count of Brunswick, 
to reassure him as to his mental condition. 
Art and Commerce 
We may identify here, emanating through an anecdote again 
borrowed from Schindler, 159 an aporia: it is the consumer 
market that is shown to be the measure of "importance"; 
language is for the rest merely "rumour". The unknown in the 
production of art is suddenly interrupted by the real, by - in 
the simplest sense - the reality of the symbolic, which as an 
economic principle of language is far more effective in 
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"realizing" music than the rhizomic mechanism of rumour. 
Rumour here entails the paradoxical liberation of language in 
the face of absence (it metaphorically enacts the systemic 
procedures followed in this analysis), yet it also returns 
itself to the economic principle: Beethoven's development, 
like that of Haydn, is said to follow a natural curve of 
production, with the peak already achieved. Similarly, the 
suspicion of madness can be related to the nature of the 
latter as anti-symbolic, as a condition in which stable 
signifier-signified linkings and thus the logic of language 
are subverted. 
Yet again this pattern itself is set up only to be 
invalidated by the appearance of the great artist: Beethoven's 
lastness is a historically new phenomenon, and on his return 
from the country to the city of music - which can be related 
to the end of transgression into the disorder of madness 160 -
his productivity both exceeds expectation and proceeds away 
from the symbolic towards incomprehensibility. Production 
itself - and the return to larger works, indicating sustained 
effort - is alone necessary at this stage to ensure the 
stability of the "mental condition"; the symbolic is directly 
related to form rather than to content, enacting in the most 
simple of senses the division between the success of language 
in describing formal elements and in describing what is 
expressed. 
And then Kretschmar talked about the Sonata in C minor, which 
indeed it was not easy to see as a well-rounded and 
intellectually digested work, and which had given his 
contemporary critics, and his friends as well, a hard 
aesthetic nut to crack. These friends and admirers, Kretschmar 
said, simply could not follow the man they revered beyond the 
height to which at the time of his maturity he had brought the 
symphony, the piano sonata, and the classical string quartet. 
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Metamusical: Reception 
The audience (and a large section of the readership) are 
themselves doubled: the new is placed as history, and is 
normalized by becoming iterable itself. Inexplicability is 
both detemporalized and affirmed as general condition (the 
powerfulness of the work remains); it is furthermore presented 
as a narrative prologue against which some kind of explication 
will be given. Both these are techniques on Kretschmar's part 
to create a field for language. Kretschmar diverts the 
metamusical onto the metasystemic: historiography amounts to a 
deindividualization of linguistic response, to both the 
acquisition of self-consciousness and the location of the self 
within a larger convention. 
But does initial reception of a musical composition not 
in general differ from how it is received later on? As 
relatively primary linguistic response the former potentially 
has great power in directing the future course of language in 
relation to this music; such associations may be read in the 
context of as simple a principle as the arbitrariness of 
signifier-signified relations identified by Saussure . 161 Where 
original responses are revised by the supposedly objective 
progress of history, such responses are also often kept alive 
in support of a present reading; the initial rejection of a 
composer's works is for instance linked to greatness itself, 
is given as proof of artistic foresight. The immediate 
response, as a defense against loss in Barthes' sense, is one 
that needs to be effective: quick, formulaic; this is perhaps 
why Opus 111 is referred to as a "nut to crack" (eine Nuf3 zu 
knacken) . Linguistic reductionism is revealed as being at its 
most extreme at the moment of appearance, a condition which 
supports the point that subsequent linguistic activity might 
well exist as language on language ratber than on music. 
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The Three Periods 
In most cases, chronological classification of a composer's 
musical production necessarily depends on an identification of 
uniform "development", and can be made in terms of a 
practically limitless array of parameters: the balance between 
different musical genres composed in, the appearance of 
certain "set" stylistic characteristics, the number of works 
given programmatic relevance, the length of compositions, and 
so on. Whereas artistic development is generally granted its 
own logic it is also the practice of general musicology to 
link such development to biographical elements; at the most 
basic level there is a correlation of sequence, and the 
existence of poietic reality at any given stage unavoidably 
creates an implicit correlation with the composer's 
subjectivity. 
Beethoven's case is unusual in that his artistic 
development seems in traditional terms capable of being fairly 
successfully divided into three stages. This division was 
already made by an anonymous French writer in 1818, 162 and 
gained great currency later with the publication of 
Schindler's biography soon after the composer's death and. 
Lenz's Beethoven et ses trois styles in 1852. The middle 
period is in each case divided from the early and late ones by 
a productive hiatus; both these dividing stages have been 
causally linked to traumatic experiences, the first to 
Beethoven's awareness of becoming deaf and his probable 
suicide attempt and the second to the loss of the "Immortal 
Beloved", severe illness and the battle for guardianship over 
his nephew . 163 Inferred causality behind what is here 
specifically stylistic output is significantly more developed 
than usual: the extensive presence of the great personality 
manages to frame metamusical discourses in their extended 
forms also, and to direct even formalist analyses of the 
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composer's works. 
In this regard it may be noted that the triadic division 
has been questioned in terms of uniformity and number. Kerman 
has suggested that Beethoven's use of different genres is at 
unequal stages of development during any gi v_en period164 - the 
late quartets and sonatas are for example far more 
iconoclastic than the Ninth Symphony - and others have either 
identified further "periods "165 or subdivided the three 
existing ones into further temporal categories . 166 The number 
three represents a standard trope of completion and natural 
balance: the temporal subject, which generally achieves 
ascendancy - and its furthest temporal extension - during the 
"middle stage", that of the adult male or functional member of 
patriarchal society, requires a preceding and succeeding phase 
for self-definition - the "cycle of life" has for centuries 
been linked to triadic temporal structure in nature. Beethoven 
as great human being is both a reflection of and an archetypal 
model for the ~ubsequent centrality of division according to 
this number. 
As Nattiez's notion of plot and seriation process 
(mentioned earlier) brings to the fore, even the most 
technical formalist analyses are subject to musicological-
political programs. Stylistic analysis - although it cannot 
ever simply be relegated to the entirely subjective, the 
entirely unidirectional - chooses its own objects, and is 
slanted towards identification of certain formal procedures 
within what is relatively ambiguous matter in all senses. Thus 
while Beethoven's late style is usually characterized by his 
extensive use of polyphony, we should note that "polyphony" 
itself is not a stable frame, and can to some extent be 
ascribed to all music in which different parts do not strictly 
follow an identical progression of note durations. Limited use 
of polyphony under the traditional definition may in any case 
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be observed even in the earliest of Beethoven's works such as 
the String Trios, Opus 9. Similarly, Opus 111, while not 
containing - like Opus 110 - a fugue "proper" (which is in 
itself a difficult stipulation to make), is said to contain 
"fugal procedures" ; 167 to some extent, then, stylistic 
development is pressured into uniqueness for the sake of 
claiming radical heterogeneity and, ultimately, ineffability. 
As regards definition of period via musical genres, Mann 
also relegates this process to novelistic requirements. Even 
though it is only the piano sonata and the mass that will be 
lectured on by Kretschmar, Mann identifies the "height" 
reached during the middle period as consisting in "the 
symphony, piano sonata, and the classical string quartet"; the 
concerto - which for many represents Beethoven's greatest 
achievement - is ignored. The metamusical as criticism 
intrudes into musicology proper.(musicology as historical 
categorization), and what Mann values the most (it is late-
period works - the Ninth Symphony and the Fifteenth String 
Quartet - that are mentioned elsewhere in the novel) governs 
his definition of the middle period. 
In the works of the last period they stood with heavy hearts 
before a process of dissolution or alienation, of a mounting 
into an air no longer familiar or safe to meddle with; even 
before a plus ultra, wherein they had been able to see nothing 
else than a degeneration of tendencies already previously 
present, an excess of introspection and speculation, an 
extravagance of minutiae and scientific musicality - applied 
sometimes to such simple material as the arietta theme of the 
monstrous movement of variations which forms the second part 
of this sonata. The theme of this movement goes through a 
hundred vicissitudes, a hundred worlds of rhythmic contrasts, 
at length outgrows itself, and is finally lost in giddy worlds 
that one might call other-worldly or abstract. And in just 
that way Beethoven's art had overgrown itself, risen out of 
the habitable regions of tradition, even before the startled 
gaze of human eyes, into spheres of the entirely and utterly 
and nothing-but-personal - an ego painfully isolated in the 
absolute, isolated too from sense by his loss of hearing; 
lonely prince of a realm of spirits, from whom now only a 
chilling breath issued to terrify his most willing 
contemporaries, standing as they did aghast at these 
communications of which only at moments, only by exception, 
they could understand anything at all. 
Negative Reception 
104 
The response to the incomprehensible music of the late period 
is an emotional one, and can be thus because of a personal 
link to the composer. The "friends and admirers", these "most 
willing contemporaries", are affected by an alienating 
"process" which in this passage is not clearly located within 
either music or composer; they "stand before" it (vor ... 
gestanden batten), or it appears "before [their] startled - ...... 
gaze" ( vor erschrocken nachblinkenden Menschena ugen) . 
Syntactical constructions create an anthropomorphization of 
musical process; in one sentence "Beethoven's art" and "an ego 
painfully isolated" are both used as the subject. By doubling 
the possible situation of the audience Kretschmar again makes 
what is to come_more accessible; whereas the original audience 
could respond directly to poiesis in its purest form it is the 
alienating work itself that here has to be dealt with. 
Beethoven as human, in succession to how he has been presented 
thus far, remains present as an integral part of introductory 
discourse, which is in fact already penetrated here by musical 
analysis of Opus 111. 
Whereas author and text are directly linked within 
esthesis here, the normal process of reception entails a more 
detached - and linguistically considered - response, however 
quickly it appears. The more careful sections of critique 
found in the passage no doubt have their origin in the 
published history of reception (largely as found in 
Schindler), which often reveals attitudes to Opus 111 that 
were far from flattering. 
While Beethoven's music enjoyed considerable popularity 
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during his lifetime, especially during his middle period, the 
later music was generally not well received by the public, 
particularly for reasons of its unusual harmonic and 
structural configurations. Although a number of recent studies 
have shown how the notion of the historically "misunderstood 
genius" in general is itself often a myth, 168 it does seem as 
if the sonata, together with a number of other late-period 
works, 169 took a long time to gain acceptance outside of a 
specialized audience. Maynard Solomon writes that 
Beethoven in his late sonatas and quartets may be regarded 
as the originator of the avant-garde in music history ... 
The late sonatas had been Beethoven's first works that were 
composed without the expectation of performance in either 
aristocratic salon or public concert ... their audience was 
in the private musicale. 170 
Beethoven himself during this phase moreover seemed to place 
great belief in the judgement of posterity; a memorable 
example of this attitude occurred after finishing the 
Hammerklavier Sonata, op. 106. 171 
Late-period works were called "obscure", "abstruse", 
"capricious", "meaningless" and "aimless", "difficult to play 
and understand", "perversely extravagant"; 172 and it is of 
relevance that Beethoven's supporter Grillparzer wrote in-one 
of the last conversation books, "We can make nothing of your 
music". 173 While publishers were uneasy about the fact that the 
sonata only contained two movements 174 - the aspect that also 
puzzled Schindler175 - blame was laid elsewhere on the 
composer's by now complete deafness and perceived mental 
deterioration. William Gardiner wrote in 1837 that in 
Beethoven's last works "[h]is imagination seems to have fed on 
the ruins of his sensitive organs"176 , and even Lenz identified 
the extra thirty-second notes found in certain measures of the 
second movement as "the spectacle of madness" . 177 A review by 
The Harmonicon of August 1823 is particularly slighting: 
The Sonata, op.111 consists of two movements. The first 
betrays a violent effort to produce something in the shape 
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of novelty. In it are visible some of those dissonances the 
harshness of which may have escaped the observation of the 
composer ... [The signature variation of the second 
movement] really is laborious trifling, and ought to be by 
every means discouraged by the sensible part of the musical 
profession ... [T]he publishers have, in their title, deemed 
it necessary to warn off all pirates by announcing the 
sonata as copyright. We do not think they are in much danger 
of having their property invaded.us 
More telling, however, and reflected directly in 
Kretschmar's talk, were accusations of "scientificality", of 
the departure from humanistic input into this work in favour 
of artificially contrived formal complexities. The Harmonicon 
accused the composer a year later of "studied eccentricity", 179 
and Schindler writes of how the piece was criticized for the 
"employment of an excess of scientific methods on such simple 
material as the 'Arietta'"."0 He cites a review from Leipzig: 
It has pleased the composer, in working out his fine 
material, to make use for the most part of such artificial 
means as we consider not quit~ worthy of his genius . 181 
The Berliner Allgemeine Musikalische Zeitung similarly 
criticized Beethoven for not writing "more naturally" ; 182 other 
writers subsequently tried to find connections between Op. 111 
and the composer's obsession with arithmetic figures at that 
stage of his life. 183 Sir George Smart's opinion that "although 
the later works of Beethoven may have been theoretically 
correct, they were to the ear harmoniously unpleasant "184 seems 
to sum up the attitude entailed. 
Metamusical: Mixing 
Both paragraphs and sentences are extremely long at this 
point: Kretschmar is finally approaching his topic directly, 
and musicology proper needs space within which to develop 
alongside other discourses on music. A number of different 
forms of the metamusical may be identified. 
First of all, we find music described in terms that 
approach technical analysis. Phrases such as "theme", 
·~·· •• ' "~ 4. ·~ • •• • • ' 
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"movement", "variations" and "rhythmic contrasts" are 
borderline cases, musical frames which are applicable also to 
non-musical matter, and which are likely to be understood also 
in a musical context by the relatively uneducated subject. In 
this regard Kretschmar's analytic discourse is closer to Tovey 
than to Schenker or Babbitt: the terms identified are placed 
alongside impressionistic qualifiers. The variations movement 
is "monstrous", and the "rhythmic contrasts" inhabit a purely 
metaphoric "hundred worlds" which later become "giddy worlds" 
that are "other-worldly or abstract". We are faced head-on 
here with the need to evaluate the subjectivist principle. If 
metasystemic analysis is to occur at all, it will be of no use 
to grant an absolute measure of freedom in writing 
metamusically; the "object", which inheres in the symbolic at 
the most basic level, can be located within literary and 
political requirements as a method of metasystemic production. 
For an analyst such as Adorno the object is found in 
historical reality and already exists even if it cannot be 
reduced linguistically; for a writer like Mann it is there as 
approach. 
Thus the adjective "monstrous" (ungeheuren) - which 
connotes size, threat, ugliness, brutality - can be both 
validated (the arietta movement is, after all, the longest 
slow movement found in any of Beethoven's sonatas) and traced 
to the history of reception that is being described, to the 
appearance of the demoniac which is central to the novel, to 
Mann's notion of the inhumane. Similarly, from the other side, 
the sentence beginning with "The theme ... ", while indicating a 
narrative switch to "fact" on Zeitblom's part, admits to 
metaphoricity, or at least to inexactitude of language, 
through use of the phrase "one might call". 
This type of dual positioning extends also to the way in 
which language deals with the absolute; while ineffability is 
.......... •:'•t·'"'•:.O•~-~ ...... -~ .• ···"··~·· ·~ . ,.,_ ... 
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an "objective" fact, the evaluative and descriptive elements 
attached to the absolute stem from more diverse spheres. Music 
here is repeatedly described in vertical imagery, and thereby 
metaphorically given a bearing of transcendence; at the same 
time such imagery is linked to subjective biography, to what 
Mann finds important in the late Beethoven for his own 
purposes (coldness, isolation, danger). The possible neutral 
elements allowing such a reading (and it must be remembered 
that the neutral level can only coexist with the poietic and 
esthesic) will be considered later on. 
A further use of metamusical discourse here entails the 
evaluation of formal complexity. Language in this regard is 
perhaps more closely bound to its own intentions than in the 
examples above - it is not a question of direct "content" but 
of placing of music for further means. Th.e arietta theme is 
for rhetorical and narrative purposes positioned at the far 
end of simplicity (musical material can be "as simple as" 
this), but the parameters in which such a judgement lies are 
not identified. When looking at the first sixteen bars of the 
second movement of Opus 111 (see fig. 6), we see that there 
are no unusual or extended modulations from the most basic of 
tonalities, that of C major, no unexpected chromatic 
procedures, no well-defined polyphonic divisions, no harmonic 
development out of keeping with what may have been expected 
within the tonal language of the 1820s, no abrupt dynamic or 
time signature changes, no strange silences. Simplicity here 
is generally defined by the absence of the unusual, of 
innovation: difference can be relativized in that objective 
judgment seems to be lodged more plainly in convention itself. 
In other words, the metamusical in this instance does not 
involve a "true" line of evaluation: even though the 
appearance of music cannot be fixed at a basic level, 
evaluation proceeds from a singular direction, from the 
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position of language itself facing the as yet unwritten. 
So far, so good, said Kretschmar. And yet again, good or 
right only conditionally and incompletely. For one would 
usually connect with the conception of the merely personal, 
ideas of limitless subjectivity and of radical harmonic will 
to expression, in contrast to polyphonic objectivity 
(Kretschmar was concerned to have us impress upon our minds 
this distinction between harmonic subjectivity and polyphonic 
objectivity) and this equation, here as altogether in the 
masterly late works, would simply not apply. 
Discourse of Lastness 
The intrusion in the first sentence of everyday speech, which 
reanchors the narrative position, signifies a switch from 
history to the present, from a foreground that is based within 
the "normal", the expected, to the subversiveness of the new. 
What is novel for narrative purposes has again however a 
historical basis, and Kretschmar proceeds towards an 
established discourse which, even though it reached its apex 
in this century, was already a strong presence in the previous 
one. 
The narrative of the heroic, the Promethean figure who 
overcomes personal struggles against Fate - deafness, 
loneliness - by creating great art, whose art embodies these 
successes, extends to and attains an ambiguous conclusion in 
Beethoven's late-period style. Here the heroic or "dramatic" 
mode, which found its fullest expression in middle-period 
works, is replaced by what has been called a period of 
"transcended anti theses 11185 where 11 conflicting principles 
somehow become component parts of a harmony". 186 The late 
period works, especially the string quartets, 187 have - more so 
than any other body of music in history - attained a 
widespread transcendental value among writers and composers 
alike. The glorification of the problematic Ninth Symphony is 
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well known; Wagner, for one, wrote of how this piece "preaches 
repentance and atonement in the deepest sense of divine 
revelation". 188 It was also Wagner who initiated - partly as a 
means of promoting his own ideas on music189 - a widely-
supported critical tradition which sees the choral movement as 
resulting from the fact that Beethoven had definitively 
"fulfilled all that was possible in the domain of absolute 
music, surpassing everything that had been achieved before." 190 
Other, less easily accessible late-period works received 
similar attention: Stravinsky is said to have considered the 
Grosse Fuge from Op. 130 the greatest piece of music ever 
written; Burnett James wrote of how the late quartets "stand 
alone among expressions of profound mystical experience in 
terms of created art." 191 Eliot, Huxley and Woolf were all 
deeply affected by Beethoven's late music, and seemed to 
desire certain of his effects in their own works. 192 Perhaps the 
most extreme moments of adulation occur in a book that did 
much to promote the "late Beethoven myth" in the twentieth 
century: J.W.N. Sullivan wrote in 1927 that "[t]he music of 
the last quartets comes from the profoundest depths of the 
human soul that any artist ever sounded" 193 and argued that in 
the final stages of his life Beethoven finally came to peace 
with his by now complete deafness, transcending human 
suffering completely and achieving the "state of great 
visionaries where there is no more discord". 194 Such a 
biographical explanation is directly translated into his 
assessment of the C sharp minor quartet: 
It is the completely unfaltering rendering into music of 
what we can only call the mystic vision. It has that 
serenity which ... passes beyond beauty. Nowhere else in 
music are we made so aware, as here, of a state of 
consciousness surpassing our own, where our problems do not 
exist, and to which even our highest aspirations, those that 
we can formulate, provide no key. 195 
Such ideas no doubt had great appeal, and they reappear almost 
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directly in Renate von Geyso's claim that what "makes 
[Beethoven] unique, is his simultaneous artistic and spiritual 
development. The wisdom and clarity of the music.of the third 
period resulted directly from the spiritual wisdom, the being 
at one with God, which he had attained by that time." 196 The 
potential for political abuse is of course glaringly obvious 
from such an association, as it is from the claim that music 
is able to reflect a state "where our problems do not exist"; 
for current purposes we will however look at the application 
of such discourse in its own terms. 
Positive Reception 
This discourse of "lastness", of ultimate vision and unbridled 
creativity before the prospect of final transgression, does 
then also find its way into discussions on Opus 111. Apart 
from attempts at presenting the sonata as the formal 
perfection and transfiguration of all Beethoven's earlier 
piano works, there exist a large number of conunentaries in 
which the concept of transcendence, of entry into a paradisiac 
realm above language, occurs with great regularity, especially 
in descriptions of the second movement. The fact that 
Beethoven wrote at least seven more groups of piano music 
after this sonata is most of ten elided, partly because 
emphasis is generally laid on Beethoven's last works as the 
culmination of Classicism in music, which had essentially been 
represented by the sonata-allegro form itself. We thus find 
impressionistic glosses on Beethoven's transcendent vision 
such as those of Carl Reinecke who in 1897 talks of the work's 
"supernaturally glorified sublimity and profundity" 197 and, more 
recently, of Robert Wallace and Wilfrid Mellers who 
respectively claim that the sonata arouses "[m]ystical visions 
[that] are indescribable ... [and] inhabit spiritual realms 
rarely probed in either instrumental music or prose fiction" 198 
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and that "Opus 111 is truth in process". 199 
Paradise appears as the logical extension of visionary 
insight, and already in Lenz's biography of 1855 we find the 
two movements of the sonata respectively described as Sansara 
and Nirvana. 200 William Behrend writes that "this pure, 
transfigured and exalted music ... and the deep wisdom of 
[Beethoven's] thoughts have opened for us a view into a 
beautiful, mystic and far-off land"; 201 Wilfrid Mellers claims 
that "Beethoven entered paradise in effecting 'a communication 
that reaches its goal'" ; 202 Robert Wallace calls the second 
movement "heavenly", 203 arguing that "Beethoven reached, in Opus 
111, the frontiers of what is possible in a piano sonata. "204 
Language here makes extreme claims for music granting 
"absolute" experience, and the situation is ripe for the 
appearance of a closer association of such a term with its 
nineteenth-century meaning. 
As a matter of fact, Beethoven had been far more "subjective," • 
not to say far more "personal, " in his middle period than in 
his last, had been far more bent on taking all the flourishes, 
formulas, and conventions, of which music is certainly full, 
and consuming them in the personal expression, melting them 
into the subjective dynamic. The relation of the later 
Beethoven to the conventional, say in the last five piano 
sonatas, is, despite all the uniqueness and even uncanniness 
of the formal language, quite different, much more complaisant 
and easy-going. Untouched, untransformed by the subjective, 
convention often appeared in the late works, in a baldness, 
one might say exhaustiveness, an abandonment of self, with an 
effect more majestic and awful than any reckless plunge into 
the personal . 
Mann and Adorno 
The quality of language here is distinctly different from 
anything preceding it thus far. The dialectic between subject 
and object with its link to harmony and polyphony, which 
"Kretschmar was concerned to have [the audience] impress upon 
[their] minds", is already employed as a given. The audience 
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{and readership) has to accept a theoretical construct - a 
systemic proposal - so as to have access to metamusical 
discourse which is in itself more "poetic" than "technical". 
The difficulty of language here lies in conceptual content 
rather than in form; the novelty of language- its deformation 
- exists as the reinterpretation of the familiar rather than 
the recreation of the symbolic form itself. According to the 
argument presented this happens directly in the manner of 
Beethoven's late music. 
Such interrelatedness of form and content is in the 
broader sense an intrinsic part of Adorne's philosophical 
writings, and while his works are generally far more austere 
in nature than those of Mann, the shift in the metamusical 
towards dialectical philosophy may be ascribed to what is 
practically a position of co-authorship on Adorne's part. The 
Story traces the extensive involvement of the "Privy 
Councillor"205 - the "helper, adviser and sympathetic 
instructor ... who, through exceptional knowledge and 
intellectual attainments, was precisely the right person" 206 -
and Mann admits about the writing on the Apocalypsis cum 
figuris: 
I am tempted to say that his chief contribution to the 
chapter lay not in the musical sphere but in the realm of 
language and its nuances ... 207 
With characteristic proprietary defensiveness, Mann also 
writes: 
The analysis of the row system ... in Chapter XXII of 
Faustus is entirely based upon Adorne's essay. So are 
certain remarks on the tonal language of the later 
Beethoven, such as early in the book in Kretschmar's 
splutterings: the comments on the uncanny relationship that 
death establishes between genius and convention. These 
ideas, too, I had encountered in Adorne's manuscript, with a 
feeling of their strange familiarity. As for the - what word 
shall I use? - serenity with which I put my version of them 
into the mouth of my stammerer, I have only this to say: 
after prolonged activity of the mind it frequently happens 
that things which we once upon a time threw upon the waters 
return to us recast by another's hand and put into different 
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relationships but still reminding us of what was one our 
own. Ideas about death and -form, the self and the objective 
world, may well be regarded by the author of a Venetian 
novel of some thirty-five years ago as recollections of 
himself. 208 
What is important, then, is to investigate Adorno's own ideas 
in order to ascertain how far they constitute the metamusical 
in this chapter of Doctor Faustus. Their applicability to 
Beethoven reception in general can thereby also be assessed. 
Metasystemic: Adorno on Late Beethoven 
Fredric Jameson begins his long opening section on Adorno in 
Marxi.sm and Form with the purely rhetorical question: "To whom 
can one present a writer whose principal subject is the 
disappearance of the public?". 209 It seems that mentioning the 
impossibility of summarizing any of Adorne's work, of 
systematizing its "atonal philosophy", 210 is an introductory 
prerequisite to all discussions on it, and I will not spend 
time here on repeating apologia that have been expressed far 
more effectively elsewhere. 211 
One of the central "theses" of Adorne's unyieldingly 
pessimistic musical and general artistic philosophy is the 
paradoxical formulation that the greater the autonomy of the 
work of art, the more likely it is to embody the exterior 
social forces at play during its production. He argues that 
Western art has ever since the late Enlightenment moved 
towards increased isolation from society, and that in 
complicated ways the free modern subject, who has become an 
impossibility as ontological category, can find the hope of 
expression only in entirely rigidified formal artistic 
structures. In music, this position is represented by the 
serial music of Schoenberg, Berg and Webern, whose work is a 
culmination of tendencies already present in Beethoven's late 
style. 
Adorno having himself been a pupil of Schoenberg's 
disciple Alban Berg, the musical example he returns to time 
and time again is the technique of serial composition 
developed by Schoenberg in the 1920s. A typical statement 
reads as follows: 
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The terror which Schoenberg and Webern spread, today as in 
the past, comes not from their incomprehensibility but from 
the fact that they are all too correctly understood. Their 
music gives form to that anxiety, that terror, that insight 
into the catastrophic situation which others merely evade by 
regressing. They are called individualists, and yet their 
work is nothing but a single dialogue with the powers which 
destroy individualism ... 212 
Elsewhere, in a metaphor adopted from Walter Benjamin, the 
"shocks of incomprehension" are said to "illuminate the 
meaningless world". Modern music "has taken upon itself all 
the darkness and guilt of the world. Its fortune lies in the 
perception of misfortune; all of its beauty is in denying 
itself the illusion of beauty" . 213 Music which gives simple 
pleasure, such as the pop music played by radio stations, is 
"regressive"214 and serves as an escape from social realities. 
In an excellent interpretation of Adorne's analysis of 
the late Beethoven, Rose Rosengard Subotnik explains how his 
thinking is rooted in a dialectic between form and freedom, 
two "forces" which are at the same time contradictory and· 
interdependent. 215 Form is social, extrinsic .to subjective 
freedom, yet still provides the structure in which such 
freedom can find expression. 216 Beethoven's second-period 
style, according to Adorno, corresponds to exterior historical 
conditions which appeared to offer the possibility of 
dialectical synthesis. 217 In Beethoven's music from this 
period, then, the musical individual (or "subject"), 
"( ... being at times identical with the individual tone, at 
times with the 'theme' or with the part for the concert 
instrument) is able to develop from within itself and to 
organize the totality of the musical work from the inner 
dynamics of the participating elements". 218 Through what 
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Schoenberg termed the principle of "developing variation", the 
"musical element subjects is.said to "[subject] itself to 
logical, dynamic change while simultaneously retaining its 
original identity, thus overcoming the contradiction between 
identity and nonidentity", 219 that is, between subjectivity and 
form. The clearest example of this phenomenon is of course to 
be found in the development and recapitulation procedures of 
the sonata-allegro form, 220 and it is indeed Beethoven's 
sonatas and symphonies (which often employ sonata forms) from 
this period that traditionally constitute his most widely 
popular body of works, a body which is popularly read as being 
engaged in a successful battle against Fate, or, then, 
"objectivity". 
The "fatal condition" of Schoenberg's music is however 
but a culmination of tendencies already present in Beethoven's 
work. Subotnik writes that at any given moment "each is 
implicit in Adorno' s consideration of the other" ; 221 the 
"process of dissolution or alienation" which Kretzschmar 
refers to is thus the first signal of the eventual position of 
the artistic subject in the modern age. Whereas Schoenberg's 
music represents for Adorno the end of human history, the_ 
period between the two composers' work represents a "winding 
down" 222 of humanity (which for Adorno means bourgeois 
humanism) . 223 It is important to note that Adorno nowhere 
claims that dialectical synthesis did occur during Beethoven's 
lifetime; the composer, rather, fulfilled in his second period 
a historical possibility within the realm of art, which served 
to criticize society's imperfections through its own 
wholeness. 224 The reason why the music from the second period 
could do this lies partly in its contemporary popularity; a 
deeper reason for both is that society at the time found in 
the music an answer to a general belief in and need for 
individual self-determination. 
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It is important, however, to note that Adorno nowhere 
claims that dialectical synthesis did occur during Beethoven's 
lifetime; the composer, rather, fulfilled in his second period 
a historical possibility within ·the realm of art, which served 
to criticize society's imperfections through its own 
wholeness. 225 Even in the second-period style, Adorno claims, 
Beethoven was bringing into question the authenticity of the 
principle of synthesis; one example is the "bludgeoning 
effect" or forcedness of closure in his recapitulation 
procedures, something which feminist musicologists have made 
much of. 226 The replacement of an older, fixed metaphysical 
system by a dialectical model, which conclusively occurs in 
Beethoven's second period, inevitab.ly introduces the need for 
new formal principles to contain subjective existence, 227 and 
the sense of overstatedness also found in Beethovens 
development sections brings the free coexistence of part and 
whole into question. 228 Subotnik writes, in a passage that 
might sum up the thrust of Mann's relatively impressionistic 
"transcription" of the second movement of the C minor sonata 
in Adornian terms, that 
according to Adorno, just as the work of society inevitably 
requires the sacrifice of individuality, so too, Beethoven's 
development tends to wear down its engendering material -
the musical subject - to the point where the latter negates 
itself entirely in the service of the larger entity. 
Unlimited development, in other words, turns freedom into 
enslavement. 229 
The possibility of subjective integration disappears, and 
the "process of dissolution or alienation" which Mann's 
Kretzschmar refers to becomes the first signal of the eventual 
position of the artistic subject in the modern age. In the 
third period, music - if it was to be authentic - had to forgo 
its pretence to individual freedom, and had to express in some 
way the irreconcilability of subject and object (or, of 
individual and society) . It was thus forced to negate 
"affirmative culture", which now directly partook in affirming 
118 
social repression; only "negative culture" could defend free 
human subjectivity, and, as such, a "double negation" had to 
occur. 230 Beethoven thus had to sever affinities between his 
art and the exterior social world as far as possible. Artistic 
specifications had to come from within himself, with the 
result that his music became "consciously and implacably 
autonomous". 231 
The artist who attempts the latter is of course faced 
with a paradox: if, as Adorno believes, the purpose of 
"authentic" art is to protect individual freedom, this "split 
in human wholeness" would however render the artist 
ineffectual, unless the musical subject at some stage acquired 
confirmation from the more forceful precepts of-objective 
reality. 232 Hence, for Beethoven's third-period music to retain 
its authenticity in Adorne's sense, it had to embody the 
principles of autonomy and heteronomy at the same time. 233. 
Adorno finds a solution to this paradoxical situation in 
what he identifies as a reformulation of the subject-object 
relation, one which reflects what has now become their 
absolute incompatibility. The musical subject, in order to 
achieve such a reflection, had to yield to and assimilate.the 
formal features of objective reality to a far greater extent 
than ever before; 234 Subotnik writes that "by increasing the 
explicitly formal character of music, the subjective could 
acknowledge its own underlying dependence on a foreign source 
of authority, objectivity, without ever going beyond the 
autonomous processes of musical construction". 235 To put it 
simply, the musical subject had to disappear from the music; 
and Adorno accordingly claims that in the late Beethoven 
corpus it almost never appears directly, being instead 
dispelled to a position of "permanent renunciation". 236 
Henceforth, "the very absence of a subject from a musical 
configuration necessarily constituted an integral component of 
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that configuration", 237 and Adorno believes that the subject in 
Beethoven's third period maintained its identity exactly 
through its own negation. In this way, both autonomy and 
heteronomy are comprised at the same time; 238 the ways in which 
Beethoven is said to achieve this will be elaborated later on. 
In these forms, said the speaker, the subjective and the 
conventional assumed a new relationship, conditioned by death. 
At this word Kretschmar stuttered violently; sticking 
fast at the first sound and executing a sort of machine-gun 
fire with his tongue on the roof of his mouth, with jaw and 
chin both quivering, before they settled on the vowel which 
told us what he meant. But when we had guessed it, it seemed 
hardly proper to take it out of his mouth and shout it to him, 
as we sometimes did, in jovial helpfulness. He had to say it 
himself and he did. Where greatness and death came together, 
he declared, there arises an objectivity tending to the 
conventional, which in its majesty leaves the most domineering 
subjectivity far behind, because therein the merely personal -
which had after all been the surmounting of a tradition 
already brought to its peak - once more outgrew itself, in 
that it entered into the mythical, the collectively great and 
supernatural. 
Mann and Adorno on Death 
In a moment that is perhaps closer to Heidegger than to 
Adorno, Kretschmar has to resolve his struggle to articulate 
the absolute alone; approaching death, the limit of personal 
existence, is the ultimate moment of individual subjectivity. 
The objectivity of death, its ultimate collectivity, is 
however also absolute. 
In his essay "Sp!tstil Beethovens" - an instance of 
unusually ahistorical analytic method on the philosopher's 
part - Adorno theorizes this paradox in a manner that is 
parallel to the more strongly history-based one elaborated 
upon above. He speaks here of the relationship of convention 
to subjectivity as a "law of form" (Formgesetz), one which 
becomes visible to the artist once the reality of death, which 
amounts to the abolishment of art, is considered. 239 It is 
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however only associated with "the creature, not the 
creation", 240 and therefore appears in broken form within the 
artwork, as what Adorno calls allegory. Psychological 
interpretations which seek to explain late styles as a move 
towards unlimited and regressive subjectivity therefore miss 
the point; Adorno writes that "in the later works the violent 
power of subjectivity lies [instead] in the rapidly upward-
moving gesture with which it departs from the work of art", 241 
thereby shaking off the illusion of art. The nexus of such a 
process with the presence of genius is elaborated as follows: 
Touched by death, the masterly hand sets free the material 
which it had formed earlier; the cracks inside it, evidence 
of the ultimate powerlessness of the I when faced by Being, 
is its [the I's] final creation .... [The] fragments, fallen 
apart and left behind, are finally transformed into 
expression; expression now no longer of the solitary "I" but 
of the mythic one of the creature and its fall~ whose steps, 
in the same manner as moments of holding back, are 
figuratively hewn by the late works. 242 
While Adorno is never as specific as Mann is on the notion of 
"genius" (the essay on the Missa Solemnis perhaps approaches 
this issue slightly more directly) , the point of association 
is clear. 
Mann's own attraction to the ideas of death and sickness 
- to pathology - as essential elements to artistic creation 
goes back to his early novellas such as Tristan and Death in 
Venice; The Magic Mountain itself is in many ways a "medical 
history" of intellectual debate, and in The Story he felt it 
necessary to locate Doctor Faustus as well within a creative 
period when he himself was of ten ill and at times seriously 
concerned for his own life. 243 The influence of Schopenhauer -
whose thought is after all an important precursor to the kind 
of Freudian explanation that would usually be given here - is 
evident, 244 and the sonata in this section in a sense directly 
embodies Beethoven's "will to death". The romanticization of 
death implicit in much of Mann's writing follows the leanings 
-
- .. ~ ....... 1~ ......... _. 
__ _J 
121 
of Romanticism proper. While Adorno's ideas as expressed above 
also show signs of a Schopenhauerian245 or Nietzschean 
heritage, the philosopher's approach to the late music is 
perhaps more historically sophisticated, with the position of 
the subject before death also being placed - within his 
further writings - in the context of an approaching historical 
impasse. 
He did not ask if we understood that, nor did we ask 
ourselves. When he gave it as his view that the main point was 
to hear it, we fully agreed. It was in the light of what he 
had said, he went on, that the work he was speaking of in 
particular, Sonata Op. 111, was to be regarded. 
Language and the Impossible Memory 
Another impossibility arises, called forth by the requirements 
of the novelistic essay: Zeitblom has just elaborated a 
complex argument set forth by Kretschmar in a fair amount of 
detail, and yet admits here to not "understanding" what has 
been said. Later in the same chapter he interrupts his report 
of another lecture 
to remark that the lecturer was talking about matters and 
things in the world of art, situations that had never come 
within our horizon and only appeared now on its margin in 
shadowy wise through the always compromised medium of his 
speech .... We listened to it all with the dimly excited 
fantasy of children hearing a fairy-story they do not 
understand, while their tender minds are none the less in a 
strange, dreamy, intuitive way enriched and advantaged. 
Fugue, counterpoint, "Eroica," "confusion in consequence of 
too strongly coloured modulations," "strict style" - all 
that was just magic spells to us, but we heard it as 
greedily, as large-eyed, as children always hear what they 
do not understand or what is even entirely unsuitable -
indeed, with far more pleasure than the familiar, fitting, 
and adequate can give them .... And I believe that the 
stretches jumped over fill [ed] in of themselves over time. 246 
As in Proust, desire is located within childhood memory: the 
response to "magic words" - even while there are in this 
passage overtones of Mann's notion of the eternal as discussed 
I 
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earlier - parallels the desire for exclusivity promised by the 
metamusical discourse identified earlier. Language itself is 
"meaningless" and manages to function as membrane here, and 
linguistic completion comes about with the "filling in" of 
meaning over time. 
On a superficial level, we are presented here with an 
enactment of Derrida's principle of differance: the 
syntagmatic function of words can only be linked to meaning at 
an imaginary position in the future, and "memory" until that 
moment concerns the purely signifier. Yet while such an 
extension of a theory of meaning towards the process of 
language acquisition itself may be valid in a general sense, 
deferred meaning will here be provided by a non-linguistic 
form, that of musical performance. The general deferral of 
meaning is more relevant to the experience of music to come 
than to what has been spoken, and it is exactly the fact that 
language - understood neither by audience nor general 
readership - admits to both failure {"the main point was to 
hear") and necessity ("It was in the light of what he said ... 
that the Sonata ... was to be regarded") which locates textual 
functioning in discourse that is different by virtue of being 
metamusical already. In other words, the failure of words is 
more intrinsic to metamusical discourse than to general 
language, and this aspect is foregrounded - language is freed 
- by novelistic admission. Directionality - and, to some 
extent, dialectic interreferentiality - becomes less important 
within a form that is at the most basic level removed from an 
object that can speak by itself: the move to the "particular" 
is not uniform. Factual impossibility can be related to both 
the parodic nature of the first two sentences here {the issue 
is normalized by means of humour) and to the problematic of 
musical interpretation itself. 
Far, then, from setting up a simple opposition between 
.... '" -·"' .... ··~-·-.~ .... ~·· . .:.. --~~. 
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analysis and pure listening, Mann's text reveals some of the 
complexities arising from setting both, with their respective 
relationships to desire, within the framework of the novel. 
Differing metamusical discourses are unable to claim 
hierarchical positions while still bound to the verbal text 
itself, and negotiations among them would seem to occur within 
a further frame, that of the impossibility - one which extends 
to the attendant "rules" or reality of the respective 
discourses - of actualizing the music that is their object. 
And then he sat down at the cottage piano and played the whole 
composition out of his head, the first and the incredible 
second movement, shouting his comments into the midst of his 
playing and in order to make us conscious of the treatment 
demonstrating here and there in his enthusiasm by singing as 
well; altogether it made a spectacle partly entrancing, partly 
funny; and repeatedly greeted with merriment by his little 
audience. For as he had a very powerful attack and exaggerated 
the forte, he had to shriek extra loud to make what he said 
halfway intelligible and to sing with all the strength of his 
lungs to emphasize vocally what he played. 
Acting Adorno 
As if to restate the idea that no language will stand by 
itself, remain impenetrable, give closure, Mann returns 
directly to parody. In'The Story the following passage - one 
that incidentally reveals a two-way intertextuality - appears: 
Then Adorno sat down at the piano and, while I stood by and 
watched, played for me the entire Sonata Opus 111 in a 
highly instructive fashion. I had never been more 
attentive. 247 
The revered philosopher, the man of "brutish seriousness "248 
who is the source of the language preceding this section, is 
given a body here, one which is drawn from a real event and 
made comical. Parody is again linked to the impossible: 
Kretschmar's interspersive technique is the most practical 
attempt at language-music unity (song, instrumental 
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performance, analysis and enthusiastic persuasiveness all 
proceed from a single source) but the impossibility of 
effectively doing this results in burlesque humour. The need 
to describe performance where actual listening is impossible 
- --
1 e ads to an exaggeration of such performance, to its extension 
into the process of writing itself; this can be seen as a 
further instance of language adhering to its own boundaries 
and attempting extension at the same time. Both the body and 
language struggle to appear through music in a reversal of the 
central difficulty of the metamusical novel, and here a 
further object of parody can be identified, namely the 
Wagnerian idea that in Beethoven's late music "the word should 
burst forth out of music". To some extent Leverkiihn's "taking 
back" of the Ninth Symphony is foreshadowed by the relegation 
of the singing voice to parody, which later in the novel is 
closely associated with the demoniac. 
With his lips he imitated what the hands played. "Tum-Tum, 
tum-tum, tum-tr-r ! " he went, as he played the grim and 
startling first notes of the first movement; he sang in a high 
falsetto the passages of melodic loveliness by which the 
ravaged and tempestuous skies of the composition are at 
intervals brightened as though by faint glimpses of light. 
Metamusical: Figuring Equivalence 
In the original German the imitation of the initial phrases of 
Opus 111 reads as follows: 
Bum, bum - Wum, wum - Schrum, schrum ... 
The translator is in effect making a mistake: these are 
Kretschmar's actual nonsense words, and she is giving 
preference to interpretation of the primary musical text 
rather than to Mann's secondary one. The fact that we can 
identify a problem with the altering in translation of 
supposedly non-denotative words indicates that such language 
' . ~·· -~ ... -....... . --
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is in some sense given a status not bound by ordinary 
linguistic concerns. In other words, they are closer to music 
than they would have been had they contained denotative 
meanings; presumably they involve the imitation of sound and 
rhythm only. 
From such an angle the original "translation" is however 
less correct than Lowe-Porter's secondary one. The following 
is the passage being imitated: 
~aestoso [1:J 
- figure 1 -
The scanning of these notes as "Tum-tum, tum-tum, tum-tr-r!" 
is rhythmically closer to the score, even though the reader 
who has not heard the sonata would be more likely to interpret 
these phrases as follows: 
tr 
UBUl" 
- figure 2 -
"Tum-tum" is of course an anglicization of printed matter that 
would be difficult to pronounce otherwise: the practical 
concerns of translation reveal, then, that the symbolic 
extends beyond denotation alone. Translation traditionally, 
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rather than involving interlinguistic syntagmatic association, 
is a question of transposition via an imaginary signified 
which can be linked to otherwise unrelated signifiers. The 
recasting here, rather than following the process of "musical" 
(syntagmatic, form-bound) translation at a textual level, is 
firmly rooted in the traditional procedure. The former would 
in fact amount to an impossible situation of translation not 
taking place at all, this being so both because of context and 
the necessary production of meaning within esthesic 
subjectivity. Of two "musics" one (the signified and not the 
text) is given primacy; the result, again, is that what is 
possibly a strongly ironic gloss by Mann on the type of 
metamusical method involved (the German words are "silly", 
"embarrassing"), and is therefore an equally important 
signified, is missed. 
Direct transformation of the neutral qualities of music 
into language already fails (neither Kretschmar's nor Lowe-
Porter's attempt manages to create rhythmic or auditory 
equivalence); the "musicalizing" of language into nonsense (it 
is exactly "sense" which leads to complications) does not lead 
to a stable position of understanding either. Content proceeds 
from form as soon as the esthesic is engaged, and this results 
in a destabilizing of both signified and signifier, of the 
presence of both music and the metamusical. 
We find in the same sentence an entirely different 
metamusical procedure. The diminished seventh opening chords 
are described as "grim and startling" (grimmig auffahrenden) : 
does this not seem to tell us more about the music? Again we 
find a relatively impressionistic term, related to the 
esthesic in terms of emotional response, combined with a 
relatively objective one, related to the formal level: as the 
devil points out to Leverkilhn, Beethoven employs here "the 
h h d . k h. 249 h ars est issonance nown to im", one t at steers away 
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(fahrt auf) from the historically "normal". We can see this 
juxtaposition, as well as the placing of description next to 
rhythmic imitation, as a further example of the attempt at 
fullness where individual languages fail. 
Metamusical: The Storm 
Mann's use of impressionistic terms also follows an 
established avenue for describing many of Beethoven's 
compositions, especially the piano sonatas. The "discourse of 
the storm" and the attendant "storm-calm principle" provides 
an easy mechanism for programmatizing a general pattern of 
extreme dynamic, rhythmic, contrapuntal and modulatory 
polarity found in his work, and appears extensively in 
discussions of his more well-known works. It extends to the 
names of compositions as well, as in the case of the 
Seventeenth Piano Sonata retrospectively being called "The 
Tempest". The dualism of storm and calm can of course fairly 
easily be attributed to the two movements, so different in 
character, of Opus 111. 
Objectively, again (where the object is drawn from the 
symbolic), the identification of a storm in the first movement 
can be related to an established convention of meaning, that 
of chromatic progressions signifying approaching turbulent 
weather. Some form of slow chromatic build-up is present in 
bars 6 to 11 (see fig. 3), the rumble produced by the bass 
demisemiquavers and semiquavers of bars 16 to 18 (see fig. 
4) can be seen as "non-ascending chromaticism" (the tension 
of expectation is prolonged by its development occurring 
primarily dynamically), and chromatic progression proper 
occurs in bars 47 to 53 (see fig. 5), even though the 
latter leads to a motoric anticlimax. The storm is however 
also extended metaphorically across the whole movement, 
allowing Mann both to continue a parodic usage of the 
singing voice (while at the same time establishing a 
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figure 3 -
Allegro con brio ed appassionato 
cresc. 
- figure 4 -
----------------------~--:---:-~----------
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traditional association between beauty and verticality, here 
in terms of voice pitch) and to again connect Beethoven and 
Leverktihn through a prefiguring of the end of the Lamentation 
(the composition is "brightened as though by faint glimpses of 
light") . 
At last he laid his hands in his lap, was quiet a moment, and 
then said: "Here it comes!" and began the variations movement, 
the "adagio molto semplice e cantabile." 
Expectation Achieved, Extended 
The moment of silence bears great significance: it introduces 
that upon which emphasis has been laid all along and 
represents the end of a struggle listening-wise, through 
difficult performance, through the events given by the program 
and, ultimately, biographically. It forms a two-way frame of 
absence, dividing absolutely the earthly from the ultimate. 
"Opus 111", as excerpts from the literature of reception 
have shown earlier, may be said to exist in its second 
movement: it is the latter which is drawn more readily to the 
verbal frame. In general discussions of the sonata there is a 
tendency towards either far more2~ or far less~1 space being 
bestowed upon this movement than on the first (it either draws 
extensive praise or is simply placed as "ineffable"); it is 
only in more formalist-oriented readings that the subjectivist 
element is "denied" in favour of the supposed objectivity of 
the neutral (Schenker in his monograph on the sonata252 for 
instance spends 43 pages writing on the first movement and 52 
on the second) . The economy of metamusical production at work 
here is variable, and the absolute can be seen as working both 
for and against language. 
In this instance, narrative expectations require a 
climax, something new, different or unusual. Where music 
·• •• '•' "• •·' ' "·' ·•'• ••••-•-• • • ·• I ' ·- •• ~' •••• "' ~ •• • ••·•••• • ·• '~., • .~ • 
cannot be heard, this obviously has to occur within words 
themselves, either in "content" or stylistically. 
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The arietta theme, destined for vicissitudes for which in 
its idyllic innocence it would seem not to be born, is 
presented at once, and announced in sixteen bars, reducible to 
a motif which appears at the end of the first half, like a 
brief soul-cry - only three notes, a quaver, a semiquaver, and 
a dotted crotchet to be scanned as, say: "heav-en's blue, lov-
ers' pain, fare-thee well, on a-time, mead-ow-land" - and that 
is all. 
Reducing 
What is immediately new here, then, is the attempt at finding 
equivalent units for musical segments which designate both 
rhythm and "content". Although the metaphorical nature of 
these phrases is admitted to by the inclusion of the qualifier 
"say" (etwa), they entail a hitherto unprecedented entry of 
language into music: verbal meaning implicitly proceeds from 
music (the arietta theme "speaks", makes itself heard where 
performance is merely described) while also directly 
reflecting what is important to Mann (or Adorno) 's 
interpretation of the sonata and to the novel as a whole.· 
The arietta motif of course offers a prime opportunity 
for association with the subject in Adornian terms- or for 
"subjective entry", judging by the "objective" simplicity of 
the motif and theme. It is for this reason that the longer 
theme is "reducible": Bergsten has pointed out how Adorno made 
such a reduction in pencil in Mann's own copy of the score, 253 
and Mann follows Adorno's reading directly in his novel. This 
step however also occurs for more practical reasons: the motif 
is short, easily identifiable, and because of its simple 
rhythmic stability can be easily "scanned" into verbal form; 
the fact that identification of the kernel of the work occurs 
in syntagmatic terms (melody and rhythm) can be related to the 
• ••• ~·· ~., ,_' ....... , ....... "~,; • .... -:.,,... '••• .. '°No-···~ ..... ~ M.::.:·. • "-~'·-· .>, •• ,, ... • ..... ;. 'o>. o • ~. • • >' • • •· ••" 
greater accessibility of such elements both to general 
readership (and to their subsequent understanding of 
"variation") and to linguistic equivalence. 
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Why the motif should be said to "[appear] at the end of 
the first half" is also directly related to the specifically 
Adornian analysis of the sonata: the rhythmic configuration 
identified is already present in the very first bar in the 
tonic triad (see fig. 6), but instead the reduction of the 
theme is said to appear in the form in which the configuration 
appears halfway through bar 7, extending into bar 8. Here it 
clearly occurs on the dominant, thus not entailing harmonic 
(and analytic) closure: the motif at the very end is in the 
tonic. Mann, as Bergsten shows, takes this information 
directly from Adorno's cormnents written above bar 8 in his 
score ("The motif in its original, 'objective' form: at the 
end of the first half of the theme."), 254 and is very likely 
subjugating his own understanding to that of the far more 
accomplished musical thinker. The motif in the position 
identified represents penultimacy, "becoming" (the leading B 
"requires" the appearance of the tonic), rather than a set 
unit to be elaborated upon, but it is this D-G-G version that 
will be "humanized" later on, that will, with an addition, in 
its "leave-taking form", represent the reformulated object. It 
is for this reason that the motif is also identified at the 
end of the initial thematic statement rather than in bars 1 
and 2, where it appears in D-G-G form for the first time: it 
appears right before the end of the statement, which in the 
variation genre also represents the end of what is "said" as a 
whole. On a more basic level it is also possible that such a 
positioning reflects a sense of unfulfilment at the beginning 
of the sonata, one that can only be left behind as ultimacy is 
attained by the end; while the tonic represents closure, the 
dominant is still allowed scope for subjective travel. 
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Arietta 
Adagio molto, semplice e cantabile 
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Anthropomorphization Extended 
The verbal phrases suggested by Zeitblom/Kretschmar {once 
again the source of narrative is uncertain here) are again not 
rhythmically "correct": the translation for the most part 
successfully retains the rhythm of the original German phrases 
- Himmelsblau, Liebesleid, Leb'-mir wohl, Der-maleinst, Wie-
sengrund - but even these {except to an extent the last three, 
through the placing of a pause within the normal rhythmic 
pronunciation by means of hyphens) cannot stipulate exact 
following of the rhythmic pattern identified. "Himmelsblau" 
would in a retrospective "scanning" for instance amount to two 
notes of equal duration, the first stressed, followed by 
another stressed note of double that duration. In terms of 
pitch variation in pronunciation the German words generally 
however follow the melody of the motif, at least as it appears 
right at the beginning, in broad directional terms. Such 
issues are perhaps relevant where the technical terms (quaver, 
semiquaver, dotted crotchet) are not familiar, but exactitude 
of rhythm and pitch is in general subordinated to poetic 
content. 
Mann employs heavily connoted images to convey the 
feelings which he is likely to be associating with the theme 
(the motif itself would rather acquire emotional relevance in 
context than on its own) . The phrases used are all vague and 
nostalgic, relating to an ideal pastoral state, imaginary or 
real, that has been left behind. As such, they entail the 
general pattern of desire for the "impossible" of music (music 
speaks its own impossibllity), one that has become associated 
with a Germany that is no more, with what is for Adorno the 
marriage between subject and object, with illusion. At the 
moment of departure, where it reaches the limits of music as 
defined from within, the sonata is allowed verbal self-
definition. 
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The modernist author again projects his own subjectivity 
- or web of interpersonal subjectivity - into the sonata: the 
motif comes to "act out" the lives of Beethoven, Leverktihn 
and, as Bergsten suggests, that of LeverkUhn's nephew Nepomuk 
Schneidewein255 "or Echo as everybody . . . straightway called 
him". 256 The "co-author" of Doctor Faustus is already present 
in the phrase "mead-ow-land" ; 257 the way in which Beethoven's 
"art had overgrown itself" has been compared to the motion of 
the arietta theme earlier, and the composer's own biographical 
progression through incredible hardship towards a stage of 
spiritual transcendence, his "farewell" to the sonata form, 
will now be lived out by the motif too. The motif itself - in 
an association of pure signifiance - furthermore becomes an 
"Echo" both of itself and, in context, of that which "might 
have been". Anthropomorphization is more clearly present, as 
Bergsten shows, in the parallel situation by which Echo 
himself is "destined for vicissitudes which in [his] idyllic 
innocence [he] would not seem to be born". Further 
associations can be made by means of seeing language as 
external description - Bergsten connects the phrase "heav-en's 
blue" with the colour of Echo's eyes2~ - and also within . 
novelistic structure: the same critic suggests that Echo's 
appearance in the novel is a "brief soul-cry" within the 
larger stride of the inhuman, and that the phrase "love's 
pain" (Liebesleid) signifies Leverktihn's own response to the 
child's death. 259 
Such a confluence of structural, thematic, historical, 
systemic, metamusical, projectional and anthropomorphic 
interests within a single three-note motif indicates both the 
radical heterogeneity allowed by "musical translation" and the 
flattening of difference - between levels of the tripartite 
division, between form and content, and so on - within the 
musical novel. The section cited contains the most direct 
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attempt in the whole of Doctor Faustus at equalizing language 
and music, and is more effective than many others because of a 
process of initial association rather than retrospective 
closure: music and language start at a similar point and - for 
the chronological sequence of the lecture - are similarly 
repeated and eventually transformed. 
What now happens to this mild utterance, rhythmically, 
harmonically, contrapuntally, to this pensive, subdued 
formulation, with what its master blesses and to what condemns 
it, into what black nights and what dazzling flashes, crystal 
spheres wherein coldness and heat, repose and ecstasy are one 
in the same, he flings it down and lifts it up, all that one 
may well call vast, strange, extravagantly magnificent, 
without thereby giving it a name, because it is truly quite 
nameless; and with labouring hands Kretschmar played us all 
those enormous transformations, singing at the same time with 
the greatest violence: "Dim-dada ! " and mingling his singing 
with shouts. 
Deletion, Ineffability 
Earlier on it was said that the theme of the movement "goes 
through a hundred vicissitudes, a hundred worlds of rhythmic 
contrasts, at length outgrows itself, and is finally lost in 
giddy worlds that one might call other-worldly or abstract". 
The transformation of technical numbering into metaphor (the 
variations can, after all, be counted) already indicates a 
motion towards language admitting its own failure even within 
"exactitude", and in the section here such failure is pushed 
towards a further extreme. 
The sentence begins with analytical language: it is 
indicated that the "utterance" will undergo transformation in 
what are traditionally the three most important parameters 
within musical composition. It soon, however, lapses into 
syntactical "garbage" (the original German is no less 
diffuse), without any point of clarity other than a semicolon 
break after which the "situation" (and parody) returns. This 
~ .... ,· ... ~ ·-. ·'· 
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may be a "true" dialectical reflection of the confusion 
produced by Kretschmar's method of multiple presentation (to 
recreate experience produced by content in artistic form is 
not an unusual aim in modernist writing), but there is also a 
sense here of language nearing its limits. Description of 
effect, of compositional procedure (of Beethoven "working" on 
the object), of metaphorical space attained and of 
ineffability itself work against one another while also 
blending (it is not clear whether the motif "says", "does" or 
"reaches". The "it" which is "truly quite nameless" is not 
identified, and the motif attains a super-ontological 
character; the result is that a deletion of meaning begins to 
take place. 
This deletion is already found in the "content" itself 
here: the binary oppositions "black nights and ... dazzling 
flashes", "coldness and heat" and "repose and ecstasy" are all 
nullified. They are in this composition "one and the same". 
Such a removal of difference - which can be related to the 
more uniform sense of calm attained after the dynamic, 
rhythmic and expressive extremes of the first movement - of 
course amounts in the terms of both Derrida and Saussure to 
the absence of the production of meaning. Examples have 
already been given of descriptions of the second movement that 
entail entry into paradise: if we read paradise as that which 
lies before, above or after earthly human existence, and 
therefore outside of language, the use of language to deny 
itself completely - to "defend" ineffability - is to be 
expected. 
The idea that what the arietta movement attains is "truly 
quite nameless" is thus also found elsewhere. Eric Blom for 
example maintains that 
to write about this farewell [the second movement] to the 
sonata for the piano ... is to come as near an attempt at 
describing the indescribable as any one can possibly be 
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faced with. One cannot even extract musical quotations from 
it. No idea can be given of the theme on which Beethoven 
bases his variations except by writing out the whole of it; 
... this movement ... can be formally analysed but is 
extremely hard to assimilate spiritually. 2" 
Similarly, for Barry Cooper "Op. 111 epitomizes Beethoven's 
late style ... Words are inadequate to convey the range of 
emotions - the tension, the despair, the sublimity - expressed 
therein". 261 Marion Scott writes that "no human terms can give 
an idea of [the first movement's] magnitude. Nor can words 
describe the serenity and light of the arietta that follows -
a set of variations upon what one may call a theme of light 
and peace everlasting."20 In more extreme fashion Philip 
Barford calls bars 106-9 of the second movement "the 
profoundest moment in all music, a still emptiness 
transcending thought and emotion". 263 
The notion of the absolute finds its particularized 
fulfilment· and "proof" here: the sonata exceeds language and 
other music altogether; it is as if an entire philosophical 
notion comes to be drawn into a single musical instance. The 
sonata, retrospectively, can combine language and music by 
itself - the flip into the absolute, to the limit, allows once 
again for experience beyond formal division. 
"These chains of trills!" he yelled. "These flourishes and 
cadenzas! Do you hear the conventions that are left in? Here -
the language - is no longer - purified of the flourishes - but 
the flourishes - o~ the appearance - of their subjective -
domination - the appearance - of art is thrown off - at last -
art always throws off the appearance of art. Dim-dada! Do 
listen, how here - the melody is dragged down by the 
centrifugal weight of chords! It becomes static, monotonous -
twice D, three times D, one after the other - the chords do it 
- dim-dada ! Now notice what happens here -" 
Adorno: Metamusical 
The hyphenated appearance of this passage reminds of 
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Kretschmar's stutters earlier on: while music is in a sense 
represented by means of graphological absence (music .exists on 
paper where language admits to disappearing), the fracturing 
of language itself is necessary in terms of what has happened 
in the preceding sentence, for analytical closure would work 
directly against the idea that the sonata is "nameless". For 
the sake of narrative structure, however, the dialectical 
argument presented earlier on has to be.located within 
specifics, and we again find Adorne's ideas appearing. The 
links between musical elements and dialectic theorization are 
not readily apparent from this passage, and it will be 
worthwhile to look at how Adorno identifies such elements 
elsewhere. 
In his essays on Beethoven's late style and on the Missa 
Solemnis Adorno elaborates a number of ways in which Beethoven 
achieves what was identified as the reformulation of the 
subject-object felation earlier on; they will b~mentioned 
briefly. 264 First of all, he extensively reintroduces 
counterpoint, which Adorno identifies as a more objective or 
"collective" form, 265 as well as other Baroque and pre-Baroque 
techniques such as use of the church modes, 266 "the dissolution 
into often short, hardly symphonically integrated parts, the 
lack of decisive thematic inspirations ... and a lack of 
discharging dynamic developments. "267 Secondly, convention, 
unlike in the second period, suddenly plays a heightened role 
in the last works: Adorno attaches special importance to the 
appearance of "trills, cadenzas, and fioritures"20 as well as 
other ornaments, the accompanimental bass pattern, and the 
simple V-I cadence. Convention for Adorno signifies what 
Nietzsche would call the immergleich aspect of external 
reality, the unchangeable elements unaffected by subjectivity; 
thus Beethoven's return to convention in his last works 
signifies that the belief in subjective musical ordering was 
but a "passing phase", even if convention is now self-
consciously assimilated. 269 In a passage to which Mann must 
have had direct access to, conventions are said to 
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become expressions of their barest depictions of themselves. 
This occurs by means of ... the shortening of his style: it 
desires less to remove the flourish from the musical 
language than to remove the appearance of the flourish 
having subjective control: the liberated flourish, released 
from the [subjective] dynamic, speaks for itself. 270 
Thirdly, Beethoven replaces development with repetition or 
variation: ·the Missa for instance "does not at all break out 
of the pre-planned objectivity of the model through any 
subjective dynamic, nor does it create the totality out of 
itself"; its motifs "rather constantly reappear in changing 
light though they are always identical."271 Fourthly, there is 
an absence of mediating structures272 between extreme moments 
within last-period works, so that we often find unresolved 
"collisions" or unusual silences. The idea that "art always 
throws off the ~ppearance of art" is central to the essay 
"Spatstil "273 and to much of Adorno' s thought in general, 274 and 
the methods by which the presence of the subjective is denied 
on a surf ace level all amount to such a "throwing off" of that 
appearance in the face of death or larger historical 
necessity. 
Many of these musical processes or elements are of course 
to be found in Opus 111, and if we accept Adorne's 
explanation, accusations of "artificiality" can be understood 
within a framework of incipient alienation. This process 
itself is directly linked to a motion towards ineffability, 
and Adorne's ideas will be considered in relation to other 
possible explanations of why Opus 111 should specifically be 
linked to the absolute or ultimate in piano music. 
True Words? 
The phrase "dim-dada" appears as what may be called a "true 
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leitmotif" within literary format: it entails a specified 
representation, a fixed quantity that does not proceed beyond 
what it represents originally; it is not extended or developed 
until the end. In Barricelli' s terms, 275 the reader is here 
thus engaged in a successful musicoliterary process. Language 
comes to partly enact the structural· role of a musical unit; 
it can, however, be noted that this is but a limited 
achievement if the aim of writing is to reproduce music. 
The term "monotonous" in this context is a "true word" 
from another perspective. Whereas identifying an effect such 
as monotony is strongly lodged within the subjective, the 
repetition of the D in what is presumably bars 106 to 114 (see 
fig. 7) entails a change within an expected pattern of 
reappearance towards immediate restatement of the most basic 
melodic unit, so that "monotony" appears in its most direct 
etymological sense (one tone is repeated). In other words, 
etymology coinc~des directly with supposed effect; the neutral 
and esthesic levels are unified in an uncommon fashion by 
language from the outside, and the form-content union -
Pater's "music" - appears because of a shifting of content 
towards perception itself (music does not signify monotony but 
exists in it). Language here "is" music by the removal of the 
signified of music while at the same time being even further 
away from it. We should perhaps note that the D is stated in a 
trill, and this trill moves from major to minor - in effect 
there is thus not only one tone that is repeated. For the 
purposes of analysis here, however, such departures can be 
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It was extraordinarily difficult to listen to his shouts 
and to the highly complicated music both at onoe. We all 
tried. We strained, leaning forward, hands between knees, 
looking by turns at his hands and his mouth. The. 
characteristic of the movement of course is the wide gap 
between bass and treble, between the right and the left hand, 
and a moment comes, an utterly extreme situation, when the 
poor little motif seems to hover alone and forsaken above a 
yawning giddy abyss - a procedure of awe-inspiring 
unearthliness, ~o which then succeeds a distressful making-of-
itself-small, a start of fear as it were, that such a thing 
could happen. 
Subject and Object? (1) 
The audience context is returned, but what is said about them 
at first bears little relation to the narrative sense: 
Zeitblom immediately returns to a "better educated" (although 
confidently universalizing) position towards music - he makes 
it clear that the essential characteristic of the music in 
question is "of course" the one that he identifies. The 
"technical" knowledge that the tessitura of the movement is 
unusually large is however immediately reformulated in lay 
terms: "bass" and "treble" are "explained", if inversely, as 
"the right and the left hand". The way in which 
anthropomorphization of the motif is continued also relates 
more to a general than to a musically educated readership: the 
motif is described both sympathetically and in the language of 
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existentialism, and is both subjugated to audience authority 
and granted a certain heroic quality. 
Could the interplay between analysis and more accessible 
language be related to that of object and subject? Could the 
dialectic established between audience and l_~cturer, young and 
old, listening and understanding, be a further instance of 
Mann's making use of Adorno's thought, of attempting a form-
content reflection even in the reception of his novel? Mann's 
interest in parody as source of humour, his political 
conunitment by this stage towards democracy, the need to 
present a bygone Germany, and the basic fact that he is still 
writing a work of art and not of theory all lead towards an 
approach that is markedly different from Adorne's consistently 
austere style and active complication of the position of the 
reading subject. More specific comparisons between the writer 
and philosopher are made elsewhere; it can be noted at this 
point that the :.•subject-object" interaction in terms of style 
here is more a question of juxtapositional balance than of 
mutual reformulation. 
One Moment 
Where the "moment comes" in bars 114 to 118 {see fig. 7), 
-
Zeitblom's reading of the sonata is hermeneutic in the 
Barthesian sense. 276 One specific instance is isolated, is 
given subjective prominence, and becomes a bodily kernel, a 
"figure" which is both the presence from which the rest of the 
interpretation is drawn and the point in which it reaches its 
most extreme emotional actualization. The procedures leading 
up to the falling fifths at bar 110 are perhaps harmonically 
as unusual as what the gaps over more than four octaves in 
bars 117 to 119 are in terms of piano tessitura (the highest 
and lowest notes here are practically at the limits of the 
keyboard available to Beethoven). Either way, however, the 
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earlier idea that emotional response to the neutral level 
could occur because of a direct poietic presence is now 
extended to the history of music itself. The fear "that such a 
thing could happen" is thus a formal one in more than one 
sense. Depending on how Zeitblom's analysis is itself 
interpreted on a larger scale, the later "moment", where a C 
sharp is added to the D-G-G motif, may in any case be a more 
important one. 
Bergsten again links the workings of the motif here to 
Echo's life, and to the extreme oscillations between heaven 
and hell in the chapter describing his death; 277 the procedure 
of "awe-inspiring unearthliness" is related both to 
transcendence and to vertigo. Mann is perhaps forcing his 
interests: the motif neither appears in D-G-G form, nor does 
it follow its original direction or exact rhythm in the 
relevant section. Yet his claim that music here produces the 
sensation of vertigo is perhaps not far-fetched or entirely 
subjective: empirical evidence towards showing that music does 
in specified instances create spatial or kinetic effects has 
already been mentioned earlier. The fact that such effects are 
not "natural", that they are also encoded by the symbolic, 
brings them into association with Mann's own "symbolic", in as 
far as that exists as verbal opposition to music. 
If we follow the text closely, the "start of fear" is 
located in bars 119 to 130: a musical response is given to the 
"extreme situation"; in other words, music is given both 
narrative and metanarrative ability. Such a "narrative" does, 
if the moment is considered in the greater light of Zeitblom's 
translation, seem to make sense in relation to the descending 
sequence of semiquavers within the contextually subdued key of 
E flat major, the diminuendo into pianissimo and the relative 
stasis or carefulness of melodic statement up to where the 
theme reappears in the original tonic key in bar 130. In other 
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words, the identification of the specific "moment" comes, as 
first principle, to direct narrativization of subsequent 
development in a successful manner, especially in as far as 
the nature of the moment is given in broad metaphorical terms 
such as it is here. 
Much else happens before the end. 
The Archetypal Sentence 
Calvin S. Brown writes in a passage that sums up a large 
number of literary - specifically poetic - attempts at 
translating music: 
The opening bars of a movement can readily be described, 
interpreted, or imitated almost note by note, but the 
complications of musical form soon outrun the possibilities 
of poetic treatment, and before long we find the poet lost, 
so far as the music is concerned, and going off on his own 
tack, keeping .. the composition in mind only vaguely, if at 
all. z1s ; 
The most successful use of music for language thus far has 
been the transcription of the initial motif. The problem 
identified by Brown is to some extent circumvented by the 
motif reappearing in similar form throughout the movement (if 
it had for instance developed significantly in melodic or 
fugal fashion this would not have been possible); Mann also 
sticks more closely to analysis than the poetry which Brown is 
referring to generally does. Yet the statement is valid in 
other ways: a longer technical analysis than this one would 
get boring; a longer poetic one would become self-indulgent, 
prolonging the worst excesses found in the earlier sentence 
beginning "What now happens to this mild utterance ... ", and 
would affirm the failure of language in the most undesirable 
fashion. For language to elicit desire - to produce 
inspiration - it has to be an initial moment; again, a 
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But when it ends and while it ends, something comes, after so 
much rage, persistence, obstinacy, extravagance: something 
entirely unexpected and touching in its mildness and .goodness. 
With the motif passed through many vicissitudes, which takes 
leave and in doing so becomes itself entirely leave-taking, a 
parting wave and call, with this D G G occu~s a slight change, 
it experiences a small melodic expansion. After an 
introductory c, it puts a C sharp before the D, so that it no 
longer scans "Heav-en 's blue," "Mead-ow land," but "O-thou 
heaven's blue," "Green-est meadowland," "Fare-thee well for 
aye," and this added C sharp is the most moving, consolatory, 
pathetically reconciling thing in the world. It is like having 
one's hair or cheek stroked, lovingly, understandingly, like a 
deep and silent farewell look. It blesses the object, the 
frightfully harried formulation, with overpowering humanity, 
lies in parting so gently on the hearer's heart in eternal 
farewell that the eyes run over. "Now for-get the pain," it 
says. "Great was - God in us." "'Twas all - but a dream," 
"Friendly - be to me." Then it breaks off. Quick, hard 
triplets hasten to a conclusion with which any other piece 
might have ended. 
Hope 
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Adorno's advice is followed through: where the C-C#-D-G-G 
sequence occurs in bars 170 and 171 (see fig. 8), the_ 
philosopher wrote in Mann's score "the humanized leave-taking 
variation at the end", 279 and above the C sharp he wrote "the 
added, differentiating note is C sharp". 280 Whereas the motif 
has been human for Mann all along (and in its new form 
acquires direct agency both within musical narrative and 
esthesic process), such a "subjectivizing" of the object 
occurs directly in the Adornian sense for what is possibly the 
first time here. Adorno concludes his essay "Spatstil" - in 
which he argues that subjectivity itself "takes leave" much in 
the manner of the motif - by writing that 
The fragmented landscape [the "collected" musical 
"matter"] is objective; the light that glows therein 
subjective. [Beethoven] does not bring about their 
harmonious synthesis. He tears them apart in time, as a 
force of dissociation, perhaps to preserve them for 
Eternity. In the history of art, late works are the 
catastrophes. 281 
The appearance 6f the subject within fragmented objectivity -
in the face of death - redeems art from its nature as 
illusion, but does not redeem the subject from its isolation, 
its imminent departure into final absence. 
It is here that Mann departs from Adorne's radical 
pessimism. In The Story he mentions how the philosopher 
persuaded him to give the Lamentation a less hopeful ending, 282 
and when Zeitblom writes about Leverki.ihn's last work there are 
strong shades of Adorno's impossible idealism: 
[T]his dark tone-poem permits up to the very end no 
consolation, appeasement, transfiguration. But take our 
artist paradox: grant-that expressiveness - expression as 
lament - is the issue of the whole construction: then may we 
not parallel with it another, a religious one, and say too 
(though only in the lowest whisper) that out of the sheerly 
irremediable hope might germinate? It would be a hope beyond 
hopelessness, the transcendence of despair - not betrayal to 
her, but the miracle that passes belief .... what remains, 
as the work fades into the air, is the high G of a cello, 
the last word, the last fainting sound, slowly dying in a 
pianissimo-fermata. Then nothing more: silence, and night. 
· .. ' ~· ......•.• c. ~-··· ..... 
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But that tone which vibrates in the silence, which is no 
longer there, to which only the spirit hearkens, and which 
was the voice of mourning, is so no more. It change_s its 
meaning; it abides as a light in the night. 283 
The emphasis on a single tone which offers some kind of 
redemption can be directly linked to the appearance of the C 
sharp in Kretschmar's analysis of Opus 111; the reformulated 
motif appears in full once only in bars 169-70 and is cut off, 
"left hanging in the air", at the end of bar 170, as the 
"objective" conclusion steps in. It is likely that this 
procedure is closely related to the kind of "moment" Adorno 
refers to when he writes: 
It is subjectivity which compresses the extremes in 
movements, which loads tightly packed polyphony with its 
tensions, which breaks them up in unison and escapes from 
them, leaving behind the naked tones, which uses the empty 
flourish as a monument of the past, within which 
subjectivity is petrified, decays and dies. The caesuras and 
abrupt endings, however, which more than anything 
characterize the late Beethoven, represent such moments of 
escape; the work is hollow when it is left behind and turns 
its hollow in~ides outwards. 284 
Subjectivity - or what may be identified as hope for the 
individual - can only appear within its own escape from 
musical matter. Yet, within the passage cited from Mann, the 
appearance of the extra note amounts to a victory of humanism 
over historical necessity, even if this can be achieved only 
retrospectively. Its "mildness and goodness" can be related to 
the return of dynamic and rhythmic stability, yet this phrase 
also arises from a direct correlation of tonality, the 
conventional system, with the good. The added C and C sharp 
are in effect here a "reinforcement" of the existing tonal 
pattern, a leading up to its beginning that imbues it with 
more "presence". 
The emotional effect which the reformulated motif 
produces is one of nostalgic reaffirmation of the humane, 
nostalgic because the latter is about to be left behind 
absolutely, as are the "rage" and "extravagance" of both 
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movements, the lives of Beethoven and Echo, the old German 
tradition, and the sonata as genre itself. Subjectivity 
departs both in the simple sense of the individual approaching 
physical death and as more abstract possibility within art. 
The verbal equivalents for the extended motif, reformulated 
and new, also reflect such sentiments: the addition of ewig to 
the phrase Leb'-mir wohl and the new phrase "'Twas all - but a 
dream" are both examples of this. 
Kretschmar did not return from the piano to his desk. He 
sat on his revolving stool with his face turned towards us, in 
the same position as ours, bent over, his hands between his 
knees, and in a few words brought to an end his lecture on why 
Beethoven had not written a third movement to Op. 111. We had 
only needed, he said, to hear the piece to answer the question 
ourselves. 
Subject and Object? (2) 
An instance of easy symbolism occurs: Kretschmar will not 
return to the locus of isolated and commanding verbalization, 
will remain seated beside his musical instrument, vulnerable, 
in the same position as the audience; "it is music that 
remains", which is universal, and which here transcends both 
the barrier between performer/lecturer and audience and the 
difference principle supposedly unique to language. In so far 
as the chain of identity is concerned, Kretschmar is once 
again linked to Beethoven: he, too, has struggled through the 
performance of the work itself (in a sense, his vocal 
involvement indicates a direct correlation of the performer-
as-subject with the motif itself), and will "go away" alone, 
amid the sound of "thin but prolonged applause". 
On one level, then, Kretschmar as subject himself has 
been involved in a "reformulation": from a parodic to a fairly 
serious situation, from comic subjectivity to a subjectivity 
that is now grounded in "the collectively great and 
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universal", reconstituted by the entry of both music and 
audience. The lecture - the overarching term - is of course 
also the objective containment of Kretschmar's entire 
linguistic and musical performance, and its central paradox -
that of presenting a musicological argument while stating that 
music needs no words - can perhaps be explained in a similar 
regard. In other words, while there is a definitive shift 
towards the importance of listening for answering the original 
question, such a subjective evaluation can be cast by 
Kretschmar in absolutely objective terms by virtue of 
objectivity now being located within transcendence, within the 
absolute itself. The "objective" analytical introduction that 
appeared earlier is - within the fictive world of the novel -
restated in combined musical and verbal terms; it proceeds 
through performance towards silence. 
In the end, it is the reader and not the fictive listener 
who is left, and association can only extend to the substance 
of narrative itself. The dialectic between language and music 
as theorized fails more decisively for the reader in that the 
absence of music is also a proportional one. The parts where 
music is "present" via combined description of performance and 
analytic comment are limited to less than a paragraph, with 
the result that understanding of the subject-object 
theorization itself cannot adequately occur. Language here, in 
the last analysis, primarily inspires further - extra-
novelistic - listening. 
A third movement? A new approach? A return after this parting 
- impossible! It had happened that the sonata had come, in the 
second, enormous movement, to an end, an end without any 
return. And when he said "the sonata," he meant not only this 
one in C minor, but the sonata in general, as a species, as a 
traditional art-form; it itself was here at an end, brought to 
its end, it had fulfilled its destiny, reached its goal, 
beyond which there was no going, it cancelled and resolved 
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itself, it took leave - the gesture of farewell of the D G G 
motif, consoled by the C sharp, was a leave-taking in this 
sense too, great as the whole piece itself, the farewell of 
the sonata form. 
Ending the Sonata 
A value judgment is implicit here: Opus 111 is distanced 
absolutely from Beethoven's other two-movement piano sonatas, 
and the knowledge that Beethoven did write other piano music, 
that he lived for another four years, and that others did 
write more sonatas, is all cast aside by rhetorical 
persuasiveness. Kretschmar in this regard provides final 
closure on what has been a close association of biography and 
musical progression. He engages in rhetorical overkill to 
bring his point across: Beethoven had for once and for all 
transcended all human possibility of sonata writing; the 
sonata had achieved its ultimate potential technically, 
expressively, i~ all manners of speaking. In an extreme 
Hegelian moment the motif takes leave of Opus 111, Opus 111 
takes leave of the sonata form as a whole, Beethoven takes 
leave of music and of life, and the novel takes leave of the 
cultural achievements made possible in Beethoven's work. 
Reasonings 
The idea that Beethoven reached with Opus 111 the limits of 
what is possible in the sonata form is not unique to Mann: the 
idea is already implicit in much of the positive reception 
identified earlier, and Mann himself (possibly Adorno too) 
seems to have taken the "leave-taking" metaphor from a line in 
Bekker's biography which states that "[w]ith Opus 111 
Beethoven conclusively took leave of the piano sonata form. "285 
It will be worthwhile to again place Mann's writing 
within the wider discourse on Beethoven, not only to locate 
sources but to investigate also the ways in which language 
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comes to assign ultimacy. "Objective" musicological reasons 
will thus be sought for why Beethoven's last piano sonata 
should specifically be linked to the realization of the 
absolute, both in the way described here and in terms of 
transcendence or ineffability. These elements can then also be 
related to the way' in which Mann manages a negotiation between 
the two broad opposing forms of reception of the sonata 
identified. 
Philosophical Influences 
Various streams and figures within Mann's own philosophical 
background have been discussed; to start off, we will here 
consider more general trends in the production of language on 
Opus 111. 
The idea of transcendence through art is central to the 
discourse of Romanticism. Whereas Beethoven, in the words of 
Martin Cooper, ~remained to the very end of his life ... a man 
of the eighteenth-century Enlightenment", 286 the strong ethical 
drift traditionally observed in his work comes into conflict 
with introspective tendencies in the late music. Prometheus 
becomes more Faust-like, and the "overreacher"287 provides .a 
suitable model for both early writings on the "morality of 
art" and later Romantic concepts such as Nietzsche's idea of 
ubergehen, which in the last analysis of course amounts to a 
rejection of the language of society as well. 
Robert Jacobs has successfully identified the 
similarities between Beethoven's recorded statements and the 
thought of Kant, 288 and it is not difficult to see how Kant's 
moral idealism arrives at Beethoven's door via Schiller when 
the composer writes in a letter that "[o]nly art and science 
give us intimations and hopes of a higher life" . 289 Schiller's 
dictum that the artist must "set himself the task of an idyll 
... that will lead humanity, for whom the path to Arcadia is 
.. 
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forever closed, onwards towards Elysium"290 seems to be at the 
center of Beethoven's self-concept. This is clear from 
statements such as "Whosoever understands my music will 
henceforth be free from the misery of the world. "291 Kant's 
propagation of the noumenal as a sphere resistant to control 
via reason, with attendant shades of ineffability, is further 
reflected in a request supposedly made by the composer to Von 
Arnim: "Tell [Goethe] to hear my symphonies and he will then 
agree that music is the only bodiless entry into a higher 
world of knowledge which comprehends mankind, but which is not 
comprehended by it. "292 
Beethoven is thus, of course, complicit in being assigned 
messianic status and in the general tradition of discourse on 
his music. Again, to critics of his later symphonies he 
replied: "You have not the energy, the bold wing of the eagle, 
to be able to follow me. "293 Although there seems to be little 
evidence concer9ing his own opinions on the last piano sonata, 
it is clear that he himself saw his later music in 
transcendent terms. In a letter written to the Archduke 
Rudolph shortly after the completion of Op. 111 he states that 
"[t]here is no loftier mission than to come nearer than other 
men to the Divinity, and to disseminate the divine rays among 
mankind"; 294 he is also known to have considered his last works 
better than his earlier ones. 295 It might be worthwhile to note 
that among the books found in Beethoven's possession after his 
death, there were three by the theologian Johann Michael 
Sailer, who argued that art was the expression of the divine 
in human terms; the thesis that the religious and the artistic 
impulse are identical is extensively elaborated in one of 
these three, the Bund der Religion und der Kunst. 296 To the 
extent that authorial intention is acknowledged, then, the 
sonata does "express" or "create" paradisiac or transcendent 
states of mind; poiesis may be said to frame esthesis directly 
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(and this is exactly why Beethoven's own approaching death 
plays such an important part in Kretschmar's analysis of Opus 
111), with this frame necessarily ruptured by language and 
intention working against itself. 
Technical Achievement and Expression 
As far as the notion of ultimacy in terms of technical 
achievement is concerned, it is likely that Beethoven did 
believe that he had achieved enough with the classical sonata 
form as regards the piano. Whereas unfinished works after 1822 
include a Mass, an Overture on the notes B-A-C-H; a String 
Quintet and a Tenth Symphony, 297 no attempt seems to have been 
made at writing a thirty-third piano sonata. After condemning 
the physical limitations of the piano by calling it "an 
unsatisfactory instrument" the only keyboard compositions 
completed were the Diabelli Variations (which, it must be 
noted, is in itself a "colossal" achievement) and a number of 
short pieces. A. Forbes Milne writes that Op. 111 "crowns with 
success the efforts which Beethoven made to combine the 
harmonic and structural principles of the sonata with the 
contrapuntal requirements of the fugue", 298 and it is likely 
that the composer would have been highly satisfied with his 
successful implementation of a genre that had caused him much 
difficulty before. There is an unusually clear line of 
development in Beethoven's sonata writing, and Milne 
identifies the attempt at such a fusion as the logical 
conclusion to this progression. 
The idea of the limit is relevant also in other ways. 
While it is for instance impossible to objectively gauge 
levels of "expressive content", there is a sense in which 
Beethoven's oft-remarked historical achievement of 
unprecedented expression within Classical forms 299 can indeed 
be authenticated. It is at points of renewal - and 
particularly of individualist renewal - in musical development 
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that "expression" can in one sense be said to occur: the 
individual appears exactly where there is a departure from 
convention. The composer's endless striving towards formal 
development - often in rejection of social expectations - can 
be read, together with the increasing number of score 
directions (the appearance of molto espressivo, cantabile and 
so on in particular) as a tipping of Classical balance towards 
subjective experience, a paving of the way for Romanticism. 
The tendency towards "organic form" 300 can already be observed 
in the Pathetique Sonata, where the separate introductory 
section is combined with the first theme of the allegro; in 
the first movement of Op. 111 the exposition almost fuses with 
the development stage, suggesting an extensive progression 
towards primacy of subjective exploration. 
While Beethoven never quite abandoned Classical forms 301 
he did stretch them to the limits of what Paul Henry Lang 
calls "their maximal tensile strength" . 302 In the exceptionally 
long Arietta movement the harmonic configuration of the 
"little song" remains "almost primitively simple 11303 and 
Beethoven can - in an optimistic view - be said to achieve the 
old ideal of maximum content within an established form, again 
occupying an ideal transitional locus between two aesthetic 
codes. Whereas the first movement of Op. 111 still carries 
elements of the "dramatic style", the switch to variation form 
in the second movement (and in his only subsequent piano work 
of importance, the Diabelli Variations) indicates an attempt 
at drawing the most from a simple form. The length of the 
second movement, the scope of octaves employed, the technical 
difficulty of performance, the repetitions, the great number 
of extended trills and also of silences between notes, and 
above all, the sheer scope of dynamic, rhythmic and melodic 
redefinition within variations, all point to a desire for 
maximum deliberation (or "exhaustion") within a consciously 
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he did stretch them to the limits of what Paul Henry Lang 
calls "their maximal tensile strength". 302 In the exceptionally 
long Arietta movement the harmonic configuration of the 
"little song" remains "almost primitively simple" 303 and 
Beethoven can - in an optimistic view - be said to achieve the 
old ideal of maximum content within an established form, again 
occupying an ideal transitional locus between two aesthetic 
codes. Whereas the first movement of Op. 111 still carries 
elements of the "dramatic style", the switch to variation form 
in the second movement (and in his only subsequent piano work 
of importance, the Diabelli Variations} indicates an attempt 
at drawing the most from a simple form. The length of the 
second movement, the scope of octaves employed, the technical 
difficulty of performance, the repetitions, the great number 
of extended trills and also of silences between notes, and 
above all, the sheer scope of dynamic, rhythmic and melodic 
redefinition within variations, all point to a desire for 
maximum deliberation (or "exhaustion"} within a consciously 
limited framework. Where expression is accepted as 
compositional aim, it is easy to see how these expressive 
elements in Op. 111 come to be seen as "aiming towards 
silence" - or towards self-exhaustion - and are transposed 
into descriptions of the ultimate or paradisiac. 
Lastness 
The discourse of the absolute, be it in terms of 
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expressiveness or otherwise, can of course not be sustained on 
technical explanation only. Writing on Op. 111, Eric Blom 
claims that "[f]orm ... is not only an indispensable attribute 
of a work of genius; it is the only attribute that is 
analysable". 304 The conflation of musical achievement with a 
valorized biographical program is evident in his statement 
that "[t]he last Sonata sums up the whole experience gathered 
by Beethoven throughout all the sonata writing that had 
occupied him on and off for twenty-six years". 305 Wilfrid 
Mellers makes the point even more directly: "Though opus 111 
has only two movements, it traverses the total range of 
Beethoven's experience, as manifest in the previous sequence 
of sonatas. 11306 
Discourse on the last music forms a logical narrative 
conclusion to a more well~established myth: the artist who has 
heroically battled against giant setbacks throughout his life 
now reaches peace, a happy ending. A long-standing tradition 
maintains that the successful resolution of a long struggle 
over the guardianship of Beethoven's nephew as well as final 
acceptance of deafness led to a period of peaceful and 
unhindered creation; the composer's self-absorption and 
neglect of physical appearance here - and even his 
questionable dealings with publishers - are signs of his 
ld . 307 • • 11 "unwor iness" . H1stor1ca y, however, this is simply not 
true. Beethoven's concern over financial matters, his health 
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and his nephew's education placed him, if anything, painfully 
in the middle of worldly affairs, and there occurs, rather, a 
remove between art and life, reflected stylistically in the 
departure from the "heroic mode". Maynard Solomon cites 
Beethoven's loss of patronage, his waning popularity in favour 
of Rossini's "narcotic" music, and a general public 
disillusionment with the social and political ideals of the 
Enlightenment 308 - a point which is implicit to Adorno' s 
analysis - in this regard. 
Other writers have seen the late works as the result of 
sickness and struggle themselves, either in terms of 
sublimation or of joyful inspiration upon recovery. 309 
Psychoanalytic readings have attempted to explain the creative 
fertility of the late period as the direct outcome of 
pathological mental fragmentation occurring at that stage, 310 
and some have cited the composer's supposed syphilis as the 
source of creative success. 311 On a more mundane level - if we 
accept Schindler's record - the fact that the last three 
sonatas were written in response ·to accusations of inventive 
exhaustion might well account partly for their formal 
excellence. 
The idea that a composer's last works, because of their 
general temporal proximity to death, manage to capture visions 
of afterlife is not unique: Mahler's Ninth Symphony for 
instance still carries the "I saw death" tag even though a 
Tenth Symphony was almost fully completed. The trope of 
artistic foresight is extended to the ultimate limit itself, 
and the temporal status of last works contributes directly to 
being assigned hierarchical supremacy in terms of general 
"vision" or expression as well. For a writer like Thomas Mann 
death is central to all artistic creation, and this explains 
his strong attraction to late Beethoven works in a novel such 
as Doctor Faustus. 
-· 
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What is more problematic, however, is a response to Op. 
111 from Berlin published while Beethoven was still alive, in 
which the reviewer claimed to hear "the sounds of the grave" 
and "the digging of the grave" in the sonata. 312 While rumours 
of Beethoven's physical and supposed mental deterioration 
might be at the root of this, the chance that contemporary 
musical perception might have functioned in ways inaccessible 
to modern-day analysis cannot be discounted. Even when 
considered metaphorically, these images in a sense have 
aptness beyond that of merely signifying criticism of the 
compositional result. 
Double Ineffability 
The extremity of the difference between the two broad types of 
reception mentioned earlier might suggest the general 
nonverifiable nature of linguistic translations of absolute 
music; yet the t:wo are undeniably linked in their descriptions 
of motion away from understandable "language", musical or 
otherwise. Joseph Kerman identifies a "drive toward 
dissociation" in Beethoven's late works, which signifies for 
him the dialectical obverse of the composer's dominant 
synthesizing impulses; 313 similarly, Martin Cooper writes that 
one of "the characteristic marks of his late style" is that 
"nothing is conceded to the listener, no attempt is made to 
capture his att~ntion or hold his interest."3u This process 
can be read as a departure from (and, in Adorne's sense, a 
self-deconstruction of) Enlightenment ideals (such as 
synthesis between individual and society): the dissolution of 
the middle-period style, with its powerful resolution 
procedures, results in a denial and subsequent exclusion of 
the human subject as inte9rated entity. The language of reason 
and of successful "appropriation" of exterior objects such as 
music begins to fail, and silence offers the possibility of an 
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"open" reading in either positive or negative direction. 
Adorne's views offer an interesting perspective on this 
process as historical event, and, in so far as Op. 111 is 
representative of the late style in general, clears up many of 
the apparently contradictory elements in its reception. 
Whereas his analysis of Beethoven's late style is a far more 
pessimistic reading of subjective expression than the one 
expressed earlier, the subject can be said to tend towards the 
absolute - both as silence and ultimacy - by assuming a 
position of "implacable autonomy", even if that subject is no 
longer redeemable from the outside. It is worth noting that 
Adorno himself considered the Missa Solemnis - completed soon 
after the last sonata - as "the greatest of [Beethoven's] 
works". 315 The reason for this is most probably that this 
"resistant" composition embodies a pessimistic stance toward 
both religion and the certainties of the Enlightenment 
tradition of boqrgeois humanism, which Adorno values as 
"humanity" at its peak316 and which was realized by Beethoven 
in his second period, 317 while yet containing a kernel of 
idealism. In a sense Beethoven's return to convention is thus 
more "authentically" subjective than the works of later 
Romanticists who take his middle period as their starting 
point. 
Where the subject is still to an extent discernible, as 
in the Arietta motif of the second movement of Op. 111, the 
listener's identification, if it does occur, leads him or her 
to exhaustion, fragmentation or silence. In both cases the 
subject comes to be defined by absence, and the assignment to 
the sonata of both paradise - which Adorno might well call 
regressive 318 or link to "affirmative culture" - and anti-
humanist artificiality make sense under the sign of horror 
vacui assumed at the limits of subjective being. It is to 
Adorne's credit that he sees the difficulty of the late music 
... · ..... ' .. ' ... ·~ ..... :-~ ... ·~ ........ ,,~ . .;._ .. , ........................ _ .. :-.......... -· 
as an atemporal phenomenon - in 1959 he could write of the 
Missa Solemnis that "recognition of its content ... [is] to 
this day ... still missing" 319 - and it is in this sense that 
the two responses elucidated are not bound merely to 
ideological positioning or historical progress. 
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The idea of ultimacy in a work of music is, as has been 
shown, bound to result in the positing of a correlative 
related in some way to silence. If the correlation between 
ineffability and paradise is kept in mind, and if it is 
accepted that Beethoven's late music occupies a tentative 
position between the integrated and the totally absent subject 
in music, it can be argued that guided access into emptiness 
within Op. 111 allows for a form of ecstasy similar to that 
aimed for in certain Eastern religious traditions, one that is 
also akin to the self-annihilation desired in certain 
symbolist and modernist literary works. Adorno's assertion 
that the Missa Solemnis "balances on a point of ineffectivity 
; 
which approaches nothingness" 320 is particularly relevant in 
this regard. Silence, however, becomes in many cases a term 
against itself, as the excessive verbal discussions on the 
inadequacies of language have indicated earlier. While God 
cannot be described, paradise and the human condition of 
silence can, and in a sense must be given linguistic form. 
"Meaning" returns as a linguistic means of ordering musical 
experience into a continued human existence that.is not 
transcendental itself. As a corollary, art replaces religion , 
as transcendental signifier, finding its specific and 
accessible embodiment in a work of music such as Beethoven's 
Op. 111. Whereas Beethoven's own life history can be embraced 
as a principle of artistic heroism,· it is this musical limit 
that remains, and which can, in the end, be read as the place 
where the non-human, human and archi-human come together. 
...... .-~• ....... •··•• _ ..... ,.~~~ ...... «.·.· ..... 1~·~· "·· ........ ·. ·'···~·-·····"~'- ...... '•"''· .... ,_ 
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With this Kretschmar went away, accompanied by thin but 
prolonged applause, and we went too, not a little reflective, 
weighed down by all these novelties. Most of us, as usual, as 
we put on our coats and hats and walked out, hummed bemusedly 
to ourselves the impression of the evening, the theme-
generating motif of the second movement, in its original and 
leave-taking form, and for a long time we heard it like an 
echo from the remoter streets of the little town: "Fare-thee 
well," "fare thee well for aye," "Great was God in us." 
Ending Off 
The lecture is over, the frame has exhausted itself, 
individual identity is returned to the real in the act of 
applause. 321 The highpoint of musical history, of the novel, of 
desire, has been reached; what follows will be a motion into 
lesser achievement, into verbalization. The motif remains, 
together with the words it has become associated with, echoes 
into the world of the novel, into homewards motion, into 
Leverkuhn's musical career, into the short life of a later 
character. It is in this sense that the worded motif is a 
"parting wave and call": by acting as membrane it is not 
merely a frame within which the rest takes place, but figures 
both further desire and inspiration, allows outward movement 
instead of forcing closure on a piece of music and the process 
it supposedly brings to an end. Musical experience is both 
privatized (each audience member repeats the motif "bemusedly" 
to himself) and extended. 
It is here that important differences between the 
approaches of the two authors in this chapter can again be 
ascertained. While Beethoven's late music represents for both 
Adorno and Mann (in context of the novel) a "leave-taking" 
from earlier musical possibilities, the musical positioning of 
the reading subject in Mann's novel is substantially different 
from the experience of Adorno's reader. This is obviously due 
in part to a "poeticizing" of theoretical language, but there 
is also a sense in which Mann draws on desire for the 
- ., ~ • u • - • . _, ........... -.~·-• ........ -··· ···~· ~- *'···-···~····-··· ........... ,. ,. ... -·~ ........ ~ ..... _' ............. ··--··· 
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impossible. Especially for the reader who has not heard 
Beethoven's last piano sonata, the functioning of desire is 
little different from that - as identified in an earlier 
section - surrounding fictional works of music such as 
Proust's Vinteuil sonata; such a hope for subjective 
association and expression is of course an impossibility for 
Adorno. While the main intellectual topics of Doctor Faustus 
often correspond extensively to Adorno's theories, and whereas 
music is physically absent to the same extent as in the non-
ficti ve writing thus far considered, Adorno's writings 
themselves embody the condition of modernity by complicating 
or "alienatin9" the music which is their concern to a far 
greater extent than Mann does in his novel (it is utterly 
inconceivable that Adorno could for instance, like Mann, speak 
of "[t] he eternally romantic quality of music ... ") . 322 In his 
easy conflation of biographical details, history of reception, 
formal musical ~istory, evaluation of performance, aesthetic 
judgement of the work itself, pure Adornian theory, 
impressionistic transcription, linguistic translation of 
specific musical phrases, formal analysis and "natural" 
emotional response (singing, shouting), Mann draws on a number 
of forms of the metamusical which are far more readily 
accessible than Adorno's paratactic and hypotactic discourse, 
and which would in many cases be considered regressive by the 
philosopher; the heteroglossic aspect of such a presentation 
has in general less impact on the reader than the persistence 
of a generalized Romantic vision of "musical power". 
Criticizing Erhard Bahr's idea that in Doctor Faustus 
Mann's long-standing concern with the Nietzschean opposition 
between life and art is replaced and even resolved by Adorno's 
dialectical structures, Helmut Schneider asks: "Could Thomas 
Mann not ... aim at the Nietzschean heritage in Adorno, rather .. 
than 'supersede' it?". 323 Adorne's praise of Beethoven is 
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admittedly subjective, and the composer forms part of his 
complicated idealism - incredibly pessimistic as it is - only 
in so far as he appears at a specific point in history. Mann's 
historical project, on the other hand, is more consciously 
Germanocentric, and the "barbarous" implications of a 
Nietzschean tradition of self-transcendence discovered by the 
novel are perhaps exactly alleviated by passages in which 
language can still create a sense of "that which was". 
The ending to Kretschmar's lecture is thus sensitive even 
as music becomes disparate (and it can only be so because of 
the latter) : in its echo, the earlier musical appearance - as 
the last phrases of Zeitblom's report further suggest - is 
broken up, repeated, turned into remnants, into darkness, 
sleep, dream and forgetting. Closure reads as the institution 
of nostalgia, the empowerment of rereading, the necessary 
positioning of the subject within the limit before silence, 
and ultimately, the attempt at response, at a metasystemic 
that is always called into being because of the absence of the 
object in the perceived metamusical ("Of that which one cannot 
speak and of which others do, one must let words appear 
anew") . The musical novel, then, has to be an "open text" -
open towards an impossible signified or towards further 
production - if it hopes to avoid false closure; Mann's own 
Story of a Novel is a prime example of how language is 
extended in both directions. 
Lastly 
Mann's metamusical discourse has been shown to be complex, 
eclectic, disparate, and this is one reason why metasystemic 
closure is more difficult to attain than usual, is in a sense 
rendered a conspicuous instance of conscious delinquency, in 
that it is placed in the same relation of linguistic closure 
towards music itself. His own "metasystemic" - The Story of a 
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Novel, his essays on music, philosophy and culture - does not 
account for historical, semiotic, intertextual, and 
musicological processes that are well beyond the scope of even 
an investigation such as this one (at the furthest point, the 
"presence" of the absolute - musical and otherwise - in a 
linguistic form cannot be judged effectively even in the most 
basic of definitional terms) . 
The word of music has perhaps "appeared", as inspiration, 
as liberating process, somewhere between Mann's text and this 
one, in that the intricacies of ~usic-language involvements 
have not been successfully "framed" at any stage, both because 
of the specific nature of the "objective" metamusical and the 
metasystemic procedure itself. The original text has, like 
language, been a necessary frame: it is the process of 
interpretation itself, the making parallel of pure music and 
the imaginary signified of the text, which allows the solidity 
of this frame to be dissipated. Carefulness, the affirmation 
of failure, ecstasy, "truth" can only appear within such a 
process, and it is in this regard that the many avenues opened 
by the present reading have not been given definitive 
directionality, linkages, endings: there is extensive room for 
further research, and it is the imperative of the 
Wittgensteinian-style aphorism above to let such a chain 
proceed of its own accord. 
Notes 
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Notes to Preface and Section 1: 
1. For the sake of avoiding facile sociopolitical arguments, it can be noted 
here that this is what the term "music" will henceforth refer to. 
2. Barthes, 1990, p. 179. 
3. ibid. 
4 . ibid. p . 181. 
5. See ibid. p. 189. 
6. See particularly Barthes, 1975b, 1984, 1986a. 
7. Barthes, 1986b, p. 299. 
8. See Bent and Drabkin, 1987, chs. III and IV for a history of the rise of 
formalist analysis. 
9. See Brelet, 1968 for a provocative - if excessively esoteric - reading of 
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10. See Benveniste, 1971. 
11. See Lacan, 1981. 
12. Ludwig, 1943, p~ 230. 
13. Tovey, 1948, pp. 294-95. 
14. In Kerman, 1985, p. 76. 
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achieved (see Kerman, 1977, pp. 176-81). 
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18. See for example Narmour, 1977, Kerman, 1985, Maconie, 1990, Mcclary, 1991, 
Cook, 1992, Detels, 1992. 
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generative ru+es?" (1990, p. 165). He adds that "Formalist reductionism's 
great mistake is to proceed as if gaining precise knowledge of a work were 
possible only by working through the constraints of formalization" (ibid.). 
Other semioticians such as David Lidov actually include "intuition" as an 
important variable in all semiotic undertakings. 
The debate on the validity of empirical method for aesthetic theory is 
one of the key issues of twentieth-century philosophy, and it is often in the 
"science" of cognitive psychology_ that the most confident claims for 
scientific explanation are made. See Raffman, 1993 for an example of a more 
subtle approach from this angle; see also Seashore, 1981. 
20. 'In Nattiez, 1990, p. 152. 
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21. It can also be noted here that doing a "correct" analysis of a musical 
composition in itself nears impossibility; in a section on "plot and seriation 
process" Jean-Jacques Nattiez displays the extent to which analyses are 
effected via preordained "paths" (see Nattiez, 1985, 1990, pp. 223.;..33). 
22. In Steiner, 1967, pp. 42-43. 
23. See for instance Nattiez, 1982, especially pp. 290-97. 
24. Nattiez, 1990, p. 12; see Preface and ch. 1 for general discussion. 
25. ibid. p. 153. 
26. Cases in which performed music is notated for the first time (for instance 
in transcriptions of audio recordings by ethnomusicologists) can of course be 
seen as successful renditions - it is to be decided whether notation is to be 
seen as "language" or not. It can also be noted that early notation recorded 
"general lineaments of successful improvisations" (Durant, 1984, p. 98), with 
little respect being paid for precise details of performance or for the 
intentions of composer. 
27. Brown, 1948 and 1953 (see especially ch. II). 
28. See for example Barricelli, 1988, pp. 1-10, Schoolfield, 1992; on systemic 
difficulties see Scher, 1981, 1983. 
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30. See Aronson, 1980, chs. 1 & 2. 
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Barthes, 1975a) and Derrida's idea that there is nothing outside the system of 
signifieds (see Derrida, 1976), one which, incidentally, is indirectly 
borrowed from Schlegel, who himself was greatly influenced by Romanticist 
thought on music (see Bowie 1990, ch. 4). A writer such as Boyne (1990) 
approaches the work of Derrida and Foucault directly from the angle of a~ti­
rational critique. A further simple correlation can be made with metafictional 
and metahistorical programs from the viewpoint that music cannot be related to 
"fact" or "fiction". 
32. Barthes' deconstruction of the categories of "objectivity" and 
"subjectivity" is useful in this regard (see Barthes, 1975a, pp. 10-11). 
33. The attempt at translating the "music of the spheres" into painting was 
common among Renaissance artists such as Ficino and Da Vinci; in the Twentieth 
Century this tradition is continued primarily by Mondrian and Kandinsky (see 
Aronson, 1980, pp. 6-8). 
34. Both Goethe and Hegel saw architecture as "frozen music"; the link between 
music and architecture coincides with a long tradition of natural mathematical 
relations existing both in harmony and visual proportion, the divine appearing 
in numbers, humanist ideals being perfected in the Golden section (see for 
example ibid. p. 7). 
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36. In Wallace, 1986b, p. 1. 
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37. Most of the poems in Mallarme, 1957 can be taken as examples here. See 
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tradition. 
38. Jackendoff and Lerdahl, 1977, p. 111. 
39. See primarily Chomsky, 1965 and Chomsky, 1966. 
40. See Jackendoff and Lerdahl, 1980, 1990; see also Raffman, 1993, p. 19. 
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Whittall, 1988, chs. 3 & 4. 
42. Jackendoff and Lerdahl, 1990, pp. 5-6. 
43. Nattiez, 1990, pp. 156-60. 
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Notes to Section 2: 
1. There is a long tradition which, finding partial verification in the 
historical movement from song lyric to lyric poetry, argues that poetry is by 
definition a "blending" of music and prose (see for instance Egri, 1988). 
Parameters addressed in judging music such as rhythm and texture are of course 
basic to all forms of verbal usage; the fact that they are foregrounded in 
poetry necessitates a similar judgment but does not imply any intrinsic 
difference between poetry and prose as expressive forms. 
2. See Silverman, 1981. The consummate nature of this division is expressed in 
The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis as follows: 
We can locate this Vorstellungsreprasentanz in our scheme of the 
original mechanism of alienation in that first signifying coupling that 
enables us to conceive that the signifier appears first in the Other in 
so far as the first signifier, the unitary signifier, emerges in the 
field of the Other and represents the subject for another signifier, 
which other signifier has as its effect the aphanisis of the subject. 
Hence the division of the subject - when the subject appears somewhere as 
meaning, he is manifested elsewhere as "fading", as disappearance. There 
is, then, one might say, a matter of life and death between the unary 
signifier and the subject, qua binary signifier, cause of its 
disappearance." (Lacan, 1981, p. 82) 
3. See Laplanche and Pontalis, 1973, p. 210. 
4. There are other models of semiotic functioning - such as those of Kristeva 
and Barthes - which avoid such a strict division; for the purpose of 
commenting on the articulation of music, however, Lacan's model is more useful 
as basic groundwork here. 
5. Certain works of;music of course also offered a sense of wholeness through 
which the artist could escape the social alienation of twentieth-century 
existence; one critic writes that "Proust, Forster, Virginia Woolf and Thomas 
Mann ... alike turned to the musical experience as embodying a primordial 
vision of human life expressed through rhythm or melody, pitch or volume, 
concord or discord. In their search for a faithful representation of the 
inwardness of experience, be it through individual consciousness or through 
the awareness of social identity, they discovered in music a metaphor of 
harmonious coexistence" (Aronson, 1980, p. 32). One could hardly dismis~ the 
similarity between the kind of "unity" perceived here and the idealizing 
nature of Lacan's notion of Being. 
6. LeverkUhn's "anti-art" develops as a response to what he refers to as the 
"laughability" - the creative predictability - of existing compositions. While 
most of his work is permeated by irony or by "relentless ugliness", pushed to 
final extremes in The Lamentation of Doctor Faustus, this last work however 
still ends with an almost imperceptible glimmer of hope, a high G that "abides 
as a light in the night" (Mann, 1948, p. 491). Positivity here reads both as 
the ability to avoid "epigonality" and to produce music which has meaning 
beyond its textual functionings (the "value" of music is measured from early 
on in Mann's novel by its ability to escape explanation in words; the narrator 
Zeitblom fills a paradoxical position in following this principle while yet 
being particularly eloquent and insightful in his discussion of Leverkuhn's 
own works). 
7. It has been noted (see for instance Kerman, 1985, Scher, 1983) that much of 
the "serious" music from the formalist trend of the 1960s and 70s was written 
exactly for the purpose of analysis, in other words with analysis both as 
informant and as object. In a sense the music here is intended to be "equal" 
to the analytical discourse that accompanies it, and an interesting paradox 
occurs in the fact that formalist analysis, which continues the tradition of 
absolute music, changes (if one includes mathematical analytical constructs 
under "language") the ontological status of these musical works into one which 
is primarily verbal. Whereas the verbal "meanings" released by such analysis 
..... \ ··-·· --- . ·-· ........ " ........ _d ..... "' ••. ~· .:.-• .:-···-·-~·- ··- ~-·· 
cannot of course be negated, they can never entirely indicate how music is 
experienced, especially by the musically uneducated. 
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8. Whereas transcripts of some of Beissel's works have surfaced in recent 
years, those that have been "forgotten" assume for all practical purposes the 
same status as imaginary works, both representing something unattainable and 
therefore capable of mirroring unlimited desire. 
9. See Jackson, 1981, pp. 14-17. 
10. The interaction between the word of music and passages in fiction writing 
which deal with imaginary music is thus also an exemplary instance of what 
occurs with Barthes' scriptible text: "The writerly text is a perpetual 
present, upon which no consequent language (which would inevitably make it 
past) can be superimposed; the writerly text is ourselves writing, before the 
infinite play of the world (the world as function) is traversed, intersected, 
stopped, plasticized by some singular system (Ideology, Genus, Criticism) 
which reduces the plurality of entrances, the opening of networks, the 
infinity of languages" (Barthes, 1975a, p. 5). Art here, as in the Symbolist 
tradition, becomes a "membrane" through which outward movement is made 
possible. 
11. A good example occurs where George Sands for instance writes about the 
fifteenth prelude: · 
There is one [prelude] which occurred to him on a rainy dismal evening 
which produced a terrible mental depression. We had left him •.. The rain 
had come on, the torrents had overflowed ... and we arrived in the dead of 
night ... On seeing us he rose, uttering a great cry, then he said to us, 
with a wild look and in a strange tone: 'Ah, I knew well that you were 
dead!' ... [H]e had seen all this in a dream and, no longer distinguishing 
this dream from reality, he had grown calm and been almost lulled to 
sleep while playing the piano, believing that he was dead himself .•. 
His composition of this evening was indeed full of the drops of rain 
which resounded on the sonorous tiles of the monastery, but they were 
transformed in his imagination and in his music into tears falling from 
heaven into his heart. (in Brown, 1953, pp. 89-91) 
12. Nattiez, 1990, p. 127. 
13. Returning to program music, it is also for example possible that the 
program narrative occurred to the composer after certain sections of the· 
composition had been written. The non-referential nature of music once again 
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